Abstract
This paper discusses the life and works of Gottfried Semper who was a nineteenth century German architect. It specifically analyzes the first and second Dresden Hoftheater designs that he created. It discusses Semper's major contributions to architecture, both as a theorist and as an architect. The paper includes some pictures of his designs.

Table of Contents:
Introduction
Gottfried Semper
Dresden Hoftheater

From the Paper
"Semper made major contributions to architecture both as a theorists and as an architect. His career was divided by his time outside of Germany, but his most notable structures were created and built in Germany. His second design for the Hoftheater can be seen to this day, for the structure is still in existence and still used as an opera house, benefiting not only from Semper's exterior designs but from the interior and the elements that Semper added to the stage in relation to the audience."

Tags:structures, theorist, Germany

Abstract
In this article, the writer discusses the 19th century architect, Gottfried Semper. The writer focuses on Semper's work on the first and second Dresden Hoftheater, that is the opera house. The writer looks at the building of the first Dresden Hoftheater, its destruction and then the different techniques involved with the second building.

From the Paper
"Gottfried Semper was a nineteenth century architect who is noted for a number of designs, among them the first and second Dresden Hoftheater designs. Semper taught architecture at the Dresden Academy. The first Dresden Hoftheater, or opera house, was built from 1838 to 1841 and was destroyed. He was an exile for a time after political problems but returned to build the second Dresden Hoftheater in 1870-1878. In the intervening years, his technique improved and would be better received than had been the case with his first version. Gottfried Semper ..."

Abstract
The paper reviews the work of Gottfried Semper and explains his theory known as "The Four Elements of Architecture". The paper discusses the use of textiles in architecture and labels it as a fairly new, but growing, industry in the world market. The paper also examines new textile designs available. The paper relates that today, woven fabrics are being used to construct buildings and highway overpasses since these materials are resilient and resistant to environmental factors.

Outline:
Objective
Introduction
Textiles in Architecture
Semper's Theories
New Textile Designs
The Future of Textiles in Architecture
Summary and Conclusion

From the Paper
"Gottfried Semper was among the most outstanding architects during his day. The work of Egenter (nd) states that Semper "...globally documented one basic paradigm: the fact that fibrous and perishable materials are widely found in art and architecture related to durable materials, mostly as texture ('incrustation' principle) or structurally. When one investigates the similarities that exist between the art of weaving and the pursuit of architecture, one is able to see the concepts as they overlap."

Tags:Semper, material, fabric, weaving, wickerwork, building

Abstract
This paper explains that Locke does not believe human beings can have any access to accurate knowledge of the actually existing reality of things; whereas, Leibniz holds that the way a word is used to refer to an object is part of our understanding of the object's real essence and that its real essence can be understood through its observable properties. The paper states the suggestion that such concepts are acquired only through sense experience, which is Locke's position, thus undermines, not only Leibniz's view of the relationship between the human mind and the external universe, but his interpretation of the role of God in giving existence to the universe through the principle of the First Cause and final sufficient reason.

From the Paper
"This is a fundamentally different position from that of Leibniz, who holds that this process does indeed function in human beings as it does in animals " "men act like the lower animals, resembling the empirical physicians, whose methods are those of mere practice without theory" " but that this is only part of the explanation for human understanding. The element this empirical explanation disregards is precisely that rational capacity which separates people from animals and makes human nature what it is: "it is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that distinguishes us from the mere animals and gives us Reason and the sciences, raising us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God."

Tags:reality, word, essense, observable, interpretation

From the Paper
"Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz was born in Leipzig in 1646 and died at the age of 70 in 1716. His philosophy was in part a rejection of the philosophies of Descartes and Spinoza and what he saw as their inadequate explanation of the relationship between "God, man, and nature, each of which Leibniz wanted to keep separate." Leibniz seems to have been determined to create a philosophy which was as positive as possible, rather than to rigorously explore reality scientifically and objectively and declare what he had found whatever it might be. It is no surprise, in that context, to find that Leibniz not only argues for the existence of God, but also goes on to argue that God has essentially created the best of all possible worlds here, despite any evidence to the contrary. Leibniz's optimism seems to fly in the face of all the evidence that this is hardly a perfect world."

Abstract
This paper presents a critique of Johann Gottfried Stallbaum's (1793-1861) vague and generally accepted thesis that the true argument of "The Republic" is "the representation of human life in a State perfected by justice and governed according to the idea of good" . The paper contrasts a discussion of what justice refers to in Plato's thought and how justice is related to the Good, as defined by Plato, to the subtly deceptive and incomplete idea of Gottfried's exegesis.

From the Paper
"In "The Republic" separate functions are the foundation for justice. Justice is the professed aim of the constitution of the kallipolis. It becomes visible in individuals because justice is the order of the state, which in turn is its visible embodiment. The one is the soul and the other is the body in the Greek ideal of a fair mind in a fair body. In Hegel's language, the state becomes the reality of which Justice is the ideal. Political justice is the harmony in a constituted body based on specialization. This is a direct refutation of Stallbaum's description because his generalization makes no mention of the roles the people have in the development of justice in the State. Plato regards the ideal form of the perfect city as the ideal form of the good person. Plato is not interested in "the representation of human life in a State perfected by justice" because he is arguing that a kallipolis requires a specialized constituted community in order to exist under the guidance of the Guardians."

Tags:Myth, of, Er, virtues, honesty

Abstract
This paper addresses Gottfried Leibnitz's comments on the need for wisdom, practical reasoning and taking total responsibility for all one does, for one has moral choice within a framework of divine creation. Comments on Leibnitz's belief that moral reasoning was practical reasoning, given a mystical sense of creation to be made through moral goodness, promoting harmony and self-direction.

