Abstract
This paper stresses that Cuba has been a point of contention between the US and other nations ever since the US gained independence thus resulting in many Cuban crises such as the nineteenth century "Cuban Question". Next, the paper focuses on the 1962 missile crisis which was not just another Cuban problem because the presence of USSR's nuclear missiles in Cuba meant that the whole earth could have been annihilated. The paper traces the history of this period from the USA failure at the Bay of Pigs to Cuba's continued relations with the Soviets.

Table of Contents:
Introduction
Nuclear Possibilities
The Cuban Crisis: Khrushchev and Kennedy
The Event and Aftermath: Postmortem
Missiles, Cigars, Castro and the Soviets
Conclusion

From the Paper
"The frenzied activity did not go unnoticed by the US authorities. According to the CIA, the then Deputy Director for Intelligence, Ray Cline, informed of this activity to McGeorge Bundy, the 'National Security Adviser' to the President. The President of the United States Kennedy was informed of the developments. According to the CIA, the information of the Soviet action was passed on to the agency by a double agent, serving Soviet military intelligence officer, Oleg Penkovsky. Based on this information the e ExComm recommended a 'quarantine' of the navy on military shipments of USSR to Cuba."

Tags:fidel, kennedy, installations, cia, khrushchev

Abstract
This paper gives an in-depth analysis of the role of American intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The paper further examines the shortcomings of the U.S. intelligence community in the last-half of 1962 which it cites as having made the Cuban Missile Crisis as frightful as it was. At the same time, while directing the reader to the CIA's failings the paper will considers President John F. Kennedy and argues that Kennedy's skepticism towards anything coming from the CIA made him phlegmatic in addressing the Soviet threat only about 90 miles from the continental United States.

From the Paper
"The role of American intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis has long been a topic of discussion among scholars. With that in mind, the following several pages will look at how the shortcomings - even lassitude - of the U.S. intelligence community in the last-half of 1962 made the Cuban Missile Crisis as frightful as it was. At the same time, while directing the reader to the CIA's failings (including, briefly, the failings of its then-director, John McCone), the paper will also turn its attention to President John F. Kennedy and argue that Kennedy's skepticism towards anything coming from the CIA made him phlegmatic in addressing the..."

Tags:cuban, missile, crisis

Abstract
In this paper, the writer examines President John F. Kennedy's decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The writer provides a background of the crisis. In the article, the writer discusses dealings between Kennedy and Soviet leader, Khrushchev. The writer also covers the outcome of the crisis.

From the Paper
"The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in October when the Soviet Union under the leadership of Premier Nikita Khrushchev began placing offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba, just miles off the U. S. coast. Traditionally, historians have contended that Khrushchev began placing the missiles in Cuba from a position of strength, intended to defy a weak foe, President John F. Kennedy. They emphasized the apparent resolve Kennedy showed in dealing with Khrushchev, essentially portraying Kennedy as a man who finally became presidential during ... "

Tags:kennedy, cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev

Abstract
The paper discusses how during the Cuban Missile Crisis in late October of 1962, President John F. Kennedy's ability to balance issues of national interest against the imminent threat of global nuclear war was the most important aspect of his leadership. The paper notes that ironically, it was the dissension within the ranks of Kennedy's advisors that ultimately produced a viable solution that enabled the United States to compel Soviet removal of the missiles from Cuba without an invasion and subsequent escalation into nuclear war.

From the Paper
"During the Cuban Missile Crisis in late October of 1962, President John F. Kennedy's ability to balance issues of national interest against the imminent threat of global nuclear war was the most important aspect of his leadership. Ironically, it was the dissension within the ranks of Kennedy's advisors that ultimately produced a viable solution that enabled the United States to compel Soviet removal of the missiles from Cuba without an invasion and subsequent escalation into nuclear war."

Tags:cuban, missile, crisis

Abstract
A very brief overview of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

From the Paper
"The Cuban Missile Crisis was one of the most dangerous moments in the history of the human race. For sixteen days in October of 1962, the world watched in horror as the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a stare-down over nuclear weapons deployed by the Soviet Union in Cuba. Five months earlier in May of 1962, the premier of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, decided to deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba. This decision was seen as a way to counter the vast..."

Tags:cuban, missile, crisis, kennedy, kruschev, 1962

Abstract
The paper argues that the leadership of John F. Kennedy was tested during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The paper explains that the creation of the ExComm, together with JFK's own willingness to heed advice, take responsibility for decisions and explore all options, may well have spared the world from nuclear disaster.

From the Paper
"President John F. Kennedy is today celebrated as much for his steady leadership during tumultuous times as he is lauded for his eloquence and ability to inspire. At no time during his presidency and perhaps during his life would JFK be asked to handle an event more challenging-and more potentially combustible-than the Cuban Missile Crisis."

Tags:JFK, Kennedy, Cuban Missile Crisis, ExComm, Khrushchev

Abstract
The paper discusses the Cold War, viewed as a battle of power between the two major actors, the United States of America and the USSR, had several turning points in its evolution. The paper continues and states that one of the most important moments of the Cold War, when mankind was closest to a nuclear disaster, happened in 1962 in Cuba. The paper then relates that, in order to further understanding of the crisis, it discusses it in a historical context, describes it and discusses its results within the Cold War evolution. The paper concludes that an effect of the crisis was the creation of a direct link between the US and the USSR (the Hot Line) which represented a first step towards a better communication and cooperation between the two political systems.

