Abstract This paper advances the argument that the colors we consciously experience are not the same as whatever colors may exist in the external world/ This means that even if color is a real physical property of things in the world, the colors objects "actually" have are not the same as the colors we experience them as having. This is not to say that things we see as being red may actually be blue, but rather that red, blue, and all of the other colors that comprise human color experience do not exist outside of that experience, regardless of whether there is an objective property of color in the world. This paper uses considerations put forward by George Berkeley and John Locke as well as current philosophers, neuroscientists and physicists. It approaches the topic from both a scientific standpoint as well as a philosophical one, though more emphasis is put on the latter.
From the Paper "Berkeley simply extends this argument to additionally cover Locke's primary qualities, which he argues are likewise only known to us through our senses and perceptions. If colors, smells, tastes, etc., do not exist objectively in the world because they are not independent of the senses, then, by Berkeley's reasoning, nothing can exist independently of perception because our knowledge of everything in the world ? including the primary qualities, which are the basic entities of all objects ? also stems entirely from our senses. Berkeley's argument is largely based on the false reasoning that physical things in the world could not possible cause ideas in us , so his conclusion is easy to shrug off. But there is something very intriguing in the points he makes leading up to that misstep: We are indeed limited in our knowledge of the world by our inability to observe external things independent of our senses."
