| Papers [1-15] of 100 :: [Page 1 of 7] | | Go to page : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 —> | Search results on "NASA CHALLENGER DISASTER": |
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The NASA Challenger Disaster.
This paper discusses the problems and organizational dysfunction that contributed to the NASA Challenger Disaster.
1,710 words (approx. 6.8 pages), 4 sources, APA, $ 55.95
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Abstract
This paper explains that organizational behavior focuses on the study of behavior within the organizational construct, concentrating on how an individual, group, and structure affect the behavior within the organization. The author points outs that learning from the Challenger Disaster required the NASA organization to look carefully at (1) forces contributing to the flawed decision, (2) reasons for the decisions and behavior that contributed to them, and (3) organizational shortcomings that affected the outcome. The paper stresses that communication can lead to misunderstanding, but so does lack of action; people within the chain of command at NASA did not act upon information that may have changed the outcome.
Table of Contents
Introduction
The NASA Challenger Disaster
Recommendations
Conclusion
From the Paper
"In exploring the history behind the Challenger disaster, one discovers, as the Presidential Commission did, that information threatened the "can-do" ideology of the space agency was routinely suppressed by managers at the agency's Marshall Space Flight Center. When Thiokol's engineers raised their concerns a full six months before the disaster, the information they provided was distorted as it made its way up the organizational chain of command, primarily to suit the career interests of Center managers eager to please NASA headquarters. Bosses were told what they wanted to hear and not what they needed to know. Ultimately, Thiokol's engineers were told, in effect, to "sit down and shut up" the night before the launch because the final decision would be made by management."
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The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster., 2002.
This paper discusses the causes of the space shuttle Challenger disaster.
1,900 words (approx. 7.6 pages), 6 sources, $ 71.95
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Abstract
This paper explains the technical aspects and managerial issues of the Challenger disaster. The author states that behavioral issues don't apply, but rather NASA proved to be seriously deficient in their organizational theory.
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Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster, 2004.
Examination of the events leading up to the Challenger disaster and lessons that were learned following it.
1,624 words (approx. 6.5 pages), 4 sources, APA, $ 52.95
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Abstract
The Challenger Space Shuttle exploded 73 seconds after take-off from the Kennedy Space Center on January 28, 1986, killing all 7 crew members on board. The accident threw the U.S. space program into turmoil as NASA grounded its remaining space shuttles over the next two years for redesigning of their safety features and implementing stricter quality control. This paper describes the Challenger disaster, discusses why the accident occurred, whether it could have been prevented, and who was to blame. It also discusses the dangers of space travel even in the 21st century.
From the Paper
"NASA launched the re-usable Space Shuttle program in the late 1960s. The Space Shuttle was initially part of a plan to ferry astronauts and cargo to and from an Earth-orbiting space station. Later on, lack of funding forced NASA to drop the plan for the ?space station? and it revised the shuttle?s function as a ?space truck? that could deploy and retrieve satellites and carry out scientific experiments in space. Each Space Shuttle was designed to perform about 100 missions with only minor maintenance. Their re-usability, in contrast, to the ?throwaway? spacecrafts used earlier was purported as a major cost-cutting feature. However, space shuttles proved very expensive to develop and NASA had to make more frequent launches to offset the costs. In one year alone (1986--the year of the Challenger disaster) 24 shuttle missions were planned. (Chaikan, 2003)"
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NASA Disasters and Policy, 2005.
A discussion about how NASA space disasters have been a result of flawed decision-making policies.
1,192 words (approx. 4.8 pages), 4 sources, MLA, $ 40.95
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Abstract
This paper discusses how, in order to keep the shuttle program an effective vehicle for space exploration, safety of the astronauts must always be the first concern. It explains how deadlines must always be flexible and based on the ability of NASA to make a launch that is as safe as possible. It also discusses how final votes on decisions must be made anonymously to eliminate the influence of group pressure for a goal inappropriate for such a risky endeavor.
From the Paper
"The Rodgers Commission, in addition to making numerous suggestions about how to improve the structure of shuttles and ways to increase safety for the astronauts, noted the management decisions that contributed so significantly to the disaster. They particularly noted that decision makers were under considerable pressure to maintain ambitious flight schedules (Harwood, 1986). This pressure stemmed from both political and economic forces. NASA will have to decide whether its goals are one of scientific inquiry or of making money through space exploration. When it is recognized that these two goals are incompatible, they will have to be prioritized. Given the inherently danger to space exploration, it will be clear that safety, based on the best science available, will have to be the overriding concern. In decision meetings, the structural dynamic must support real inquiry, not simply support a predetermined and preferred outcome."
