Abstract This paper looks at the currencycrisis in Thailand, which started in the summer of 1997 and rapidly engulfed a number of East Asian "Tiger economies" in a major financial crisis. This crisis became a an interesting case study for economists who were interested in analyzing the pros and cons of globalization and laissez faire market economies. The author further examines the effects of the East Asian currencycrisis, on Thailand itself, which underwent a painful re-adjustment of its economy.
Outline:
Background
The Danger Signals
Foreign Exchange Reserves
Current Accounts Deficit
Excessive Credit Expansion
Why Did the Growth Slow Down?
The Housing and Real Estate Bubble
The Stock Market Bubble
The Crisis The Aftermath of the Crisis for Thailand
Conclusion
From the Paper "The country took a number of measures to attract foreign capital during the 1980 and early 1990s. These included lifting of restrictions on foreign investments, elimination of most barriers on foreign ownership of export oriented industries, granting of tax incentives to foreign mutual funds and investments in the stock market, creation of closed-end mutual funds, and reduction of taxes on dividends remitted abroad (Antczak 40-41). These measures along with a pegged exchange rate policy (i.e., the Thai currency baht was pegged to the dollar and its value rose and fell with dollar's value), and the large differential in interest rates provided comfort to foreign investors who came to Thailand in droves. "
Tags: Thailand, currency, crisis, globalization, Asia
Abstract The paper provides the background of the 1997 Asian currencycrisis and explains the five main causal factors. The paper then explores the effects of the Asian currencycrisis on the Asian economic paradigm and concludes by relating that major hindrances still remain in the banking system.
Outline:
Main Explanations of the 1997 Asian CurrencyCrisis Implications of the Crisis for the Asian Economic Paradigm
From the Paper "The Asian currency crisis started in two phases of currency depreciations which were underway since the initial part of summer of 1997. The first round was marked by a steep decline of the Thai Bhat, the Malaysian Ringgit, the Philippine Peso and the Rupiah of Indonesia. Following the stabilization of the currencies, the second round set off with downward pressures hitting the Taiwan dollar, Won of S. Korea, Singaporean and Hong Kong Dollar. The governments of these nations had countered weakness in their currencies through the process of selling foreign exchange reserves and raising interest rates that in effect rendered economic growth sluggish and have made interest-bearing securities more appealing compared to equities. The currency crises also brought to light acute problems within the banking and financial sectors of the burdened Asian economies. (Nanto, 1998)"
Abstract This document discusses currency crises and utilizes the Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998 and the Mexican peso crisis of 1994 as illustrative examples. In both of these examples, the writer notes that the currency crises were precipitated by sudden capital flights out of the markets in question which exacerbated the devaluation of the currencies. In essence, the writer maintains that currency crises occur because investors, internal or external, leave a market suddenly and with little prior indication. The writer concludes that regardless of how valid the investor assumption of impending currency devaluation is the fact of their sudden flight from the market always leads to the devaluation they were predicting.
Outline:
Abstract
Currency Crises in Asia and Mexico
Overview
Asian Financial Crisis South Korean Crisis Central Bank & OMO
Exchange Rate Behavior
Conclusion
Mexican CurrencyCrisis Overview
Build up to Crisis The Trigger
Conclusion
From the Paper "Thus, because of the currency speculators, who are typically foreign institutional investors, introduce a degree of risk simply through the size of their investment in a single currency that would not otherwise be there if the speculation was limited to smaller investors. While there are a whole slew of factors that must accompany a genuine currency crisis, in general, a crisis develops as these large institutional speculators perceive a decline in value of the currency and dump their investments en masse. The ensuing devaluation of the currency in question is unsustainable and the event often exposes other fundamental economic weaknesses that were disguised previous to the onset of the currency crisis, such as credit over extension in the market and a lack of foreign capital reserves."
Abstract The paper discusses the primary explanations for the 1997 Asian currencycrisis and highlights the implications of that crisis for the Asian economic paradigm.
