Abstract
This paper looks at the currency crisis in Thailand, which started in the summer of 1997 and rapidly engulfed a number of East Asian "Tiger economies" in a major financial crisis. This crisis became a an interesting case study for economists who were interested in analyzing the pros and cons of globalization and laissez faire market economies. The author further examines the effects of the East Asian currency crisis, on Thailand itself, which underwent a painful re-adjustment of its economy.

Outline:
Background
The Danger Signals
Foreign Exchange Reserves
Current Accounts Deficit
Excessive Credit Expansion
Why Did the Growth Slow Down?
The Housing and Real Estate Bubble
The Stock Market Bubble
The Crisis
The Aftermath of the Crisis for Thailand
Conclusion

From the Paper
"The country took a number of measures to attract foreign capital during the 1980 and early 1990s. These included lifting of restrictions on foreign investments, elimination of most barriers on foreign ownership of export oriented industries, granting of tax incentives to foreign mutual funds and investments in the stock market, creation of closed-end mutual funds, and reduction of taxes on dividends remitted abroad (Antczak 40-41). These measures along with a pegged exchange rate policy (i.e., the Thai currency baht was pegged to the dollar and its value rose and fell with dollar's value), and the large differential in interest rates provided comfort to foreign investors who came to Thailand in droves. "

Tags:Thailand, currency, crisis, globalization, Asia

Abstract
The paper provides the background of the 1997 Asian currency crisis and explains the five main causal factors. The paper then explores the effects of the Asian currency crisis on the Asian economic paradigm and concludes by relating that major hindrances still remain in the banking system.

Outline:
Main Explanations of the 1997 Asian Currency Crisis
Implications of the Crisis for the Asian Economic Paradigm

From the Paper
"The Asian currency crisis started in two phases of currency depreciations which were underway since the initial part of summer of 1997. The first round was marked by a steep decline of the Thai Bhat, the Malaysian Ringgit, the Philippine Peso and the Rupiah of Indonesia. Following the stabilization of the currencies, the second round set off with downward pressures hitting the Taiwan dollar, Won of S. Korea, Singaporean and Hong Kong Dollar. The governments of these nations had countered weakness in their currencies through the process of selling foreign exchange reserves and raising interest rates that in effect rendered economic growth sluggish and have made interest-bearing securities more appealing compared to equities. The currency crises also brought to light acute problems within the banking and financial sectors of the burdened Asian economies. (Nanto, 1998)"

Tags:currency, foreign, exchange, rates, interest, investments, liabilities, debt, policies

Abstract
This document discusses currency crises and utilizes the Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998 and the Mexican peso crisis of 1994 as illustrative examples. In both of these examples, the writer notes that the currency crises were precipitated by sudden capital flights out of the markets in question which exacerbated the devaluation of the currencies. In essence, the writer maintains that currency crises occur because investors, internal or external, leave a market suddenly and with little prior indication. The writer concludes that regardless of how valid the investor assumption of impending currency devaluation is the fact of their sudden flight from the market always leads to the devaluation they were predicting.

Outline:
Abstract
Currency Crises in Asia and Mexico
Overview
Asian Financial Crisis
South Korean Crisis
Central Bank & OMO
Exchange Rate Behavior
Conclusion
Mexican Currency Crisis
Overview
Build up to Crisis
The Trigger
Conclusion

From the Paper
"Thus, because of the currency speculators, who are typically foreign institutional investors, introduce a degree of risk simply through the size of their investment in a single currency that would not otherwise be there if the speculation was limited to smaller investors. While there are a whole slew of factors that must accompany a genuine currency crisis, in general, a crisis develops as these large institutional speculators perceive a decline in value of the currency and dump their investments en masse. The ensuing devaluation of the currency in question is unsustainable and the event often exposes other fundamental economic weaknesses that were disguised previous to the onset of the currency crisis, such as credit over extension in the market and a lack of foreign capital reserves."

Tags:financial, investors, devaluation, assets

Abstract
The paper discusses the primary explanations for the 1997 Asian currency crisis and highlights the implications of that crisis for the Asian economic paradigm.

