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Wittgenstein According to Kripke, 2005.
A review of the book, "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language," by Saul Kripke.
2,041 words (approx. 8.2 pages), 3 sources, APA, $ 64.95
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Abstract
This paper examines how, in "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language,",Saul Kripke reconsiders Wittgenstein's writing on rule-following and private language. It discusses Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein in terms of the 'paradox' and the private language argument and looks at what Kripke views as the skeptical problem within philosophical investigations with his proposed skeptical solution. It also distinguishes between what Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's writing is and Wittgenstein's argument itself.
From the Paper
"Kripke attempts to quell foreseeable objections to his sceptical problem by employing a further rule, counting, as an instruction on how to perform addition in new cases. This leads to infinite regress, since any new rule that I employ in giving myself instruction on addition will only result in questions about this new rule itself. It would be impossible to know if my past or present intentions or behaviour correspond with how I learned this new rule, used it in the past, and intend to use it in future instances. A new instructive rule would be needed after that, and this cycle would continue ad infinitum: "Rules for interpreting rules don't get us any further." This problem does not apply to mathematical cases alone. In language, any word I use can be said to have an alternative interpretation or use."
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Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, 2006.
An analysis of the early and the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, in terms of his philosophy.
1,723 words (approx. 6.9 pages), 10 sources, MLA, $ 55.95
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Abstract
This paper discusses Ludwig Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and how his philosophy can be divided into two very different 'philosophemes', resulting in the differentiation between the early and later Wittgenstein. The paper analyzes the views of the early and the late Wittgenstein. It then examines the bridge that allows access to a unifying interpretation between the two.
Table of Contents:
Philosophical Problems
Early Wittgenstein's Logical Construction of a Philosophical System
Nature of Philosophy as Presented in Tractatus
Nature of Philosophy as Presented in Philosophical Investigations (PI)
Continuity of Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy
Conclusion
From the Paper
" Wittgenstein maintains in all his early and later works that philosophy is an activity of clarifying propositions and preventing us from being led astray by the misleading appearances of ordinary language. The difference, however, lies in the method employed to clarify propositions. The earlier method of philosophy was to analyze propositions in order to reveal their hidden logical structure, however the later Wittgenstein, while still maintaining that the task of philosophy is to critique language, states that the method to clarify propositions is to show how they are applied in language games. This later method is concerned with the grammar of language and how language is used, it has nothing to do with criticizing the nature of language."
"It can be concluded that the aim of Wittgenstein's philosophy has always been "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle, to free it from the need to answer many deep questions due to a misunderstanding of the uses of language". (PI, 309)"
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Ludwig Wittgenstein's "Tractatus", 2005.
An examination of the connection between thoughts and language according to Ludwig Wittgenstein's "Tractatus".
1,607 words (approx. 6.4 pages), 4 sources, APA, $ 52.95
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Abstract
This paper examines how Wittgenstein explains the connection between thought and language and investigates the occasions where he claims that thought comes before language and where he seems to contradict this idea. It also looks at Wittgenstein's picture theory of relations, one of the main themes of his "Tractatus" in order to understand how exactly Wittgenstein conceives the relation of thought and language.
Outline
Picture Theory
Contradiction
Expressing Thoughts
Wittgenstein's Beetle
Conclusion
From the Paper
"For a sentence to be totally logical and understandable, there needs to be propositions, names and objects. This suggests to us that everything in a sentence is linked in such a way that it can only describe the circumstances or situation it is describing. Much like the picture theory shows through its structure, what exactly it is. The problem is that sentences cannot be totally unique in that way; there will always be ambiguity, due to the nature of language. While the thought remains in our minds it's meaning can be straight to the point and sharp, but when we transfer it into language to express it, the sharpness becomes lost in translation. "
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Ludwig Wittgenstein, 2006.
An analysis of the life and theories of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
3,720 words (approx. 14.9 pages), 7 sources, MLA, $ 102.95
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Abstract
This paper discusses the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The paper focuses on two writings of Wittgenstein - "Tractatus" and "Philosophical Investigations". The paper discusses Wittgenstein's theory that most paradoxes can be solved by focusing on words, their origins and the role that they play in life. It discusses his theory that the greatest paradox is that philosophy, which is supposed to help people understand life, makes it doubly confusing.