Outline:
1985 - Plaza Accord (Appreciation of Yet Against Dollar)
Liberalization (Bank of Japan, Foreign Loans)
Kieretsu - Export of Capital
End of Bubble Economy
Foreign Banks Lending Expands
1988 -Gsp Status Ends (4 Tigers Economy)
1994 - China: Devaluation of Currency 1995-96 -Mini-Recession, Debt Problem, Accumulation
1996-97 - Debt/ Foreign Exchange, Reserve Rations Deteriorate
1997 July 2nd - CurrencyCrisis Expands From Thailand into East
Aian Countries
Explanation of the Asian Crisis
From the Paper "Following the Plaza Accord the Bank of Japan was characterized by liberalization and specifically in the area of foreign loans and as well the Bank of Thailand followed the same course in lending. Entrepreneurs in Asia are noted in the work of Wong entitled: "Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis relates that Asians are known to place a general trust in their governments for enactment of economic policies which are sound and "their failure to sense the dangers of borrowing short in foreign currency and investing in long-term projects with earnings denominated in local currency was disastrous." (Wong, nd) In July 1997 Thailand "ran out of foreign reserves and devalued the baht which lost over 1/2 of its value. Having admitted the total loss of foreign reserves, there was a run on the bank of Thailand and this quickly spread to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Attempts of the International Monetary Fund to assist these countries was not successful with too small a bailout package at too late of a date."
Abstract This paper reviews ten articles on the currency crises of the past 20 years. The paper examines the global impact a crisis in one country or area has on the world, such as the Asian currencycrisis of the 1990s, and discusses the notion that currency crises are self-fulfilling. The paper also looks at whether currency crises are predictable.
From the Paper "Currency crises have gained much attention in the past years because they have apparently occurred with greater frequency than in the past or perhaps because the global nature of today's financial markets make a currency crisis in one nation a concern around the world. Increasingly, currency stability is of interest to more than just economists and policy makers, with companies and individual investors noting the movement or stability of various currencies with interest .These are not necessarily new stakeholders with regard to..."
Tags:Currency crises, currencycrisis, literature review
Examines the causes and effects. Discusses devaluation, historic bank failures and the impact on international banking, as well as currency exposure risks. Includes tables.
2,475 words (approx. 9.9 pages), 9 sources, 1999, $ 87.95
Abstract "This paper is an examination of the Southeast Asia currencycrisis in general and its relationship to, and possible impact on, the field of international banking (The BCCI affair..., 1992, Online; Haq, 1998).
From the Paper "This paper is an examination of the Southeast Asia currency crisis in general and its relationship to, and possible impact on, the field of international banking (The BCCI affair..., 1992, Online; Haq, 1998). One of the primary topics to be discussed is the fact that as a business and practice, an international bank has the primary goal of measuring an economy's performance and the stability of its currency so that investors can identify investment opportunities and thereby make value-added business decisions (Tamburini, 1997, 32).
Another topic addressed in this paper will be to explain and examine the reasons for the fluctuations in currency values, most of which are caused by a phenomenon caused by the currency exchange rate. Simply defined, this means the value comparison..."
Abstract This study applies ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation procedures, with and without lags, to identify the causes of currency crises in selected economies during the 1997-98 East Asian currency and financial crisis. The author states that the cause of the crisis was attributed to initial macroeconomic conditions, weak macroeconomic fundamentals, financial sector regulation, and policy reaction. The paper relates that the empirical results were consistent with previous literature on currency crises; episodes of depreciation appear to be associated with the depletion of foreign exchange reserves and the increase in foreign liabilities. Equations. Tables.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Classical Theory
Empirical Research Explaining CurrencyCrisis First Generation Models
Second Generation Models
Third Generation Models
Policy Reactions and the Role of the IMF
Conceptual Model
Initial Conditions
Deterioration of Macroeconomic Fundamentals
International Sector and Financial Regulation
Macroeconomic Policy
Ideal and Actual Data
Measuring the Symptoms
Measuring CurrencyCrisis Actual Data
Results and Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix I: Summary of Data and Indicators Used in Previous Studies
Appendix II: General F-Tests
Appendix III: Statistical Analysis for Multicollinearity and Heteroskedasticity
Appendix IV: E-views Output of Granger Causality Tests
From the Paper "Although Korea, the Philippines and Thailand followed the classic prescription of raising their interest rate to defend their currencies, all three saw continued depreciations, well in excess of what would be predicted by the currency crisis models Furman and Stiglitz (1997). From a policy perspective, Goldfajn and Gupta (1998) look the real exchange rate "undervaluation" episodes in 80 countries following the crises to assess whether tight monetary policy brings about a recovery in the real exchange rate through a nominal appreciation of the exchange rate. They find that in their total sample, tight monetary policy increases the probability of recovery by about 10 percentage points. But among countries undergoing simultaneous banking and currency crisis, as in East Asia, tight monetary policy is associated with roughly 10 percentage points lower probability of success. Both of these differences are statistically significant."
