Japan-ROK Revised Fisheries Agreement of 1998 Term Paper by mmm

Japan-ROK Revised Fisheries Agreement of 1998
Looks at the Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) Revised Fisheries Agreements of 1998, especially the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute.
# 147587 | 6,735 words | 19 sources | MLA | 2011 | PH


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Description:

This paper explains the background of the two-year negotiation process relating to the Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) Revised Fisheries Agreements of 1998, especially the agenda-setting, framework, and outcome. Next, the author presents two-level game as applicable to the actual negotiation process in this case.
The paper concludes that Japan's aggressive diplomacy put Korea at a disadvantage, thus making the process least pleasant especially because of the co-incidence of national elections. The paper includes quotations, footnotes and illustrations.

Table of Contents:
Backgrounder
The Evolutionary Process of the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute
Opposing Claims
The Big Question
The Negotiation Process
Pre-negotiation Driven by the New UN Convention on Law of the Sea:
How Japan and Korea Came to the Table
Negotiation Rounds Overview
Details of the Negotiation
1996: The Four-Item Agenda
1997: Things Heat Up
1998: Struggling to Agree
Meetings between Leaders
Main Contracts in the New Fisheries Agreement
Putnam's Two-Level Game Theory
Definition of Theory
Theoretical Model
The International Level: A Sphere of Contending Pressures
Level II Non intersecting Interests: Korea's Domestic Atmosphere versus Japan's
Dokdo Search
Takeshima Search
Conclusion

From the Paper:

"There are some additional points, however, to Putnam's theory. One is that although a smaller domestic win-set may be a source of bargaining power (one can pressure the other that any 'other' agreement will not be ratified domestically), it can also be a real source of problems as it gives less space for concession-making. Players may lose out even on a Pareto efficient solution due to the fact that there is not much room given for creating value for the other through functional alternatives that may come out of concession-making."

Sample of Sources Used:

  • Boukhars, Anouar. A Two-level Game Analysis of the Complexities of Interstate Rivalry in the Maghreb. Colombia International Affairs Online, May 2001, accessed 10 Dec 2008, from <http://www.ciaonet.org/access/boa02/>.
  • Harvard Asia Quarterly. Accessed 10 Dec. 2008, from <http://www.asiaquarterly.com/>.
  • Japan MOFA. January 27, 1998 Japan-Republic of Korea fishing agreement, from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1998/1/127.html#2>.
  • Japan MOFA. February 27, 1998 Japan-Republic of Korea fisheries issue from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1998/2/227.html#3>.
  • Japan MOFA. July 25, 1997 Japan-Republic of Korea Fishery Agreement from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1997/7/725.html#4>.

Cite this Term Paper:

APA Format

Japan-ROK Revised Fisheries Agreement of 1998 (2011, May 15) Retrieved April 04, 2020, from https://www.academon.com/term-paper/japan-rok-revised-fisheries-agreement-of-1998-147587/

MLA Format

"Japan-ROK Revised Fisheries Agreement of 1998" 15 May 2011. Web. 04 April. 2020. <https://www.academon.com/term-paper/japan-rok-revised-fisheries-agreement-of-1998-147587/>

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