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The "Challenger" Launch Decision, 2004.
This paper evaluates, by reviewing individual journal articles, the correctness of Joe Kilminster?s decision to launch the ?Challenger? space ship on its mission, which ended in disaster.
2,745 words (approx. 11.0 pages), 6 sources, APA, $ 82.95
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Abstract
This paper explains that NASA managers were informed, adequately and promptly, about the unsuitability of the approved design of shuttle rocket boosters when used under temperatures below 40 F per the contract signed with Morton-Thiokol; but NASA authorities were subject to severe economic and political pressures and schedule backlogs. The author states that, instead of upholding his superior?s decision, his fellow professionals? technical findings and recommendations, and observing his profession?s code of ethics, Joe Kilminster subjected himself to the pressure of NASA and recommended the launch, despite the negative input of his engineers. The paper concludes that Kilminster is morally accountable and culpable for the disaster, directly risking the lives of seven persons by ignoring his own knowledge as an expert engineer and the strong recommendations of his subordinate professionals
Table of Contents
Introduction
Review of Literature
M. M. Jennings, ?Summary of the Challenger Episode?
Gordon Stubley, ?Engineer and Integrity?
Diane Vaughan, ?The Challenger Launch Decision?
National Society of Professional Engineers, ?Code of Ethics for Engineers?
Texas A & M University, Departments of Philosophy and of Mechanical Engineering, ?The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster?
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
From the Paper
"Joe Kilminster, an engineer, and the Vice President or Space Booster Programs at Thiokol, was one of four management signatories who approved the launch and the author of the written recommendation that it was all right for the shuttle to fly. Thiokol?s contract with the NASA provided that shuttles with boosters, like the Challenger, would function properly only within the range of 40 to 90 F. Its engineers also formalized their objection to such launch the day before the disaster."
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The Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster, 2008.
An analysis of the events that led up to the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster and the changes that NASA has implemented to prevent a similar disaster from occurring.
1,431 words (approx. 5.7 pages), 4 sources, APA, $ 47.95
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Abstract
This paper introduces and analyzes the topic of the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster. Specifically, it analyzes the accident that occurred on the morning of February 1, 2003 and discusses the events that led up to its occurrence. The paper then discusses what NASA learned from the Columbia disaster and the changes that it has implemented as a result.
From the Paper
"In conclusion, NASA learned much from the Columbia disaster, and they have implemented new flight techniques and safety checks that help ensure this type of accident does not happen again. However, the Columbia disaster indicates that communication and decision-making at NASA is sometime suspect, and that continues, even today, even though NASA has developed these new safety checks to help make sure disasters like Columbia do not happen again. While the communication techniques NASA officials use may come into question, ultimately, it is recognized that space travel, although we often take it for granted, is inherently dangerous. Astronauts know that, and so do their families. Every time we send another space shuttle into orbit, we face the possibility of disaster, it is that simple. Still, space travel has largely been safe, and it seems that NASA will continue to promote safe space travel into the future."
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Challenger Case Study: Lessons Learned, 2003.
An overview and analysis of NASA's work culture and the lessons learned from the space shuttle Challenger catastrophe.
1,307 words (approx. 5.2 pages), 4 sources, APA, $ 44.95
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Abstract
This paper discusses how, like most tragic or unusual events in history, the 1986 NASA Challenger explosion offers a hindsight perspective of what ?went wrong? and what ?should have been done? to prevent the loss of lives.
From the Paper
"The United States? government, NASA officials, airspace scientists, engineers, educators, public interest groups, and the media alike, immediately jumped on the band wagon to explain the events that led up to the tragedy. President Reagan initiated an independent commission to investigate all of the parties involved, while NASA, the media, and the scientific community pointed fingers, called names, and ?explained away? with great political finesse the behavior and choices that ultimately led to explosion. Very much like the Salem Witch Hunt Trials, people were questioned and re-questioned concerning their thoughts and actions. Reporters, academicians, social scientists, culturalists, authors, and even, folk song writers, seized the moment to ?glean and explain? the events and the ?lessons learned.? The author, Diane Vaughan, is one of many, who attempted to offer, for a nominal fee of $20+ tax per copy, a ?cultural-contextual? explanation of people?s thoughts and behavior before and after the explosion. Based on the reading of Dr. Vaughan?s book as well as a review of other articles and reports, below is an outline of some of the ?lessons learned? from the Challenger accident."