From the Paper
"Gottfried Leibnitz (1646-1716) was a strongly Aristotelian thinker who also gained from the philosophy of Thomas of Aquinas, towards an idea that although God made each agent in Creation `everything that it will ever be' that each was completely responsible for its own actions. In effect, he refers to a mass creation of beings that should then learn to exercise the practical reasoning that others associate with being among the different processes of free will. Roinala's Leibnitz on Rational Decision-Making is a starting place for what can be determined of the thought of a remarkable..."

Tags:leibnitz, moral reason, responsibility

Abstract
This paper compares and contrasts the idea of God posited by Benedict Spinoza with that posited by Gottfried Leibniz. The paper points out that, according to Spinoza, God exists necessarily from its divine nature, inhabiting the world as the world inhabits it. It claims that Leibniz saw the elegance of this utterly rational God, though he also espied a threat that he attempted to displace by defending the traditional anthropomorphic idea of God. Spinoza's God is beyond human, to which the human notions of 'good' and 'evil' do not apply. Leibniz saw in this God no freedom, no agency, and no morality by which man could live. The paper concludes that these two philosophers, arguably the most significant of their day, differed drastically in their views of God's role with regard to the world. While Spinoza's view of a non-human God appeals to humanity to find a liberal and democratic method by which to exist in the world, Leibniz's more traditional view of God involves the reliance upon faith and provides a perfect example upon which humanity must model itself.

From the Paper
"While this eminently rational idea of God possesses an almost geometric elegance, the implications of such a view would greatly disturb Spinoza's contemporaries, Leibniz among them. Since all things follow necessarily from God's nature as substance, determined solely through itself, it follows that things could not be any other way than they are. "Things could not have been produced by God in any manner or in any order different from that which exists." This is an utter rejection of the supreme anthropomorphic father figure, who chooses between right and wrong and lays down laws by which humanity is judged. Good and bad are reduced to human notions relative to our limited experience of the world, completely irrelevant to a universe that functions from the necessary. Morality is seemingly abolished, and God seems too powerless to ever have created anything at all. In fact, freedom to Spinoza is the ability to be determined by nothing other than one's nature, which entails that only God is completely free as the one substance, and to choose to be anything but what he is would be absurd, as what he is, is perfection. "...God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists only from the necessity of his nature and acts from the necessity of his nature." The threat to the theocratic order is explicit here, for while Spinoza's God is necessarily perfect, he is not necessarily good. Following from necessity, what we term 'evil' is as much in God as what we call 'good'. This God is not based on relative human notions or longings: it follows purely from the necessity of reason. Spinoza maintains that he sees God as surely as he can see the truth of a geometric proof: "I know it in the same way that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles." The rejection of ultimate reward and punishment places the onus for morality squarely upon human shoulders; a yoke religion explicitly labors to remove because it is too heavy for most humans to bear and would lead to social chaos. Perhaps Spinoza had such in mind when he penned the last line of his Ethics: "...all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare."

Tags:morality, ethics, philosophy, existence, faith, logic, metaphysics, rational

Abstract
Gottfried Leibniz's philosophical system relied on the foundational principles of non-contradiction and sufficient reason. The paper shows that in his "Discourse on Metaphysics" (1686), Leibniz argued that the perfection of God was demonstrable through the principle of non-contradiction and that His perfection meant that God's creations must also be perfect. The paper compares this view with that of Baruch Spinoza in whose "Ethics" (1675), the pantheistic argument was that there was but one substance, and that substance was God, which left no room for contingency or free will. In Spinoza's view the impression of contingency was merely created by the inadequacy of the human mind to grasp the completeness of creation.

From the Paper
"Spinoza held, therefore, that because God was all-powerful and perfect nothing in his creation could take place without his willing it to be so, which deprived his created things of agency and left them only with its illusion. Leibniz, however, wished to demonstrate how, despite the perfection of God and his complete control over all of his creation, he allowed contingency and free will a role in the universe. Leibniz immediately established, via the principle of noncontradiction, that God was perfection. Anything that is not capable of perfection "in the highest degree" is not perfect (581)."

Tags:substance, kingship, Judas

Abstract
This paper first outlines Baruch Spinoza's argument in Part 1 of the "Ethics" for "substance monism" - the position that there exists only one substance. It then explains how Spinoza's position differs from that of Gottfried Leibniz in the "Discourse on Metaphysics". The paper concludes with the assertion that Leibniz's account for the nature and number of substances is superior since accepting Spinoza's conclusions leads to a number of logically troublesome consequences.

From the Paper
"Leibniz's account for the nature and number of substances differs significantly from Spinoza's. For Spinoza, there is only one substance in the world: God. Leibniz essentially agrees that there is only one true substance. However, to Leibniz this substance is the monad, comparable to a soul or spirit, which "is nothing but a simple substance that enters into composites" (Monadology, p. 484). For Leibniz, God exists external to the world of monads, and might be best thought of as a type of "supersubstance" or "supermonad." It was God who set the world in motion; therefore, substances depend on God for their existence. Since Leibniz's God possesses the will to create or destroy substances "in accordance with the principle of the best" (M., p. 487), God is the only necessary being. All other monads, then, depend on Him for their existence, and as such, are non-eternal contingent beings. Spinoza's pantheism forces the conclusion that all substance is eternal; if it were not eternal, then it would have to be created, which would then violate his definition of substance as something "that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it has to be formed" (E., p. 416)."

Tags:modern, philosophy, God, eternal, creation