Abstract In this article, the writer looks at ancient Greek history and explains that the formation of the Delian league is a significant turning point in history. The writer notes that the Delian League was established soon after the victory won at the 'Battle of Salamis', when the Persian wars were fought. The writer explains that the Delian league was named thus because of the fact that its treasury was located at Delios. The writer concludes that the Delian League came to an abrupt end in the year 405, although not without leaving a significant impact on the history of the world, especially because of the fact that the Delian League is, even today, taken as an example by various organizations such as NATO.
From the Paper "Why was it considered important to form the Delian League? It must be stated that there were several different causes, the more important one being that at that time, Sparta was regarded as one of the larger powers, and when the Persians, under Darius and Xerxes invaded Sparta, the city felt a loss of prestige and power. Added to this was the simple fact that the Spartans were not known for their strength of character or purpose, and the tide turned against Pausanias, the victor of Plataea, and the Ionians came to the realization that the Battle of Greece need never have been fought, but for the personal follies and foibles of this leader. When Pausanias was recalled to Sparta, the Ionian allies soon appealed to the Athenians, and when Sparta decided to send out Dorcis to combat Pausanias, it was discovered that Aristides was in unquestioned command of the allied fleet."
A history and examination of how Ancient Athens, out of necessity of protecting its allies and lands, grew from a powerful city-state to an Aegean Empire.
Abstract This paper gives a history of how Athens, originally looking for a united front against the invading Persian armies during the Persian Wars in antiquity, grew from an influential city-state to one of the world's first empires, stretching its power base across the entire Aegean sea. The paper begins by discussing how the Delian League, the pretext to what would become the Athenian Empire, came into being as a direct way to combat the invading Persians. The alliance was created out of necessity, as a united Greek front would be the only way to repel the massive Persian army under King Xerxes. A brief history of the Persian Wars is given, with Persia's invasion of Northern Greece and the burning of the Acropolis in Athens, but eventually their defeat at the hands of the Athenian general Cimon at the mouth of the Eurymedon River. After Persia was defeated and their troops driven back to Asia, Athens was firmly set as the predominant military and economic leader of all of Greece. The Delian League that was organized to fight against the Persians soon evolved into an Athenian Empire, with Athens collecting tribute and taxes from other city-states in exchange for protection and economic stability. Athens used their power to create a more safe and secure Greece, but was eventually corrupted by greedy politicians who abused other Greek city-states to the point of war. The second half of the paper goes into detail over how Athens was justified to create an empire, as it brought about prosperity for all involved. This includes the destruction of piracy and the opening up with trade routes to eastern Turkey. Ancient sources are heavily quoted to reinforce the argument that having a single dominant polis inevitably stabilized the once troubled area of Ancient Greece. This section also deals with Athens feeling morally obligated to spread their particular form of democracy to all of the other city-states, and their desire to see Sparta have their power limited. This ancient Cold War would eventually boil over into the Peloponnesian War, and the result ended in a weakened Greece that would not rise to prosperity again until Alexander The Great unified Greece.
From the Paper "During the expansion of Athenian power, an economic concept developed that allowed a particular polis to form an economic alliance with a fellow Delian League member. This agreement would allow the two states to work together in transporting particular goods through their territories to a marketplace where the goods would be sold, and the profit generated from the selling of the goods would be evenly distributed between the two Greek states. Such an example of this economic unity can be seen in agreement between Athens and the polis of Phaselis, which held joint control over certain economic endeavors and even adopted the same coinage for a short span of history. Athens also made it clear that if the city-states were to live under the protection of Athens, then the economic system should be standardized."
Abstract The paper relates that around the 9th century, Athens began to emerge as a Greek city state although it was a poor city, built on undesirable land. It became the city of the world's first democracy, and produced fine art and architecture in unprecedented numbers, and became the center of philosophy and literature. The paper describes the Delian League, which was a confederacy of cities designed to protect themselves from Persian attack. The paper explains that the Delian League began as an ancient version of NATO and matured into the Athenian Empire. After some thirty years of war, however, the Athenian Empire was defeated and although it founded a second empire, Athens would never recover the full extent of her power.
From the Paper "In the beginning, the Delian League was a rather loose coalition of states, each independent and each sharing a common interest with the others (Ash 2000). There were numerous members of the league, including "Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, most of Acarnania, Ionia, the Hellespont, Thrace, and the islands between the Peloponnese and Crete towards the East, and all the Cyclades except for Melos and There, as well as Aegina and most of the Euboean cities" (Ash 2000). Combined, these states created a formidable force capable of achieving its objectives (Ash 2000)."
Abstract This paper charts the rise of Athens from a city in ruins in 480, to the possession of a large and rapidly expanding empire 50 years on. It examines the causes of this, and the reaction of Sparta. It questions whether Athens actually set out to form an Empire, or whether this was an idea which devoloped over time. Finally, it weighs up the respective responsiblities of Athens and Sparta for the outbreak of war.