Outline:
1985 - Plaza Accord (Appreciation of Yet Against Dollar)
Liberalization (Bank of Japan, Foreign Loans)
Kieretsu - Export of Capital
End of Bubble Economy
Foreign Banks Lending Expands
1988 -Gsp Status Ends (4 Tigers Economy)
1994 - China: Devaluation of Currency
1995-96 -Mini-Recession, Debt Problem, Accumulation
1996-97 - Debt/ Foreign Exchange, Reserve Rations Deteriorate
1997 July 2nd - Currency Crisis Expands From Thailand into East
Aian Countries
Explanation of the Asian Crisis

From the Paper
"Following the Plaza Accord the Bank of Japan was characterized by liberalization and specifically in the area of foreign loans and as well the Bank of Thailand followed the same course in lending. Entrepreneurs in Asia are noted in the work of Wong entitled: "Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis relates that Asians are known to place a general trust in their governments for enactment of economic policies which are sound and "their failure to sense the dangers of borrowing short in foreign currency and investing in long-term projects with earnings denominated in local currency was disastrous." (Wong, nd) In July 1997 Thailand "ran out of foreign reserves and devalued the baht which lost over 1/2 of its value. Having admitted the total loss of foreign reserves, there was a run on the bank of Thailand and this quickly spread to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Attempts of the International Monetary Fund to assist these countries was not successful with too small a bailout package at too late of a date."

Tags:torrent, of, funds, debt, chronic, weakness, bailout, funds

Abstract
"This paper is an examination of the Southeast Asia currency crisis in general and its relationship to, and possible impact on, the field of international banking (The BCCI affair..., 1992, Online; Haq, 1998).

From the Paper
"This paper is an examination of the Southeast Asia currency crisis in general and its relationship to, and possible impact on, the field of international banking (The BCCI affair..., 1992, Online; Haq, 1998). One of the primary topics to be discussed is the fact that as a business and practice, an international bank has the primary goal of measuring an economy's performance and the stability of its currency so that investors can identify investment opportunities and thereby make value-added business decisions (Tamburini, 1997, 32).

Another topic addressed in this paper will be to explain and examine the reasons for the fluctuations in currency values, most of which are caused by a phenomenon caused by the currency exchange rate. Simply defined, this means the value comparison..."

Abstract
Though the situation is still unfolding and surely will continue to for many years to come it can confidently be said that this is the worst economic crisis the world has experienced since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Until very recently, most analysts had confined the crisis to Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Some obdurate analysts even continue to suggest that the Asian 'miracle' is still far from over! These, and many other predictions that the crisis would result in only a short, sharp downturn with almost no impact on the major capitalist countries, have all proved to be wrong. Severe economic crisis in Japan along with economic slowdown in China, currency lows in Canada, South Africa, Mexico and many other countries, and the finale of the stumbling American economy, do clearly suggest that the crisis is endemic to the entire global system. This is an ugly and painful realization, but it is indeed reality. Not only does it seem that the Asian miracle is surely over, but that the burgeoning global economy is headed for a drastic slowdown.

Abstract
This paper is about what came to be known as the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, which hit Thailand in July 1997, soon engulfed most of the countries in the region and at one time threatened to spread the world over. It traces the history and background of the crisis, the reasons why it happened, the effects it has had socially, politically and economically. The paper also covers the approaches adopted by the countries involved, and the international financial institutions to overcome the crisis and the lessons that need to be learnt from it. The focus of the paper is on the business and economic aspects of the crisis and only briefly covers its cultural, social, and political ramifications.

From the Paper
"The next country to be affected by the Thai contagion was Philippines. Its central bank tried to support its currency by increasing the interest rates overnight. The Thai finance minister who was against devaluing the country's currency resigned on June 19. The Thai prime minister continued to declare that his country would "never devalue the baht" as late as June 30. But things had already gone out of hand as the Thailand's central bank had limited reserves of dollars and soon ran out of them in trying to defend the bath. The Bank of Thailand was forced to announce a managed float of the currency on July 2 with an SOS to IMF for help. This resulted in a sudden devaluation of baht to record lows against the dollar and the start of the currency crisis in East Asia was well and truly underway."