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The Destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger, 2003.
A look at technical aspects of the failure of the Space Shuttle Challenger and the organisation and culture within NASA.
7,743 words (approx. 31.0 pages), 10 sources, MLA, $ 168.95
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Abstract
On 28 January 1986, the world was shocked by the destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger, and the death of its crew. This paper examines the processes used in deciding to launch the ill-fated mission. It focuses on the flawed culture within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and its associated mismanagement. It analyses how this culture influenced NASA's beliefs, its decision-making process and its performance.
Outline
Background
Engineering
Management Issues
Belief Systems
Conclusion
Bibliography
From the Paper
"President Nixon endorsed the Shuttle during the 1972 election year because it would increase employment. In a crime against the English language, he announced that the vehicle would "revolutionise transportation into near space, by routinising it." He also recognised that it was politically unacceptable not to maintain a manned presence in space. However, the Office of Management and Budget continued to monitor the programme's costs. NASA was forced to make savings in the short term, at the expense of higher operational costs and greater risks. Solid-rocket boosters were chosen because they were less expensive to develop and could be more quickly refurbished than boosters using liquid propellants."
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The Buffalo Creek Disaster, 2004.
An in-depth overview of the 1972 Buffalo Creek disaster which killed over 100 people and the long-term effects on the communities affected.
3,123 words (approx. 12.5 pages), 7 sources, MLA, $ 90.95
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Abstract
On February 26, 1972, the coal waster dam at Buffalo Creek collapsed and flooded Logan County's communities with water, sludge, waste and rubble. More than 125 people were killed, 1000 were injured and 4000 left homeless. This paper focuses on this disaster which was not attributed to mother nature. The Buffalo Creek Disaster of 1972, in many circles within the Appalachian community, was considered to be the fault of a mining company. In contrast, the mining company's upper management claim that the dam breaking was an act of God. From an outside point of view, it is difficult to decide which is correct and this is what continues to create controversy. This paper looks at the disaster from many standpoints. First, this paper describes exactly what happened that fateful morning. It looks at different accounts and descriptions of the event. Second, this paper examines the existing trauma still evident among the disaster's survivors and also explores how this event has affected the coal mining industry from the worker's perspective. Third, this paper looks at the lawsuit that quickly followed as part of the aftermath. Finally, this paper attempts to determine who is to blame. The paper looks at steps that the coal-mining executives have taken to improve dam technology and other business practices that seem to incriminate.
Paper Outline:
Introduction
The Disaster
Survivors' Trauma and Long Term Affects
The Lawsuit
Who is to Blame?
Conclusion
Works Cited
From the Paper
"The people of Buffalo Creek would like to see someone accountable for the disaster. Even before the collapse, many citizens had gone to Pittston to complain and display their concern over the dam's safety. Giardina writes, "residents of Buffalo Creek had repeatedly complained to the company that dam was unsafe but had received no response" (2). This would later become an issue as the settlement was being decided based on three out of five manifestations of survivor syndrome. The three being: death imprint, death guilt and psychic numbing."
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Environmental Perception and Post-Disaster Impact, 2002.
Argues that natural disasters impact society and community differently than do manmade disasters and that this distinction is important to the recovery of communities that have experienced a disasterous event.
1,650 words (approx. 6.6 pages), 5 sources, $ 62.95
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Abstract
Natural disasters include such occurrences as hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, avalanches or earthquakes. Manmade disasters would include such things as airplane crashes, chemical or nuclear accidents and, of course, war. This paper will demonstrate that the distinction between these two types of disasters is significant, as each triggers different reactions in those individuals and communities who experience them. Such post-disaster impact assumes many forms depending upon variables such as locus of control, and degree of exposure to trauma. It will be argued that community planning to deal with post-disaster impact is equally as important as the reconstruction of the physical landscape after disaster.
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Model Disaster Plan for Airport, 2007.
A discussion of an airport disaster plan.
4,454 words (approx. 17.8 pages), 6 sources, MLA, $ 116.95
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Abstract
This paper examines a model disaster plan for a small regional airport. The paper explains why the Federal Aviation Authority is encouraging travelers to use regional airports and discusses how important it is for even small facilities to have practical and working disaster plans. The author points this out in light of the 9/11 terrorist attack. The role of various staff members of the airport is highlighted in the paper. The paper includes an appendix of airport safety procedures.
