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The Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster, 2001.
Looks at the problems and failures in the decision making process that led to the led to the Challenger space shuttle disaster.
1,800 words (approx. 7.2 pages), 0 sources, $ 63.95
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From the Paper
"In order for the stakeholders in the shuttle program are to be satisfied that a disaster of the Challenger type will never occur again the decision making process that allowed the disaster must be explored. It is fair to state that certain kinds of decisions that stood on their own merit should no longer have credence.
In the broadest possible sense, despite the tremendous accomplishments of the engineers, scientists, and management involved in the shuttle program, the greatest mistake in respect to Challenger was enthusiasm. The groundwork for any project from ditch-digging to landing a rocket on the moon, must be laid with careful, methodical work that allows for no shortcutting..."
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Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster, 2004.
Examination of the events leading up to the Challenger disaster and lessons that were learned following it.
1,624 words (approx. 6.5 pages), 4 sources, APA, $ 52.95
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Abstract
The Challenger Space Shuttle exploded 73 seconds after take-off from the Kennedy Space Center on January 28, 1986, killing all 7 crew members on board. The accident threw the U.S. space program into turmoil as NASA grounded its remaining space shuttles over the next two years for redesigning of their safety features and implementing stricter quality control. This paper describes the Challenger disaster, discusses why the accident occurred, whether it could have been prevented, and who was to blame. It also discusses the dangers of space travel even in the 21st century.
From the Paper
"NASA launched the re-usable Space Shuttle program in the late 1960s. The Space Shuttle was initially part of a plan to ferry astronauts and cargo to and from an Earth-orbiting space station. Later on, lack of funding forced NASA to drop the plan for the "space station" and it revised the shuttle's function as a "space truck" that could deploy and retrieve satellites and carry out scientific experiments in space. Each Space Shuttle was designed to perform about 100 missions with only minor maintenance. Their re-usability, in contrast, to the "throwaway" spacecrafts used earlier was purported as a major cost-cutting feature. However, space shuttles proved very expensive to develop and NASA had to make more frequent launches to offset the costs. In one year alone (1986--the year of the Challenger disaster) 24 shuttle missions were planned. (Chaikan, 2003)"
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The Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster, 2004.
A review of the "Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report" on the space shuttle disaster.
1,216 words (approx. 4.9 pages), 1 source, MLA, $ 41.95
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Abstract
This paper analyzes Chapters 6 and 7 of the "Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report". Specifically, it discusses the issues that surfaceed about NASA and its organization and answers the question: If you were designing a new organization to change the core processes what would be your priorities for change? It examines how the National Air and Space Agency (NASA) ultimately is a business organization, just like any other, and how it faces the same funding issues, internal power struggles, and management concerns that any other business faces.
From the Paper
"The need for change in the organization is clear, and the priorities need to be established and followed. Clearly, the first priority should be either a general housecleaning in management, or at least a re-evaluation of the current management mission, and how it must contribute to change and safety, rather than deadlines and appearances. The second priority must be communication, because the communication streams are flawed, and it seems some staff are afraid to communicate concerns or problems. It also seems budgetary concerns are also a major issue with NASA. These concerns must be addressed, but they should never come ahead of Shuttle safety, and it seems from the start, they have."
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The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster., 2002.
This paper discusses the causes of the space shuttle Challenger disaster.
1,900 words (approx. 7.6 pages), 6 sources, $ 71.95
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Abstract
This paper explains the technical aspects and managerial issues of the Challenger disaster. The author states that behavioral issues don't apply, but rather NASA proved to be seriously deficient in their organizational theory.
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The Destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger, 2003.
A look at technical aspects of the failure of the Space Shuttle Challenger and the organisation and culture within NASA.
7,743 words (approx. 31.0 pages), 10 sources, MLA, $ 168.95
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Abstract
On 28 January 1986, the world was shocked by the destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger, and the death of its crew. This paper examines the processes used in deciding to launch the ill-fated mission. It focuses on the flawed culture within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and its associated mismanagement. It analyses how this culture influenced NASA's beliefs, its decision-making process and its performance.
Outline
Background
Engineering
Management Issues
Belief Systems
Conclusion
Bibliography
From the Paper
"President Nixon endorsed the Shuttle during the 1972 election year because it would increase employment. In a crime against the English language, he announced that the vehicle would "revolutionise transportation into near space, by routinising it." He also recognised that it was politically unacceptable not to maintain a manned presence in space. However, the Office of Management and Budget continued to monitor the programme's costs. NASA was forced to make savings in the short term, at the expense of higher operational costs and greater risks. Solid-rocket boosters were chosen because they were less expensive to develop and could be more quickly refurbished than boosters using liquid propellants."
