Looks at the Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) Revised Fisheries Agreements of 1998, especially the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute.
Term Paper # 147587 |
6,735 words (
approx. 26.9 pages ) |
19 sources |
MLA | 2011
|
$ 92.95
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Abstract
This paper explains the background of the two-year negotiation process relating to the Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) Revised Fisheries Agreements of 1998, especially the agenda-setting, framework, and outcome. Next, the author presents two-level game as applicable to the actual negotiation process in this case.
The paper concludes that Japan's aggressive diplomacy put Korea at a disadvantage, thus making the process least pleasant especially because of the co-incidence of national elections. The paper includes quotations, footnotes and illustrations.
Table of Contents:
Backgrounder
The Evolutionary Process of the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute
Opposing Claims
The Big Question
The Negotiation Process
Pre-negotiation Driven by the New UN Convention on Law of the Sea:
How Japan and Korea Came to the Table
Negotiation Rounds Overview
Details of the Negotiation
1996: The Four-Item Agenda
1997: Things Heat Up
1998: Struggling to Agree
Meetings between Leaders
Main Contracts in the New Fisheries Agreement
Putnam's Two-Level Game Theory
Definition of Theory
Theoretical Model
The International Level: A Sphere of Contending Pressures
Level II Non intersecting Interests: Korea's Domestic Atmosphere versus Japan's
Dokdo Search
Takeshima Search
Conclusion
From the Paper
"There are some additional points, however, to Putnam's theory. One is that although a smaller domestic win-set may be a source of bargaining power (one can pressure the other that any 'other' agreement will not be ratified domestically), it can also be a real source of problems as it gives less space for concession-making. Players may lose out even on a Pareto efficient solution due to the fact that there is not much room given for creating value for the other through functional alternatives that may come out of concession-making."
Tags:neighbors negotiations leaders, two-level game theory, sovereignty
An analysis of the article "Paper, Rock, Scissors" by J. Kim.
Article Review # 94385 |
1,120 words (
approx. 4.5 pages ) |
1 source |
APA | 2006
|
$ 23.95
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the 2006 journal article by J.Kim titled "Paper, Rock, Scissors". According to the paper, Kim's article explains current reactions of South Korea and Japan concerning the ongoing diplomatic dispute over an islet. The paper further discusses how each government holds its own position that conflicts with the other. Kim goes on to use the children's game of paper, rock, scissors to explain this situation. The paper breaks up the article and analyzes it accordingly.
Outline:
Analysis
Title & Sub-title
Readership
The Purpose
Introduction & Conclusion
Structure
Attitude & Position
Ethical Writing
From the Paper
"Logical flows: Throughout the article, the readers can easily follow its logical flow. First, the author points out the important issue he will talk about in the article by using a comparison with the game mentioned. It is followed by other terms that are parallel to the game; "rock" hand as "hard power" and "scissors" hand as "soft power." He assumes that the most appropriate solution for South Korea is the combination of these two powers. To apply all these terms to the current situation, the author goes over the reactions of both parties. In addition, taking his own position in the article, he argues that there are some reasons behind the "soft" reaction of Japan, and follows with details of what Japan can get out of its action and what South Korea should be ready for."
Tags:perspective, Language, style, colloquial, power, information, published, Dokdo