Abstract
The space shuttle program from inception has been challenged by trade-offs. Management at NASA is forced to make difficult decisions regarding schedule and budgets, and some of those decisions aren't proper from an engineering perspective. Due to budgetary constraints and a disconnect between management and sound engineering, the nation has experienced two shuttle tragedies: Challenger and Columbia. This paper attempts to explore the tradeoff and conflict between budget and safety.
Outline
Abstract
Bad Beginnings
Challenger
From Challenger to Columbia
Conclusions

From the Paper
"On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded 18 miles from its initial launch point at Kennedy Space Center, a mere 73 seconds into its tenth flight. Seen only by launch cameras, intermittent puffs of black smoke escaped the right solid rocket booster (SRB) from .678 until 2.733 seconds into the flight, stopping only to reemerge as a flame another 56 seconds later, and ultimately leading to the destruction of the orbiter. (NASA, 1986) All eight crew members of the Challenger were lost in the explosion and the eight-mile plummet into the Atlantic Ocean."

Tags:challenger, columbia, commision, feynmann, nasa, rogers

Abstract
In this paper the author looks behind the scenes of the Challenger space shuttle disaster. Although the popular reason for the disaster is known as the technical failure of the O-rings, the author explores the intra-personal and inter-personal processes within the Challenger project which, in his opinion, led to the making of the flawed decision to launch the shuttle. He examines all of the processes of communication, leadership, monitoring and group dynamics which played significant roles in the disaster and looks at the roles of named individuals who, in the author's opinion, contributed to incorrect decisions being made by the launch team. In conclusion, the author blames inter-personal and intra-personal processes, which were flawed and problematic, with no one person able to correct the problems evident as the main cause for the disaster.

From the Paper
"Apart from physical communication problems during the project, there were also communication problems relating to areas in the project's planning stages. For instance, launch commit criteria and limits on booster surface temperatures were not communicated between NASA and Thiokol, primarily because they either did not exist, or were not part of the reporting network (Bell, p.47). In not relaying important information such as launch commit criterion, a process was occurring with individuals at various stages prior to the launch, whereby each person was using the communication and reporting process as the locus of responsibility for information disclosure rather than individually accepting responsibility for deciding whether or not to pass on information which he believed to be of significance."

Tags:resonsibility, communication, engineers, failure, planning

Abstract
On 28 January 1986, the world was shocked by the destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger, and the death of its crew. This paper examines the processes used in deciding to launch the ill-fated mission. It focuses on the flawed culture within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and its associated mismanagement. It analyses how this culture influenced NASA's beliefs, its decision-making process and its performance.
Outline
Background
Engineering
Management Issues
Belief Systems
Conclusion
Bibliography

From the Paper
"President Nixon endorsed the Shuttle during the 1972 election year because it would increase employment. In a crime against the English language, he announced that the vehicle would "revolutionise transportation into near space, by routinising it." He also recognised that it was politically unacceptable not to maintain a manned presence in space. However, the Office of Management and Budget continued to monitor the programme's costs. NASA was forced to make savings in the short term, at the expense of higher operational costs and greater risks. Solid-rocket boosters were chosen because they were less expensive to develop and could be more quickly refurbished than boosters using liquid propellants."

Tags:communication, culture, launch, neurolinguistic, nlp, orbiter, programming, rockwell, rogers, thiokol

Abstract
This paper introduces and analyzes the topic of the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster. Specifically, it analyzes the accident that occurred on the morning of February 1, 2003 and discusses the events that led up to its occurrence. The paper then discusses what NASA learned from the Columbia disaster and the changes that it has implemented as a result.

From the Paper
"In conclusion, NASA learned much from the Columbia disaster, and they have implemented new flight techniques and safety checks that help ensure this type of accident does not happen again. However, the Columbia disaster indicates that communication and decision-making at NASA is sometime suspect, and that continues, even today, even though NASA has developed these new safety checks to help make sure disasters like Columbia do not happen again. While the communication techniques NASA officials use may come into question, ultimately, it is recognized that space travel, although we often take it for granted, is inherently dangerous. Astronauts know that, and so do their families. Every time we send another space shuttle into orbit, we face the possibility of disaster, it is that simple. Still, space travel has largely been safe, and it seems that NASA will continue to promote safe space travel into the future."