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Heat Transfer and the Space Shuttle, 2002.
This paper was written to explain the Thermal Protective Systems (TPS) of the space shuttle to a non-scientific audience.
3,270 words (approx. 13.1 pages), 12 sources, MLA, $ 93.95
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Abstract
This paper talks about the ways in which the shuttle is designed to overcome basic heat transfer problems during launch, orbit and re-entry. The main points in this paper are the active and passive systems in the TPS and the history of the shuttle design.
From the Paper
"10...9...8...Patiently the Space Shuttle waits on the launch pad...7...6... everything is in place...5...4... all functions are working properly...3... the conditions are comfortable on the coast of Florida, and the temperature is nice and warm...2...1... IGNITION! (Figure #1) The sudden burn of the rockets jolts the humongous craft to life. As streams of flame shoot out its lower portion, the craft begins to inch skyward. In no time its speed has increased, and it begins hurtling through the air towards its mission. While still inside Earth's atmosphere, the airflow over the Shuttle begins to warm the craft's surface, until it becomes "white hot." Then, the craft breaks free of the atmosphere's restraints, plunging into the freezing void of outer space. The Space Shuttle must be able to withstand these temperature extremes and still accomplish its mission objectives. After the mission, as the craft returns to Earth, it again encounters tremendously high temperatures as it re-enters Earth's atmosphere. The Shuttle encounters a lot of atmospheric resistance and slows itself down through this phase, then finally glides to a comfortable rest at Edwards Air Force Base in sunny Southern California, where the astronauts and craft must prepare to begin the process all over again. These intense hot and cold extremes drive scientists and design engineers as they work to control the internal temperature of the space shuttle throughout the various phases of its journey. They do this by using many creative systems such as specially designed tiles and radiator systems, to both reflect and radiate heat that would otherwise be dangerous to the craft and crew."
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Space Shuttle - Unsafe at Any Cost?, 2005.
An exploration of how policy and budgetary considerations have influenced shuttle safety.
2,911 words (approx. 11.6 pages), 15 sources, MLA, $ 86.95
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Abstract
The space shuttle program from inception has been challenged by trade-offs. Management at NASA is forced to make difficult decisions regarding schedule and budgets, and some of those decisions aren't proper from an engineering perspective. Due to budgetary constraints and a disconnect between management and sound engineering, the nation has experienced two shuttle tragedies: Challenger and Columbia. This paper attempts to explore the tradeoff and conflict between budget and safety.
Outline
Abstract
Bad Beginnings
Challenger
From Challenger to Columbia
Conclusions
From the Paper
"On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded 18 miles from its initial launch point at Kennedy Space Center, a mere 73 seconds into its tenth flight. Seen only by launch cameras, intermittent puffs of black smoke escaped the right solid rocket booster (SRB) from .678 until 2.733 seconds into the flight, stopping only to reemerge as a flame another 56 seconds later, and ultimately leading to the destruction of the orbiter. (NASA, 1986) All eight crew members of the Challenger were lost in the explosion and the eight-mile plummet into the Atlantic Ocean."
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Heating Problems During Re-entry of Space Shuttles, 2003.
Analysis of space shuttle re-entries, focusing on the problems encountered by the Columbia.
791 words (approx. 3.2 pages), 5 sources, MLA, $ 28.95
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Abstract
As the space shuttle Columbia began its re-entry into Earth's atmosphere on February 1, 2003, it began to break up. While the exact cause of the shuttle break up is still being investigated, there are many theories being considered, many of which have to do with heating tiles under the shuttle. The paper examines the process of an air-shuttle's re-entry into the atmosphere and shows where things could have gone wrong with Columbia.
From the Paper
"In the final stage, the shuttle approaches the upper atmosphere and enters the ionization blackout. In the ionization blackout, hot ionized gases of the atmosphere surround the shuttle. This prevents radio communication with mission control for the about twelve minutes. At this point the shuttle is traveling at 17,000 mph. As the shuttle collides with air molecules, friction is generated which leads to surface temperatures of around 3000 F. The steep angle of re-entry ensures that most of the aerodynamic heating is directed towards the underside of the shuttle where the heat resistant tiles offer the greatest amount of protection. As the atmosphere thickens, the shuttle's thrusters are eventually switched off, at which point the shuttle's aerodynamic flight features kick in, and it can be flown like an airplane."
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The Challenger Disaster, 2006.
An exploration behind the scenes of the Challenger space shuttle disaster.