From the Paper
"After 1929 Wittgenstein completely avoided theorizing. The task of philosophy, as he begins to see it, is never to explain but only to describe. Since Western philosophy has mainly been conceived as a search for explanations at a very high level of generality, his work stands to one side of this convention. Thus, the biggest paradox of them all: There are no answers to philosophical questions since there are not really any such questions--just pseudoproblems that pretend to be questions."
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Wittgenstein and Derrida, 2002.
Examines how both philosophers, Wittgenstein and Derrida, view language and literature.
2,900 words (approx. 11.6 pages), 6 sources, $ 106.95
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Abstract
While Wittgenstein crafts a method of thinking, Derrida constructs the linguistic structure of philosophy within literature. In his view, philosophy exists solely within language and the language of the pen is the primary form. Language, then, for both philosophers, is the sole arbiter of philosophy. Without language, there can be no salient thought. Language and thought combine to create a form, but not a substance. Wittgenstein worked within the form; Derrida worked to provide the substance. On discourse in thought and the use of language, Wittgenstein and Derrida differed at least slightly.
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Descartes and Wittgenstein, 2005.
Examines relativism in language games through the philosophy of Renee Descartes and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
1,125 words (approx. 4.5 pages), 3 sources, $ 44.95
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In this paper, it is shown that the ever-changing cycle of language over a variety of cultures present relativism as the main argument for language games in the work of Wittgenstein and Descartes. Invariably both philosophers agree on relativism as a basis for understanding language, but differ greatly on how to perceive meaning. The paper shows that although Descartes presents reasoning as the key aspect of language that imparts greater status to human beings, he cannot provide any real hard evidence to decry the ostensive nature of words that Wittgenstein imparts on language.
From the Paper
"This philosophical study will examine the relativism that resides in language games that are discusses in the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Renee Descartes. By analyzing the various elements of Wittgenstein's "ostensive' relativistic approach to word meaning in language, one can realize how this compares to Descartes' relativism in declining real meaning at all in language games. In essence, one can compare and contrast the relativism associated with language games within the philosophical concepts brought forth by these philosophers. Ludwig Wittgenstein evaluates language through the concept of "ostensive" approaches to language. This form of relativism defines language as a meaning that is defined by a certain culture or belief, which cannot truly verify meaning through societal and ethnic bias."
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Wittgenstein?s Foundationalism, 2004.
An exploration of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on scepticism in "On Certainty".
2,254 words (approx. 9.0 pages), 6 sources, MLA, $ 69.95
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This paper explores Ludwig Wittgenstein's foundationalist approach to mainstream scepticism. It examines how it appears that one may, at first glance, equate his response with that of Moore (for example); the very person whose position he wishes to dismiss, however, this paper unearths from within Wittgenstein's last major work, "On Certainty', an altogether innovative an ingenious approach to scepticism.
From the Paper
"What therefore are the implications of Wittgenstein?s critique of Moore?s claim to knowledge? To answer this question it may be worth referring once more to the primary excerpts (?151), i.e. ?regarding it [e.g. ?here is a hand?] as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry.? Now, to his credit, Moore recognised the fundamental importance of such assertions, but what he failed to identify were the special roles that these ?truisms? play within our whole system of knowledge, or the part they play in our whole ?method of doubt and enquiry?. Indeed, according to Wittgenstein, fundamental claims such as ?my name is C.P.? ?there is a tree? or ?here is a hand?, are the ?hinges? upon which our arguments turn (?655), ?if I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put? (?343)."
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Wittgenstein's Views on the Mind, 2005.
An analysis of the works of Wittgenstein and the question of whether machines can think.
1,125 words (approx. 4.5 pages), 4 sources, $ 44.95
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The paper discusses how the central problem under investigation in The Cambridge Quintet is whether it is possible that a machine can think. The paper further discusses how the exploration of the issue is primarily between Wittgenstein and Turing, who each maintain opposing views. The paper explains that whereas Turing relied on mathematics and computing logic Wittgenstein progressed from the philosophy of mathematics to the belief that philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings of the logic of language.