Abstract Though the situation is still unfolding and surely will continue to for many years to come it can confidently be said that this is the worst economic crisis the world has experienced since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Until very recently, most analysts had confined the crisis to Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Some obdurate analysts even continue to suggest that the Asian 'miracle' is still far from over! These, and many other predictions that the crisis would result in only a short, sharp downturn with almost no impact on the major capitalist countries, have all proved to be wrong. Severe economic crisis in Japan along with economic slowdown in China, currency lows in Canada, South Africa, Mexico and many other countries, and the finale of the stumbling American economy, do clearly suggest that the crisis is endemic to the entire global system. This is an ugly and painful realization, but it is indeed reality. Not only does it seem that the Asian miracle is surely over, but that the burgeoning global economy is headed for a drastic slowdown.
This paper discusses the economic crisis in Asia in 1997-8 in the light of other crashes throughout history, from the prototypical and definitive bubble-and-crash phenomenon to the recent 1989 bubble and crash of the Japanese stock market.
Abstract This paper explains that, generally, the cause of the crisis can be narrowed down to government and banking financial policies at the time of the crisis, which were trying to develop foreign exchange currency strength in the face of insurmountable internal weaknesses. The author points out that the effects of the economic problems of the troubled Asian countries adversely affected the whole world, especially the United States and Japan. The paper stresses that it is very hard it to predict the financial future in terms of economic crisis, no matter how obvious the signs seem in retrospect.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Causes of Crisis Effect on World Economy
Solutions
Conclusion
From the Paper "As mentioned, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 can be compared in many ways to the 1989 Japanese Stock Market situation, which in turn bore some similarities to the 1929 crash in America, in that banks did not respond appropriately and raised interest rates or kept them the same instead of cutting them, in the fear that decreasing interest would only feed more speculation. The result was similarly a disaster. The banks of Japan essentially burst the speculative bubble themselves after increasing deregulation along with a dearth of experience had created new paradigms for them with which they were not prepared to deal."
Tags: policies, government, banking, currency, global
Abstract The paper reveals that the cause of the currencycrisis was because the Mexican peso was pegged to the dollar and this type of fixed exchange rate limited investment in Mexico. The paper relates that the only natural thing to do was to devalue the peso. The paper explains that the problem was that the political and security situation in Mexico was not necessarily one that would encourage foreign investment. The paper explains the 20 % devaluation, intended to take place some time in December 1994, turned into a 50 % devaluation of the peso due to pressure from investors and a subsequent significant economic crisis. The paper examines the Mexican government's response to this currencycrisis, "tesebonos", and shows the gains from this external trade growth.
From the Paper "The response to this currency crisis that the Mexican government used was the so - called "Tesebonos", "a short-term security whose principal was indexed to the dollar" . Practically, these were a form of insurance or governmental guarantee for the foreign investors. This was type of security guaranteed the foreign investor that the investment he made in Mexico would not be affected by the peso devaluation and that it would still be calculated with direct connection to the US dollar."
Abstract This paper offers an economic analysis of the financial crisis in Argentina. It discusses long term and immediate problems. The author also explores Argentina's economic restructuring in the early 1990s. The paper expands on the privatization initiative and changes in the banking system.
Abstract This paper explains that, because investors lost confidence, the Asian financial crisis was not just a domestic problem but rather spread to other parts of the, world especially Third World countries. The author posits that the recovery from the crisis was dependent on the macro economy prior to the crisis within each country. The paper relates that South Korea and Malaysia have different internal structures, were at different levels of development before the crisis and have different survival rates with very different 'after crisis' scenarios. The author points out that the crisis in Malaysia was more of a currencycrisis, which had spillover effects within other sectors of the macro economy; however, South Korea faced more of a banking crisis. The paper discuses the role of the International Monetary Fund, the government's role in each region and the Asian Monetary Fund to present a policy outline for preventing future crises.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
A Historical Debate
Asian Financial Crisis: A Closer Look at South Korea and Malaysia
Role of the IMF
Figure 1: Malaysia's and South Korean Unemployment Worsened by IMF Policies
Asian Monetary Fund: Policies and Procedures for Future Crises.
