Abstract In this essay the issue of interparadigm incommensurability is introduced and discussed in terms of its implications not only within Kuhn's program, but also with regard to possible historical examples. The conclusion drawn is essentially that the idea, while illustrative of theoretical circumstances, is epistemically problematic in the areas of historical analysis.
From the Paper "The problem of incommensurability is central to Thomas Kuhn's paradigm shifts, both in criticism and acceptance of his model. Its definition is inherently difficult because of its reference to the limits upon the idea of definition itself. Shortly, incommensurability refers to the state of breakdown in meaningful communication between the proponents of two competing paradigms. One should note here the requirement of multiple entities; incommensurability cannot take place under a single paradigm. In this sense, Kuhn's normal science can be conceived of as a resolution of incommensurability."
Abstract This paper reviews Galbraith's book, "Great Crash: 1929", and explains the main premise behind the text, which states that market stability and corporate interests will always be fundamentally incommensurate. The paper also explains the purpose behind Galbraith's book, points out the novelty of the book's thesis at the time it was written, and highlights the arguments Galbraith used to support his thesis.
From the Paper "The emotional and biased potentiality within the economic climate that Galbraith highlighted was a relatively novel thesis in its presentation, in the way that it deployed a psychological reading of economic relations between investors, brokers, and the media. However, Galbraith points out that the financial analyst's views of the burst of wealth of the period were not uniformly congratulatory. He cites one article from The New York Times, noting that when temporary breaks in the market's skyrocketing, hysterical upswing, "which preceded the crash" early in 1928, in June, in December, and in February and March of 1929,? and finally when ?the real crash came,? the paper reported the event with jubilation would be an exaggeration. Nevertheless, the paper ?covered it with an unmistakable absence of sorrow.? Galbraith's statements are confirmed, in terms of the New York Times with the article of the period, from October 24, 1929."
Abstract This paper discusses the Cartesian mind-body dilemma by analyzing Descartes' "Meditations on First Philosophy". The paper explains that Cartesian dualism intended to moderate between the established religious paradigm of the time and the emerging natural sciences and by positing mind and body as complete substances which refer to nothing but themselves. The paper also looks at how Descartes' theory of mind preserves the religious conception of man as an immortal soul in possession of free will by placing such outside the realm of the physical sciences. The paper points out that Descartes' "Meditations on First Philosophy" seeks to establish two distinct classes of substances in mind and extension, but fails to adequately address the manner in which these two incommensurable substances interact to generate our experience of the world. The writer suggests that Descartes conceives of the body as a 'kingdom within a kingdom' of mind, and is left with the problem of how these kingdoms are able to carry out diplomatic relations with one another.
From the Paper "The cogito, 'I think therefore I am', delimits mind as the substance of thought, the primary existential of being. This is arrived at by proposing that there could be a malicious demon of some sort that may be propagating a vast illusion of experience, generating even our thoughts. Even in this radical scepticism, however, Descartes concludes that there must be something that this hoax is played upon, and no matter what this demon may be able to do, he can never convince something that it is nothing; "...I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind" . The cogito, therefore, shows mind to be a substance that is necessarily true without reference to any other substance. It is the essence to which all the modes of thought refer."