From the Paper
"The central problem under investigation in The Cambridge Quintet is whether it is possible that a machine can think. The exploration of the issue is primarily between Wittgenstein and Turing who each maintain opposing views. Whereas Turing relied on mathematics and computing logic, Wittgenstein progressed from the philosophy of mathematics to the belief that philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings of the logic of language. Philosophy of language poses questions about meaning and truth, as well as about the nature of concepts, signs, and symbols. The dinner itself comprises an analogy between gastronomic and intellectual consumption, and is also intended as a link between two mental representations."
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The Tractarian Wittgenstein, 2008.
A analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein's views.
1,599 words (approx. 6.4 pages), 1 source, MLA, $ 52.95
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This paper discusses and analyzes Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy regarding the difference between saying and showing in the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". The author explains that although the exact definition of a tractarian object is rather vague it is important for us to understand.
From the Paper
"Wittgenstein begins the Tractatus by establishing the world as "all that is the case," determined by its existence as all the facts which are the case. The 'logical space,' which consists of both that which is the case and that which is possible, is subsequently posited as the foundation from which the relationship of picture theory is explicated. A 'state of affairs' is a combination of elementary tractarian objects that are possible 'constituents' of the 'fact' as 'what is the case'. This ontological definition of the world as 'facts' which are composed of objects that relate to one another serves to illustrate the distinctions that will create the correspondence necessary between the world and our linguistic pictures of it. The exact definition of a tractarian object is vague at best, but should be understood as the most basic, elementary aspect of things to which we may refer. Objects are contained within the structural arrangement of relationships in the form of 'facts' as actual and possible dictate. These remarks are utilized to show the manner in which a picture represents that which it pictures; elements of structure, form and content stand as the criteria by which the correspondence is enacted. The simple parts of the picture are the things or objects it depicts. "In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects." These elements are arranged "in a determinate way" with relation to one another. Pictures are not only composed of elements, but depict a specific determination of those elements' relationship to one another, which he declares is a 'fact'. This demonstrates that a picture has both a structure and a content which relates to that which it depicts: it reflects the manner in which particular things are related to one another by relating the pictorial elements that represent those particular things. Wittgenstein continues, "[l]et us call this connexion[sic] of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture". If the structure of a picture is the relationship between its elements, the possible structures constitute the form: "form is the possibility of structure". This possibility is a representational possibility in all the manifold arrangements of the elements of that picture. Thus, Wittgenstein uses 'pictorial form' to describe the way the form of a picture is all the possibilities of connecting the elements contained therein, through structures that represent the possible ways the things that the elements stand for can be arranged. "Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture." A picture, therefore, shows a particular possible state of affairs by enacting one specific way of structurally connecting the elements. The pictorial form is exactly that which it has in common with reality, correctly or incorrectly. Therefore, the form is the limit of the possible ways of combining objects in relationships, limited as that which it represents."
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Ludwig Wittgenstein, 2002.
A look at Ludwig Wittgenstein as a philosopher of the era of the world wars through a review of two of his texts, "Tractacus Logico-Philosophicus" and "On Certainty".
3,150 words (approx. 12.6 pages), 3 sources, $ 115.95
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Abstract
This paper is a detailed analysis of two texts by Ludwig Wittgenstein. "Tractacus Logico-Philosophicus" and "On Certainty" are each discussed in relation to particular biographical information that relates to the content of the books and the changing philosophical ideas that are represented in these writings.
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Language Games, 2002.
Discusses Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of sensation.
1,575 words (approx. 6.3 pages), 6 sources, $ 55.95
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Discusses Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of sensation. Linkage of the sensations (art, aesthetics, religion) as individual sensations linked by language. Idea that language is unexact means of describing the senses. Language games as semantics. The language of aesthetics. Wittgenstein's exercises. Wittgenstein's theories and changing concept of language games. Notion of human culture.
From the Paper
"LANGUAGE GAMES
INTRODUCTION AND THESIS:
Wittgenstein separates the idea of a sensation with that of a word to describe it. How often, for example, have we heard someone say "I feel; your pain!" which, as Wittgenstein would be prompt to point out, is impossible. The sensations, art, aesthetics, and religion are individual sensations, with a communal linkage called "language". But, compared to one's sensations, language is the most inexact means of describing what one feels or senses.