From the Paper "In 480-79 a Greek alliance, led by Sparta, finally defeated the Persians, first at Salamis in 480, then at Plataia and Mykale in 479. For the Athenians, there now lay two principle objectives; the rebuilding of their city, which had been destroyed by the Persians in 480, and the consolidation of their victory over the Persians. The Greek alliance now took the offensive, attacking Persia at Sestos, Cyprus and Byzantion. However, the alliance soon rejected Spartan rule in favour of the Athenians. Athens was more suited to leading an offensive against Persia; her navy was far greater than Sparta's, and had been the greatest force in the victory at Salamis; furthermore, her people were more closely related to the eastern-Greeks whom the alliance hoped to free and protect from Persian rule. The members of this alliance, called the Delian League, had to provide contributions towards the defence against Persia in the form of money (phoros) or ships. Although originally the League was intended to be an equal alliance, Athens soon came to dominate it, and over the next half century moulded it into an empire. Athenian intentions in forming the League are varied; the obvious threat of Persia should not overshadow the huge financial and political gains to be made. There is evidence to suggest that the Athenians used the argument that they wanted 'to compensate themselves for their losses by ravaging the territory of the King of Persia' as a pretext for ulterior motives; namely, the domination of the Delian League and 'a desire for power and wealth' . The need of funds to rebuild their city would have been at the forefront of Athenian minds. However, the willingness of the member states to join the League, the approval of Sparta on its creation, and the first fifteen years of anti-Persian campaigning, suggest that initial Athenian intentions were based primarily on the need to form an alliance against Persia."
Abstract This paper reviews Aeschylus? "Oresteia" in which Aeschylus uses the Agamemnon myth to convey his messages. It examines how Aeschylus? main purpose in the "Oresteia" is not to explore the psychology of his characters but to narrate the story of the House of Atreus, its theological aspects and its relevance to the contemporary political situation. It focuses on Aeschylus? use of the story of the House of Atreus in order to make relevant points about the society he lived in and whether he was successful in doing so. Also discussed is the use of charter myth and gender.
From the Paper "First of all, the story of the House of Atreus is not only of one generation, but in fact includes the terrible happenings between Atreus and his brother Thyestes, and then the abduction of Helen from Menelaus; these things are implied by Aeschylus in a very circumspect manner but not actually mentioned ? although they are an integral part of the Atreus curse, they are not necessary to the plot and therefore not included. Aeschylus gets away with this because his play is not original material as such, it is based on a myth widely known throughout his culture, he can safely assume that everyone watching the play will already know the tale and will therefore "fill in the gaps" themselves. This is, of course, a major point; would Aeschylus tell a story for its own merits if he knew that his projected audience was already aware of the outcome of the tale?"
Abstract This paper examines how the military force that the Athenians fielded in the Sicilian Campaign was unprecedented in the Peloponnesian War. It attempts to determine why it was it utterly defeated. It looks at how a series of failures of command from the political and military leadership exacerbated the likely failure of the campaign. It also explores how the end result was a greatly weakened Athens, how there were numerous defections from the Delian League, and how the myth of Athenian invincibility on the seas was shattered.
Outline
Introduction
Discussion
Hubris Within Athens
Hubris Within the Expedition
The Athenian Failures of Command
Counterpoint
Conclusion
From the Paper "The war-time footing on which the Athenians found themselves was difficult for them to maintain. The destruction of their lands and homes outside of the walls of Athens, the plague, and gradual breakdown of the structure of Athenian society led a shift away from Pericles? strategy for victory and away from the unity of purpose and common good within Athens and towards private ambition and gain. By the Melian dialogue, a year or so before the Sicilian Campaign, the Athenians had given up Pericles? conservative approach and limited war aim, the defeat of Sparta, when an Athenian acknowledged that of gods and men, ?by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can.? Though not universal, by 415 B.C., the dominant theme among Athenians was the overbearing belief in their abilities and the growth of the empire."
Tags: hubris, pelopennisian, sicilian, sicily, sparta, thucydides, war
Abstract This paper takes a look at one of the greatest wars fought in the history of Greece, the Peloponnesian War. The paper explains that while both the opposing sides, the Athenians and the Spartans, controlled a great deal of land and sea power there were actually rather few direct confrontations and this lack of direct confrontations made the battle of Amphipolis all the more important as well as a turning point in the war. The paper explains the significance of this battle by looking at how the war had progressed up to the point of the battle of Amphipolis, by examining the military strength of the warring Athenian and Spartan factions and by explaining the history of the Amphipolis war and the circumstances that made it so devastating.
From the Paper "The first major explanation for the battle of Amphilpolis's importance as a turning point is the loss of military leaders during its battle. When Cleon, the commanding general of the Athenian land forces marshaled a massive army outside of Amphilpolis to reclaim the city, Brasida also amassed a large army of almost 2000 hoplites and 300 cavalry inside the walls of Amphipolis. When the battle appeared imminent however, Brasida confused Cleon by withdrawing from battle and refusing to fight on the fields outside of Amphipolis. Thinking that the army of Sparta would not come out to fight, Cleon began to withdraw his troops, only then did Brasida storm out of the walls and attack the hapless soldiers of Cleon. In this attack Cleon was killed by one of the commanders of the Spartan forces and in its escape more than 700 Athenians were killed by the onslaught. This resounding defeat was devastating in its numerical loss because the main force of the Athenian army was devastated, but even worse; the most competent general of the Athenian military staff was also killed."
Tags:delian, league, naval, warfare, domination, seas, hoplites, land, units, commanding
Abstract This paper discusses the Persian influences on Greek thought and culture from the Greco-Persian Wars (499-479 BCE). According to the paper, in the late summer of 428, during the height of the Second Peloponnesian War, the beleaguered citizens of Mytilen importuned the Lacedaemonians for aid to repulse the immanent blockade and invasion of the dreaded Athenian fleet. Although the Delian League led by Athens and its brutally subjugated city states had liberated the Aegean and Ionian Greeks from Persian hegemony.
