Wittgenstein According to Kripke
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This paper examines how, in "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language,",Saul Kripke reconsiders Wittgenstein's writing on rule-following and private language. It discusses Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein in terms of the 'paradox' and the private language argument and looks at what Kripke views as the skeptical problem within philosophical investigations with his proposed skeptical solution. It also distinguishes between what Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's writing is and Wittgenstein's argument itself.
From the Paper:"Kripke attempts to quell foreseeable objections to his sceptical problem by employing a further rule, counting, as an instruction on how to perform addition in new cases. This leads to infinite regress, since any new rule that I employ in giving myself instruction on addition will only result in questions about this new rule itself. It would be impossible to know if my past or present intentions or behaviour correspond with how I learned this new rule, used it in the past, and intend to use it in future instances. A new instructive rule would be needed after that, and this cycle would continue ad infinitum: "Rules for interpreting rules don't get us any further." This problem does not apply to mathematical cases alone. In language, any word I use can be said to have an alternative interpretation or use."
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Wittgenstein According to Kripke (2005, April 19) Retrieved August 18, 2019, from https://www.academon.com/essay/wittgenstein-according-to-kripke-57836/
"Wittgenstein According to Kripke" 19 April 2005. Web. 18 August. 2019. <https://www.academon.com/essay/wittgenstein-according-to-kripke-57836/>