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This paper explores Ludwig Wittgenstein's foundationalist approach to mainstream scepticism. It examines how it appears that one may, at first glance, equate his response with that of Moore (for example); the very person whose position he wishes to dismiss, however, this paper unearths from within Wittgenstein's last major work, "On Certainty', an altogether innovative an ingenious approach to scepticism.
From the Paper:"What therefore are the implications of Wittgenstein's critique of Moore's claim to knowledge? To answer this question it may be worth referring once more to the primary excerpts (151), i.e. "regarding it [e.g. "here is a hand"] as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry". Now, to his credit, Moore recognized the fundamental importance of such assertions, but what he failed to identify were the special roles that these "truisms" play within our whole system of knowledge, or the part they play in our whole "method of doubt and enquiry". Indeed, according to Wittgenstein, fundamental claims such as "my name is C.P." "there is a tree" or "here is a hand", are the "hinges" upon which our arguments turn (655), "if I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put" (?343)."
Cite this Essay:
Wittgenstein's Foundationalism (2004, October 17) Retrieved May 21, 2013, from http://www.academon.com/essay/wittgenstein-foundationalism-53295/
"Wittgenstein's Foundationalism" 17 October 2004. Web. 21 May. 2013. <http://www.academon.com/essay/wittgenstein-foundationalism-53295/>