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This paper describes the challenges and mistakes that Eisenhower made when he led the desert campaign in North Africa during World War II. First, the paper presents an overview of the desert campaign. Then it describes in detail Eisenhower's weaknesses, particularly his lack of centralized, decisive command over the subordinates in the field. Next, the paper highlights Eisenhower's mishandling of the Battle of Kasserine Pass, which it claims was compounded by his political hesitancy and soft handling of Major General Lloyd Fredendall. Despite this, the paper concludes by citing Eisenhower as a strong leader who learned from his mistakes and was able to strike a balance between humility and decisiveness.
From the Paper:"In the meantime, Eisenhower's mishandling of the Battle of Kasserine Pass was compounded by his political hesitancy. Specifically, his soft handling of Major general Lloyd Fredendall showed an initial unwillingness to confront the perceived political powers at work in the military. Fredendall had initially been recommended by general Marshall, and rather than risk ruffling any feathers Eisenhower gave "suggestions" to Fredendall, who had tunneled he and his men safely into a canyon far behind the front, and who never left his command post. He reminded Fredendall that it was necessary for him to know the terrain in is area--which Fredendall did not--and reminded him that "generals are expendable just as is any other item in any army," but this was the extent of his "action." It would be another month before Fredendall, who had earned the routine mistrust of his subordinates, was quietly reassigned."
Sample of Sources Used:
- Ambrose, Stephen E.. Eisenhower: Soldier and President. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990.
- Newton, Robert A.. "Battle for Kasserine Pass." World War II Magazine, September 2002.
- Perry, Mark. Partners in Command: George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace. New York: Penguin Press, 2007.
- Stoler, Mark. Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and US Strategy in World War II. Raleigh: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
- Zaloga, Steve and Michael Welply. Kasserine Pass 1943: Rommel's Last Victory. New York: Osprey, 2005.
Cite this Analytical Essay:
Eisenhower in Tunisia: Strategies and Politics (2012, March 03) Retrieved October 21, 2020, from https://www.academon.com/analytical-essay/eisenhower-in-tunisia-strategies-and-politics-150536/
"Eisenhower in Tunisia: Strategies and Politics" 03 March 2012. Web. 21 October. 2020. <https://www.academon.com/analytical-essay/eisenhower-in-tunisia-strategies-and-politics-150536/>