Tags:astronauts flight communication STS-107, Cape Canaveral

Abstract
This paper talks about the ways in which the shuttle is designed to overcome basic heat transfer problems during launch, orbit and re-entry. The main points in this paper are the active and passive systems in the TPS and the history of the shuttle design.

From the Paper
"10...9...8...Patiently the Space Shuttle waits on the launch pad...7...6... everything is in place...5...4... all functions are working properly...3... the conditions are comfortable on the coast of Florida, and the temperature is nice and warm...2...1... IGNITION! (Figure #1) The sudden burn of the rockets jolts the humongous craft to life. As streams of flame shoot out its lower portion, the craft begins to inch skyward. In no time its speed has increased, and it begins hurtling through the air towards its mission. While still inside Earth's atmosphere, the airflow over the Shuttle begins to warm the craft s surface, until it becomes white hot. Then, the craft breaks free of the atmosphere's restraints, plunging into the freezing void of outer space. The Space Shuttle must be able to withstand these temperature extremes and still accomplish its mission objectives. After the mission, as the craft returns to Earth, it again encounters tremendously high temperatures as it re-enters Earth's atmosphere. The Shuttle encounters a lot of atmospheric resistance and slows itself down through this phase, then finally glides to a comfortable rest at Edwards Air Force Base in sunny Southern California, where the astronauts and craft must prepare to begin the process all over again. These intense hot and cold extremes drive scientists and design engineers as they work to control the internal temperature of the space shuttle throughout the various phases of its journey. They do this by using many creative systems such as specially designed tiles and radiator systems, to both reflect and radiate heat that would otherwise be dangerous to the craft and crew."

Tags:engineering, fluid, fluids, heat, mechanical, nasa, protective, shuttle, space, systems, thermal, thermodynamics, transfer

Abstract
This paper analyzes Chapters 6 and 7 of the "Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report". Specifically, it discusses the issues that surfaceed about NASA and its organization and answers the question: If you were designing a new organization to change the core processes what would be your priorities for change? It examines how the National Air and Space Agency (NASA) ultimately is a business organization, just like any other, and how it faces the same funding issues, internal power struggles, and management concerns that any other business faces.

From the Paper
"The need for change in the organization is clear, and the priorities need to be established and followed. Clearly, the first priority should be either a general housecleaning in management, or at least a re-evaluation of the current management mission, and how it must contribute to change and safety, rather than deadlines and appearances. The second priority must be communication, because the communication streams are flawed, and it seems some staff are afraid to communicate concerns or problems. It also seems budgetary concerns are also a major issue with NASA. These concerns must be addressed, but they should never come ahead of Shuttle safety, and it seems from the start, they have."

Tags:nasa, communication, mission, challenger

Abstract
As the space shuttle Columbia began its re-entry into Earth's atmosphere on February 1, 2003, it began to break up. While the exact cause of the shuttle break up is still being investigated, there are many theories being considered, many of which have to do with heating tiles under the shuttle. The paper examines the process of an air-shuttle's re-entry into the atmosphere and shows where things could have gone wrong with Columbia.

From the Paper
"In the final stage, the shuttle approaches the upper atmosphere and enters the ionization blackout. In the ionization blackout, hot ionized gases of the atmosphere surround the shuttle. This prevents radio communication with mission control for the about twelve minutes. At this point the shuttle is traveling at 17,000 mph. As the shuttle collides with air molecules, friction is generated which leads to surface temperatures of around 3000 F. The steep angle of re-entry ensures that most of the aerodynamic heating is directed towards the underside of the shuttle where the heat resistant tiles offer the greatest amount of protection. As the atmosphere thickens, the shuttle's thrusters are eventually switched off, at which point the shuttle's aerodynamic flight features kick in, and it can be flown like an airplane."

Tags:ramon, RCS, engines

Abstract
This paper explains the technical aspects and managerial issues of the Challenger disaster. The author states that behavioral issues don't apply, but rather NASA proved to be seriously deficient in their organizational theory.

From the Paper
"In order for the stakeholders in the shuttle program are to be satisfied that a disaster of the Challenger type will never occur again the decision making process that allowed the disaster must be explored. It is fair to state that certain kinds of decisions that stood on their own merit should no longer have credence.

In the broadest possible sense, despite the tremendous accomplishments of the engineers, scientists, and management involved in the shuttle program, the greatest mistake in respect to Challenger was enthusiasm. The groundwork for any project from ditch-digging to landing a rocket on the moon, must be laid with careful, methodical work that allows for no shortcutting..."