Psychological Theory of Personal Identity Analytical Essay by Nicky

Psychological Theory of Personal Identity
Looks at the psychological theory of personal identity from a philosophical perspective.
# 128913 | 1,185 words | 2 sources | APA | 2010 | US
Published on Aug 17, 2010 in Philosophy (Epistemology) , Psychology (Theory)

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This paper applies the of logic philosopher John Locke to evaluate the psychological theory of personal identity. The only safe assumptions, the author points out, are that psychological continuity is neither necessary nor sufficient to have personal identity and that personal identity must be conceived in terms, which go beyond the linear line of memory in a manner, which transcends both the physical and the psychological factors. The paper concludes that the continuity of personal identity does not exist rather what does exist is the perpetual continuation of the same type of identity that a person possesses.

From the Paper:

"If personal identity is the result of direct memory, it is safe to say that if x is equal to y and y is equal to z, then x is equal to z. On a time axis this is translated into a person who did something at the age of 8 (x), still remembered it at the age of 40 (y), but did not remember it at the age of eighty (z). If, at the age of 80(z) he remembers what he did when he was 40 (y), but he has completely forgotten what he did as a child aged 8 (x), the conclusion is that while y is equal with z, x is not. Obviously, this is absurd and personal identity can not consist of direct memory connections."

Sample of Sources Used:

  • Dabs, Jennifer. "Locke on personal identity". 19 November 2008. <>
  • Korfmacher, Carsten. "Personal Identity". The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 19 November 2008

Cite this Analytical Essay:

APA Format

Psychological Theory of Personal Identity (2010, August 17) Retrieved August 08, 2022, from

MLA Format

"Psychological Theory of Personal Identity" 17 August 2010. Web. 08 August. 2022. <>