From the Paper
"The beginning of the crisis can be placed when the American President, John F. Kennedy was notified that the Soviets deployed missile equipment and missiles in Cuba, on October 16, 1962. Viewed as a serious threat not only for the American security but also a threat for the European Allies, the US's response had a large number of possibilities to be taken into account. These were "a Blockade Plan--employs 24 to 36 destroyers, a carrier task force, etc., which can marshal significant strength to blockade Cuba, both air and maritime; air Strike Plan--currently being revised, but employs between 450 and 500 aircraft. (...); fast Reaction Assault Plan--employs both air-borne and amphibious assault with about 32,000 troops in initial phase, with balance of assault forces arriving in increments as they become available. Ultimately builds up to about 80,000 troops in Cuba around D+18 days. Full-Scale Deliberate Assault Plan--employs simultaneous airborne and amphibious assault with around 49,000 troops engaged on D-Day, building to about 60,000 by D+5 days, and again to 80,000 by D+16 days." (The Avalon Project, 1998). Form the scenarios that President Kennedy and his team made, the first option was chosen. This was a very important moment not only for the crisis itself, but for the evolution of the Cold War. A military naval blockade was chosen for several reasons: Kennedy wanted to diffuse the crisis on the basis of a non-military action that would have probably given reason for an increase in tensions between the US and the USSR. Also, because the US was unable to 100% prove that USSR had rockets in that area it needed to gain support from its European allies. "

Tags:cuban, missile, blockade, crisis, missiles, nuclear

Abstract
The paper compares and contrasts the structural realism of state nationalism (America as a first world power) and the liberal tenets of a naval blockade. The paper explains that by realizing the limited range of diplomatic deals involving two equally powerful first world nations, we can see that the use of structural realism dictates the international use of nationalism and state power to achieve a means to solving the crisis. However, the paper points out that the liberal ideology of a naval blockade provides a more passive, yet more effective means of practical use of force against the Soviets.

Tags:cuban, missile, crisis

Abstract
This paper indicates that there were serious intelligence concerns in both the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis with negative results for both the American and Cuban people and that led to further problems with the Cold War and other relationships. Next, the author reviews the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban missile crisis and the role of the Cold War in Cuban intelligence. The paper does conclude that, despite mistakes made, in general, intelligence did prevent Cuba from having Soviet-built missiles. This paper has end notes instead of a bibliography.

Table of Contents:
Introduction
The Bay of Pigs Invasion
The Cuban Missile Crisis
The Cold War - Its Role in Cuban Intelligence
Conclusion

From the Paper
"In 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion was designed to overthrow the Cuban government, led by Fidel Castro . A force of American immigrants who had been exiled from Cuba and trained by the US was used in that attempt. The attempt was unsuccessful, and the immigrants were supposed to invade southwest Cuba . They were given help by the US Air Force. The invasion planning had begun in 1960, and the funding for it began at that time, as well. However, the actual invasion was not carried out until April of the next year .
The way that the invasion was planned relied heavily on intelligence. A battalion of people cannot just go into a country and try to overthrow it without some planning. They have to have some idea of what they are doing and why they are doing it, and they also need to know what tactics should be employed, where the best place to strike can be found, and where to locate any other people who they might be looking for. These kinds of things are what intelligence is for and one of the main reasons behind it. However, getting that intelligence - and getting it correctly - can be a serious issue for a lot of countries both during war time and when things are mostly peaceful.

Tags:lapses consistent, soviet union, monroe doctrine, superpowers

Abstract
There are two views, as with any conflict or issue, on the reasons and reactions of the major players in the Cuban Missile Crisis that took place at the end of October 1962. The crisis pitted two world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, against each other in what many describe as the closest the world has come to World War III and a nuclear holocaust. This paper examines the background of the crisis from the Cuban/Soviet point of view in depth. Towards the end of the paper, the United States' perspective of the crisis is discussed.

Table of Contents:
Introduction
Background
Upheaval in Cuba - the Bay of Pigs
The Cuban Missile Crisis
The Beginning of Hostilities
The United States Perspective

From the Paper
"The account from the Cuban point-of-view paints Kennedy as a man obsessed with removing Castro from Cuba. In Robert Kennedy's memoir, he portrays his brother as someone eager to get the missiles out in a peaceful fashion. Kennedy was in favor of the blockade, despite the advice that this was a weak response and that military action was in order. Among those dissenting was Senator J. William Fullbright of Arkansas. Schlesinger points out that the Soviets were no match for the United States, a point made continually from the Cuban point-of-view; however the take of the this fact is spun differently on the American side. If Kennedy had been completely set on ridding Cuba of Castro, he could have used the Soviet deployment to invade and overthrow Castro's regime. Instead the two Kennedy brothers led the fight against invasion in favor of a peaceful solution."

Tags:Fidel, Castro, General, Batista, Eisenhower, Khrushchev