Tags:thailand, yen, japan, south, korea, taiwan, imf, economy, banks

Abstract
This paper explores the causes of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and traces the roots of the crisis back to the area's economic growth that started in the early 1990s. The paper explains that, while the crisis is believed to have begun in Thailand, conditions that existed throughout the region contributed to the destabilization of the economies of the other Southeast Asian countries as well.

From the Paper
"Throughout the early 1990s, growth in southeast Asia attracted much foreign capital. However, by 1995 and 1996, Thailand's current account deficit had grown (from 5.7% in "93 to 8.5% in "96 [Pesenti et al., 1998]). When domestic production slowed, this account imbalance represented an even greater percentage, when compared to GDP. Much of the instability in Thailand's economy was brought about by heavy short-term borrowing that required stringent debt maintenance. A boom in real estate and the Thai stock market attracted foreign speculation that could not be sustained in the face of investor doubts. The Thai government attempted to shore up shaky investor confidence by officially backing the financial institutions that were heavily indebted abroad."

Tags:indonesia, korea, japan, foreign, investment, domestic, production, development, baht

Abstract
This paper reviews ten articles on the currency crises of the past 20 years. The paper examines the global impact a crisis in one country or area has on the world, such as the Asian currency crisis of the 1990s, and discusses the notion that currency crises are self-fulfilling. The paper also looks at whether currency crises are predictable.

From the Paper
"Currency crises have gained much attention in the past years because they have apparently occurred with greater frequency than in the past or perhaps because the global nature of today's financial markets make a currency crisis in one nation a concern around the world. Increasingly, currency stability is of interest to more than just economists and policy makers, with companies and individual investors noting the movement or stability of various currencies with interest .These are not necessarily new stakeholders with regard to..."

Tags:Currency crises, currency crisis, literature review

Abstract
This study applies ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation procedures, with and without lags, to identify the causes of currency crises in selected economies during the 1997-98 East Asian currency and financial crisis. The author states that the cause of the crisis was attributed to initial macroeconomic conditions, weak macroeconomic fundamentals, financial sector regulation, and policy reaction. The paper relates that the empirical results were consistent with previous literature on currency crises; episodes of depreciation appear to be associated with the depletion of foreign exchange reserves and the increase in foreign liabilities. Equations. Tables.

Table of Contents
Introduction
Classical Theory
Empirical Research Explaining Currency Crisis
First Generation Models
Second Generation Models
Third Generation Models
Policy Reactions and the Role of the IMF
Conceptual Model
Initial Conditions
Deterioration of Macroeconomic Fundamentals
International Sector and Financial Regulation
Macroeconomic Policy
Ideal and Actual Data
Measuring the Symptoms
Measuring Currency Crisis
Actual Data
Results and Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix I: Summary of Data and Indicators Used in Previous Studies
Appendix II: General F-Tests
Appendix III: Statistical Analysis for Multicollinearity and Heteroskedasticity
Appendix IV: E-views Output of Granger Causality Tests

From the Paper
"Although Korea, the Philippines and Thailand followed the classic prescription of raising their interest rate to defend their currencies, all three saw continued depreciations, well in excess of what would be predicted by the currency crisis models Furman and Stiglitz (1997). From a policy perspective, Goldfajn and Gupta (1998) look the real exchange rate "undervaluation" episodes in 80 countries following the crises to assess whether tight monetary policy brings about a recovery in the real exchange rate through a nominal appreciation of the exchange rate. They find that in their total sample, tight monetary policy increases the probability of recovery by about 10 percentage points. But among countries undergoing simultaneous banking and currency crisis, as in East Asia, tight monetary policy is associated with roughly 10 percentage points lower probability of success. Both of these differences are statistically significant."

Tags:theory, ols, lags, reserves, liabilities