Abstract This paper analyzes and discusses the Bay of Pigs invasion, implemented and designed by President John F. Kennedy, and the impact this failed maneuver had on American foreign policy and on American-Soviet, as well as American-Cuban relations. The paper describes the attempted invasion, the Cuban response to the invasion, the events leading up to the invasion and why it represents one of the worst political disasters in recent U.S. history. The paper further discusses the political repercussions that followed the attempted invasion and its long-lasting impact on American-Cuban relations.
From the Paper "On the morning of the invasion, it was reported that the exile forces, together with the CIA, had literally destroyed numerous locations, had landed in several provinces within Cuba, had freed thousands of political prisoners and had driven inland, practically dividing the whole country into two separate parts, not to mention placing the Cuban Navy in revolt. In reality, however, none of these claims were true, for the exile forces in the Bay of Pigs encountered immediate difficulties. For example, the location for the first assault was suppose to have been an isolated area, a good place for a surprise attack, yet the forces discovered a militia patrol which destroyed the element of surprise; the beachhead was suppose to be sandy and free of obstacles, yet many reefs were encountered which sank some of the boats. Worst of all, Castro's men were lying in wait just north of the original landing point. Much gunfire then erupted and the exile forces found themselves pinned down; to make matters worse, reports soon came in the Russian tanks were moving closer with every passing minute."
Abstract This paper examines ways of weeding out and preventing moles from infiltrating intelligence organizations, as well as determining the legitimacy of information received from foreign moles. The author discusses the CIA's technique of periodic investigation, blanket searches, character and behavior analysis, and the use of the polygraph. The author assesses the polygraph as being not infallible but nevertheless an excellent first-wave method of minimizing risk in recruitment and in intelligence breaches.
From the Paper "Perhaps the most commonly used method of weeding out any potential security threats is to periodically investigate employees of intelligence agencies every few years, and to also conduct investigations at any time when their reliability comes into question. The expressed technique of the CIA is "to reinvestigate CIA employees every five years, whether they need it or not, as well as when questions arise about the individual's behavior." This, of course, relies upon both the use of the polygraph and general collection of information on the individual."