2,235 words (approx. 8.9 pages), 6 sources, MLA, $ 69.95
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Abstract
In this paper the author looks behind the scenes of the Challenger space shuttle disaster. Although the popular reason for the disaster is known as the technical failure of the O-rings, the author explores the intra-personal and inter-personal processes within the Challenger project which, in his opinion, led to the making of the flawed decision to launch the shuttle. He examines all of the processes of communication, leadership, monitoring and group dynamics which played significant roles in the disaster and looks at the roles of named individuals who, in the author's opinion, contributed to incorrect decisions being made by the launch team. In conclusion, the author blames inter-personal and intra-personal processes, which were flawed and problematic, with no one person able to correct the problems evident as the main cause for the disaster.
From the Paper
"Apart from physical communication problems during the project, there were also communication problems relating to areas in the project's planning stages. For instance, launch commit criteria and limits on booster surface temperatures were not communicated between NASA and Thiokol, primarily because they either did not exist, or were not part of the reporting network (Bell, p.47). In not relaying important information such as launch commit criterion, a process was occurring with individuals at various stages prior to the launch, whereby each person was using the communication and reporting process as the locus of responsibility for information disclosure rather than individually accepting responsibility for deciding whether or not to pass on information which he believed to be of significance."
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The Challenger Disaster, 2004.
This paper discusses the decision-making and ethics involved behind the Challenger disaster.
1,808 words (approx. 7.2 pages), 6 sources, APA, $ 63.95
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Abstract
In this article, the writer discusses why the space shuttle Challenger exploded. The writer maintains that the reasons behind the Challenger disaster include poor decision-making, ethical lapses and communication problems. This paper addresses these issues and makes recommendations.
From the Paper
"Why did the space shuttle Challenger explode? Many people assume it was because of poorly-functioning O rings on the booster rocket. However those O rings didn't send that ship up on a cold winter's morn. People did. When the space shuttle Challenger exploded, speculation about the cause of the disaster was frenzied. The last thing anyone wanted to believe was that the tragedy could be the result of willful human negligence. However, extensive evidence supporting ...."
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The "Challenger" Launch Decision, 2004.
This paper evaluates, by reviewing individual journal articles, the correctness of Joe Kilminster's decision to launch the "Challenger" space ship on its mission, which ended in disaster.
2,745 words (approx. 11.0 pages), 6 sources, APA, $ 82.95
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Abstract
This paper explains that NASA managers were informed, adequately and promptly, about the unsuitability of the approved design of shuttle rocket boosters when used under temperatures below 40 F per the contract signed with Morton-Thiokol; but NASA authorities were subject to severe economic and political pressures and schedule backlogs. The author states that, instead of upholding his superior's decision, his fellow professionals' technical findings and recommendations, and observing his profession's code of ethics, Joe Kilminster subjected himself to the pressure of NASA and recommended the launch, despite the negative input of his engineers. The paper concludes that Kilminster is morally accountable and culpable for the disaster, directly risking the lives of seven persons by ignoring his own knowledge as an expert engineer and the strong recommendations of his subordinate professionals
Table of Contents
Introduction
Review of Literature
M. M. Jennings, "Summary of the Challenger Episode"
Gordon Stubley, "Engineer and Integrity"
Diane Vaughan, "The Challenger Launch Decision"
National Society of Professional Engineers, "Code of Ethics for Engineers"
Texas A & M University, Departments of Philosophy and of Mechanical Engineering, "The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster"
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
From the Paper
"Joe Kilminster, an engineer, and the Vice President or Space Booster Programs at Thiokol, was one of four management signatories who approved the launch and the author of the written recommendation that it was all right for the shuttle to fly. Thiokol's contract with the NASA provided that shuttles with boosters, like the Challenger, would function properly only within the range of 40 to 90 F. Its engineers also formalized their objection to such launch the day before the disaster."
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Trade Spaces in "Trading Spaces", 2002.
A representation of hegemonic masculinity in the popular television series "Trading Spaces".
3,010 words (approx. 12.0 pages), 13 sources, APA, $ 88.95
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Abstract
The textual analysis of the TV series "Trading Spaces" explores the possibility of interchanging gender roles in this home improvement showcase. A strong case is built on the unchanging male hegemony. However, the paper shows that the series does focus, in a particular way, on issues of gender and power, and especially on the supposedly changing nature of masculinity. Provides limitless examples from the show to exemplify gendered television.
From the Paper
"Since its launch in September 2000 as a late-afternoon show, Trading Spaces has regularly scored a 2 or 3 household rating in its universe in prime time, according to Neilson Media Research data, peaking one Saturday evening in April at a 3:2 for an episode featuring the Dixie Chicks. With that all-time household record for TLC, Trading Spaces also beat out all broadcast networks in delivery of adults 18-49 that night (the network regularly ranks in the top 10 of all cable networks in delivery of adults 18-49 and adults 25-54). By the conclusion of its third season, Trading Spaces will have taped 65 new episodes compared to last season's 40, and can be seen in 70 million homes in America, and internationally in Canada, Japan, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines (Foege)."