People, as Wittgenstein theorizes, "cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour, for I cannot be said to learn of them-I have them" (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 89). On the other hand, this sort of "investigation" of sensations makes Wittgenstein ask whether "..."
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The Philosophy of Psychology, 2005.
This paper examines Wittgenstein's ideas of psychology as a poor substitute for the philosophy of knowledge or mind.
2,025 words (approx. 8.1 pages), 2 sources, $ 80.95
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This analytical philosophy paper addresses Wittgenstein's method in relation to the debates with Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell early in his career. The paper addresses the focal point of the provided question on why Wittgenstein would reject psychology as closer to the natural sciences than philosophy. The paper also discusses the position of psychology within philosophy of knowledge; the relational and inductive method, as opposed to the reduction of today that, the paper maintains, Wittgenstein probably would not tolerate.
From the Paper
"For Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), the theory of knowledge would serve as the philosophy of psychology, avoiding altogether psychology's claims of belonging to the natural sciences. Much has to do with Wittgenstein's perception of the human mind and reality, in producing his argument in Tractacus. This paper examines why Wittgenstein would see psychology as a poor substitute for the philosophy of knowledge or the philosophy of mind, as driven by methodological and conceptual factors."
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"The Cambridge Quintet", 2007.
A review of John Casti's work "The Cambridge Quintet: A Work of Scientific Speculation" and Ludwig Wittgenstein's arguments.
1,338 words (approx. 5.4 pages), 1 source, MLA, $ 44.95
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This paper reviews John Casti's work "The Cambridge Quintet: A Work of Scientific Speculation". It describes Casti's clear bias towards Alan Turing's views and suggests that he did not give Ludwig Wittgenstein the opportunity to argue as strongly as he might. The paper then suggests what Wittgenstein could have been allowed to say in order to strengthen his position.
From the Paper
"While on the surface the reader's immediate inclination may be to agree in spirit with Wittgenstein, his reliance on such metaphorical terms within the construct of human language is a disingenuous and vacuous platform. The terms he employs that refer to emotion are terms that humans themselves often have difficulty agreeing on both in context and in substance. Upon further reflection the rational reader realizes that a machine, just as any human does, can be taught the textbook definition of these terms which forms the foundation of their use. Yet, beyond such topical conceptions, both humans and machines are likely to vary greatly in both degree and application of how these emotions are conceived and used. In that way, machine logic would be no different than typical human communication patterns in conveying meaning."
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Language Picturing Reality, 2005.
Examines philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea that language does not picture reality and that the ?I? does not refer to a thing.
2,144 words (approx. 8.6 pages), 5 sources, MLA, $ 67.95
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Abstract
This paper discusses the theory by Ludwig Wittgenstein that shows that the ?private language argument? does not make sense because concepts do not name ?internal? sensations. In addition, concepts do not name mental states, and those mental states do not reside in the mind. Consequently, the cognitivism versus behaviorism debate should not even arise. Furthermore, the paper shows how Wittgenstein argues that the ?I? does not refer to a thing, so private thoughts and experiences do not inhabit a self. Language does not picture reality, and meaning does not reside in the mind.
From the Paper
"Throughout the history of philosophy, since Descartes, the mind was considered to be independent from reality and corresponded to this reality by way of mental concepts or language. So concepts and language referred to reality, and that language was in the mind. If the concepts corresponded with reality, then that language was meaningful. If there was a failure of concepts to cohere with reality, then there was a lack of meaning. As a result, since the mind produced concepts, meaning was also something in the mind."
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Measuring Thought and Consciousness, 2002.
Discusses philosopher, WIttgenstein's theories on mind and consciousness.
900 words (approx. 3.6 pages), 5 sources, $ 35.95
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Abstract
In the hands of philosopher Daniel Dennett, every aspect of human thought, from complex decision-making right through to the sense of self, receives a computational interpretation. Thought and consciousness, then, is indeed a reality and a tangible one at that. Wittgenstein set out in particular to undermine those seductive theories about mind and consciousness that philosophers since Descartes have puzzled and battled over. Unfortunately, many scientists have not appreciated Wittgenstein's work.
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