Outline:
Abstract
Statement of Problem
Disasters Included/Excluded from Consideration
Rationale for Included/Excluded Disasters
Personnel and Their Duties: Authority and Responsibility
Personnel Internal and Response Team
Interfaces to Persons both Internal and External to Your Operation
Response Plan and Procedures
Scenario of Events
Fire/Chemical/ Biohazard Threat or Spill
Weather or Natural Disaster Concerns
Regional Power Failure
Earthquake
Tornado
On-site Medical Emergency
In-Flight Emergencies
Terrorist Activity/Security Violations
Requirements for Response Team Activities
Communication and Documentation
References to Supporting Literature
Appendix 1 (recommendations of pre-flight responsibilities including legal and suggested by Willamette Aviation)
Pilot Responsibilities Checklist/ Violation of which will require review and potential suspension of flight privileges:
From the Paper
"Disasters that are likely to occur include natural disasters such as regional, onsite or aircraft fires and or collisions, power failure, individual medical emergencies (including one or more people) floods, earthquakes, heavy winds and biochemical and or chemical hazards, such as spills are included as well as those that must be accounted for but are less likely to occur such as hijacking, terrorist attack and or infiltration or intentional biochemical or chemical attacks either originating at this airport or as an attack on it."
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Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, 2008.
This paper describes the role of disaster medical assistance teams (DMAT).
2,341 words (approx. 9.4 pages), 5 sources, MLA, $ 72.95
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Abstract
The paper relates that disaster medical assistance teams are invaluable in providing medical assistance at the sites of various types of disaster. The paper focuses on the South Florida disaster medical assistance team, South FL DMAT-5, that is particularly successful in disaster response.
Outline:
Introduction
South FL DMAT-5
Hurricane Charley
Preparation
Duties of the DMAT
Hurricane Katrina
Conclusions
From the Paper
"Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) are defined as 'a group of professional and paraprofessional medical personnel designed to provide emergency medical care during a disaster or other event' (McEntire 156). They are utilized when a disaster or other event results in local medical professionals being overwhelmed by the situation. The system was set up by the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) in 1985 as a result of a meeting between local and state experts. There are currently 80 DMATs in the NDMS, with more than 7,000 medical and support personnel taking part."
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The Challenger Disaster, 2006.
An exploration behind the scenes of the Challenger space shuttle disaster.
2,235 words (approx. 8.9 pages), 6 sources, MLA, $ 69.95
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Abstract
In this paper the author looks behind the scenes of the Challenger space shuttle disaster. Although the popular reason for the disaster is known as the technical failure of the O-rings, the author explores the intra-personal and inter-personal processes within the Challenger project which, in his opinion, led to the making of the flawed decision to launch the shuttle. He examines all of the processes of communication, leadership, monitoring and group dynamics which played significant roles in the disaster and looks at the roles of named individuals who, in the author's opinion, contributed to incorrect decisions being made by the launch team. In conclusion, the author blames inter-personal and intra-personal processes, which were flawed and problematic, with no one person able to correct the problems evident as the main cause for the disaster.
From the Paper
"Apart from physical communication problems during the project, there were also communication problems relating to areas in the project's planning stages. For instance, launch commit criteria and limits on booster surface temperatures were not communicated between NASA and Thiokol, primarily because they either did not exist, or were not part of the reporting network (Bell, p.47). In not relaying important information such as launch commit criterion, a process was occurring with individuals at various stages prior to the launch, whereby each person was using the communication and reporting process as the locus of responsibility for information disclosure rather than individually accepting responsibility for deciding whether or not to pass on information which he believed to be of significance."
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Disaster Management and Volcanoes, 2007.
A discussion of disaster management in the event of volcanic activity.
979 words (approx. 3.9 pages), 3 sources, APA, $ 34.95
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Abstract
This paper explores both past and current methods of disaster management when volcanic activity occurs. The paper focuses on monitoring and detection as approaches to handling potentially disastrous situations. Various methods of detection are explained, such as seismic monitoring. The author concludes that new methods offer hope for better predictions of volcanic activity, yet more must be done for disaster preparation. This is imperative in order to better predict volcanic events and save the lives of those who witness such a natural disaster.
From the Paper
"Seismic monitoring is one of the most common ways to keep track of volcanic activity (Choi, 2004; Mileti, 1999). Seismometers monitor earth movement, including the earthquakes and tremors that sometimes indicate volcanic activity like underground magma movement (Choi, 2004). Though seismic activity is often linked to volcanic events successfully, not all seismic events indicate a coming eruption (Kerr, 2003). For this reason, seismometer readings do not always provide accurate predictions (Choi, 2004)."
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