Figure 2: Economic Growth, the Main Aim of the AMF: Implications for Asia
From the Paper "There were a lot of issues that caused the financial crisis. Mainly, investors lost confidence in the Asian market and started to remove capital from South Korea and Malaysia. The onset of the loss of confidence by investors began when the economies, such as Mexico had crises that preceded the Asian crisis. Similarly, the United States was increasing interest rates during the period to lower inflation as part of its monetary policy. Investors prefer to invest in the United States versus Asia, since the former is considered less risky."
Abstract This paper states that, although globalization has many powerful benefits, financial globalization is not necessarily always a force for good, as in the case of South Korea. The author points out that, before the 1997 crisis, South Korea had embraced globalization and had become one of the great economic success stories in history. The author relates that financial liberalization and globalization were perverted by powerful business interests, which resulted in a banking crisis, a currencycrisis and, finally, a full-fledged financial crisis. The paper stresses that the villains of the Korean crisis were the family-owned conglomerates called "chaebol" and their allies in the pre-crisis Korean government. The paper also describes the steps taken by South Korea to stem the downturn and to re-emerge as the strongest economy among all the countries that have experienced financial crises.
From the Paper "South Korea's macroeconomic fundamentals were strong before the crisis. In 1996 inflation in South Korea was below 5%, real output growth was close to 7%, and the country was expected to grow at a rate of more than 6% in 1997. The government budget was in slight surplus, while the current account deficit had fallen from 4.4% of GDP in 1996 to less than 2% in 1997. From a macroeconomic point of view, the South Korean economy seemed well managed, so the financial crisis cannot be attributed to macroeconomic fundamentals. Instead, the source of the crisis was perversion of the financial liberalization process, which had some particularly strange elements."
Abstract The East Asian financial crisis was an important developmental economic event in that region. This paper attempts to put that financial crisis in perspective. The paper examines the speculation on whether the region still might suffer from or be prone to the effects of such a financial crisis. The paper also explains that the East Asian financial crisis can best be characterized as a currencycrisis.
Outline:
I. Introduction
Motivation
Problem Definition
Goals and Objectives
Significance of Study
Summary of Results
II. Literature Review
Relative to Prior Research
Relevant Literature
Theory and Methodology
III. Methodology
Relation to Previous and Present Literature
Hypothesis Formulation
Advantages and Limitations
Plan of Analysis
IV. Data Collection and Analysis
Results and Explanations
Achievement of Goals and Objectives
V. Implications and Policy Recommendations
Implications
Policy Recommendations
From the Paper "The 1997 East Asian financial crisis, also known as the IMF crisis, caused the contraction of many formerly robust East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. The crisis began in Thailand and quickly spread throughout the region with sudden devaluation of currencies, stock markets and various other economic structures (Li). One unique characteristic of the East Asian financial crisis was not that it occurred but that it spread like a pandemic from one economy to the other in the region. The problem examined here is whether these conditions or characteristics that led to the financial crisis in the region persist in any real sense."
Abstract This paper is about what came to be known as the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, which hit Thailand in July 1997, soon engulfed most of the countries in the region and at one time threatened to spread the world over. It traces the history and background of the crisis, the reasons why it happened, the effects it has had socially, politically and economically. The paper also covers the approaches adopted by the countries involved, and the international financial institutions to overcome the crisis and the lessons that need to be learnt from it. The focus of the paper is on the business and economic aspects of the crisis and only briefly covers its cultural, social, and political ramifications.
From the Paper "The next country to be affected by the Thai contagion was Philippines. Its central bank tried to support its currency by increasing the interest rates overnight. The Thai finance minister who was against devaluing the country's currency resigned on June 19. The Thai prime minister continued to declare that his country would "never devalue the baht" as late as June 30. But things had already gone out of hand as the Thailand's central bank had limited reserves of dollars and soon ran out of them in trying to defend the bath. The Bank of Thailand was forced to announce a managed float of the currency on July 2 with an SOS to IMF for help. This resulted in a sudden devaluation of baht to record lows against the dollar and the start of the currency crisis in East Asia was well and truly underway."