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Challenger Case Study: Lessons Learned, 2003.
An overview and analysis of NASA's work culture and the lessons learned from the space shuttle Challenger catastrophe.
1,307 words (approx. 5.2 pages), 4 sources, APA, $ 44.95
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Abstract
This paper discusses how, like most tragic or unusual events in history, the 1986 NASA Challenger explosion offers a hindsight perspective of what "went wrong" and what "should have been done" to prevent the loss of lives.
From the Paper
"The United States' government, NASA officials, airspace scientists, engineers, educators, public interest groups, and the media alike, immediately jumped on the band wagon to explain the events that led up to the tragedy. President Reagan initiated an independent commission to investigate all of the parties involved, while NASA, the media, and the scientific community pointed fingers, called names, and "explained away" with great political finesse the behavior and choices that ultimately led to explosion. Very much like the Salem Witch Hunt Trials, people were questioned and re-questioned concerning their thoughts and actions. Reporters, academicians, social scientists, culturalists, authors, and even, folk song writers, seized the moment to "glean and explain" the events and the "lessons learned." The author, Diane Vaughan, is one of many, who attempted to offer, for a nominal fee of $20+ tax per copy, a "cultural-contextual" explanation of people's thoughts and behavior before and after the explosion. Based on the reading of Dr. Vaughan's book as well as a review of other articles and reports, below is an outline of some of the "lessons learned" from the Challenger accident."
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The Shuttle Economy Phenomenon, 2004.
An overview of the growing shuttle trade in Eastern Europe.
2,012 words (approx. 8.0 pages), 6 sources, MLA, $ 63.95
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Abstract
This paper discusses how for thriving capitalist economies with large commercial spaces for retail, the shuttle trade - buying goods abroad on tourist trips to bring back and sell at kiosks or open air markets - seems like an absurd phenomenon. It looks at how for so-called transition economies, shuttling has become a means of survival for workers who cannot find employment and for consumers who cannot afford to buy goods at conventional retail markets. It shows how although the shuttle business has been declining in the last few years, a majority of consumers in Russia and other CIS countries still buy goods at kiosks, open-air markets, informal stores on the ground floors of apartment blocks, or street vendors because prices are much cheaper than in the newer supermarkets.
From the Paper
"The origins and enormous scale of the shuttle trade in "transition" countries can only be understood against the background of the trade environment during the communist period. The exchange and trading system within communist countries was an extension of the state planning system. It was conducted through an annual foreign exchange plan and only a handful of trading agencies were licensed to engage in external trade. The retail trade industry was very small compared to capitalist economies and as a consequence it was inadequately developed to handle the flow of commodities - even in a centrally planned economy."
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The Buffalo Creek Disaster, 2004.
An in-depth overview of the 1972 Buffalo Creek disaster which killed over 100 people and the long-term effects on the communities affected.
3,123 words (approx. 12.5 pages), 7 sources, MLA, $ 90.95
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Abstract
On February 26, 1972, the coal waster dam at Buffalo Creek collapsed and flooded Logan County's communities with water, sludge, waste and rubble. More than 125 people were killed, 1000 were injured and 4000 left homeless. This paper focuses on this disaster which was not attributed to mother nature. The Buffalo Creek Disaster of 1972, in many circles within the Appalachian community, was considered to be the fault of a mining company. In contrast, the mining company's upper management claim that the dam breaking was an act of God. From an outside point of view, it is difficult to decide which is correct and this is what continues to create controversy. This paper looks at the disaster from many standpoints. First, this paper describes exactly what happened that fateful morning. It looks at different accounts and descriptions of the event. Second, this paper examines the existing trauma still evident among the disaster's survivors and also explores how this event has affected the coal mining industry from the worker's perspective. Third, this paper looks at the lawsuit that quickly followed as part of the aftermath. Finally, this paper attempts to determine who is to blame. The paper looks at steps that the coal-mining executives have taken to improve dam technology and other business practices that seem to incriminate.
Paper Outline:
Introduction
The Disaster
Survivors' Trauma and Long Term Affects
The Lawsuit
Who is to Blame?
Conclusion
Works Cited
From the Paper
"The people of Buffalo Creek would like to see someone accountable for the disaster. Even before the collapse, many citizens had gone to Pittston to complain and display their concern over the dam's safety. Giardina writes, "residents of Buffalo Creek had repeatedly complained to the company that dam was unsafe but had received no response" (2). This would later become an issue as the settlement was being decided based on three out of five manifestations of survivor syndrome. The three being: death imprint, death guilt and psychic numbing."
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