Abstract
The paper looks at America's past experiences with counterinsurgency and discusses how the US would gain by emulating the four broad principles of counterinsurgency that Britain employed to successfully target insurgency. The paper addresses the ethics of counterinsurgency, argues that counterinsurgency policies followed by the US were ruthless, inhumane, and even clumsy, and suggests the strategy of "disaggregation" in the war against terrorism. The paper emphasizes, however, that counterinsurgency doctrines cannot be abandoned altogether. The paper therefore concludes that combining force on an "as and when needed" basis with a focus on minimizing casualties and increasing nation-building activities would definitely bolster the counterinsurgency measures and be a significant step towards long-term peace and stability in the world.

Outline:
Introduction
Discussion
Past Experiences
European Experience and the 4 Principles of COIN
Ethics of Counterinsurgency
Classical Counterinsurgency and New Methods
Lessons Learnt by the US Marines and the US Army
Military Victory versus Long-term Settlement/Peace
Conclusion

From the Paper
"Insurgency is a combination of subversion and guerrilla warfare tactics used by a small fraction of a discontent population to enfeeble and finally conquer a nation from within. Insurgents normally operate from a materially and numerically weak position and operate within a discontented population by gaining the support of some adherents. They target government facilities, use hit-and-run tactics and use violence to focus attention to their cause. Countering such "low-intensity conflicts" which do not have the position of a full scale war, but are devastating nonetheless, is extremely complex and difficult. Such unconventional war robs the conventional forces of the advantages normally associated with firepower, mobility and numbers, engages the force in long drawn out engagements with an indefinite ending and confusing objectives and at the same time exposes them to criticisms from all quarters. (Joes, 1999, p. 26)"

Tags:insurgency, terrorism, force, casualities, military, jihad, ethics

Abstract
This essay examines and analyzes the Soviet approach to counterinsurgency during the Soviet-Afghan War. Four aspects of the Soviet counterinsurgency are considered. Firstly, the Soviet's initial approach to the insurgents. Secondly, the Soviet approach of seeking out and destroying the insurgents outside secured areas. Next, the Soviet's use of terrorism to reinstate control. Finally, the fledgling level of discipline of Soviet troops and its effect in the counterinsurgency. Through this research, this paper concludes that the Soviets had a ruthless approach to counterinsurgency with doctrine that had been applied to past conflicts and was not tailored to Afghanistan.

From the Paper
"Leading up to the Soviet-Afghan war, the USSR had learnt much from their experiences in internal irregular conflicts to consolidate communist revolutions in Eastern Europe and in Central Asia. They had learnt that fast conventional forces in overwhelming numbers taking key political and military points, or what could be called a type of 'shock and awe' campaign of the contemporary age, had been effective in the quelling of rebellions against Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. The Soviets had also learnt that the creation and strengthening of a mass-based political organisation was a part of the first step in effective counterinsurgency in Central Asia. Subsequently, a form of counterinsurgency doctrine had been developed from these conflicts."

Tags:insurgency, counterinsurgency, Afghanistan, soviet-afghan, war, Taliban

Abstract
This paper examines how the word "uniform" mostly conjures up two examples, the military and prison. It analyzes how, although uniforms are designed with functionality in mind, they also have features that either give power to the wearer or take power away. It looks at the history of uniforms in the American militia, shows how rank insignia gives the wearer unquestionable power over his subordinates, and how, with military rank insignias prominently displayed, no matter which of the plethora of uniforms a soldier is wearing, a fellow member of the military can quickly determine if the person he or she is seeing is a superior.

From the Paper
"The uniforms of early America were as varied as the groups who fought in them, although they too occasionally had design elements that signified rank, most of the deviation was to signify which company a man was a member of. For example, "in 1772 the uniform of the Independent Foot Companies of New York were, for the Grenadiers blue, with red facings, for the Fusileers, the same with bearskin caps. The Forresters and the Rangers wore short green coats with buff or crimson facings (and) the dark blue with red facings was worn by the artillery." (Long) Each company had unique uniform systems. And, if a company did have variations within its troops, they didn't always have variations indicating the rank of the wearer. With all of the different uniforms in use, one company would not necessarily understand the differences of another company's uniforms."

Tags:prison, rank, insignia, power

Abstract
In this article, the writer reviews and assesses strategic military intelligence focusing on reviewing and assessing strategic analysis methods, techniques and practice. The writer looks at military power as an important tool of foreign policy and discusses how this is supported by military intelligence.

From the Paper
"Foreign policy is the totality of a state's relations with and policies toward other nations. Military power is an important tool of effective foreign policy. For some countries military power is the most effective foreign policy tool when the objective of a country is to impose its will on another country. Military intelligence is the collection analysis assessment and interpretation of information that supports the effective application of military power."

Tags:strategic analysis, foreign policy, military power

Abstract
This paper discusses President Dwight Eisenhower's warning to Americans in 1961 to beware of the military-industrial complex. It explains why he was concerned about the power and influence being accumulated by the defense industry in the United States. The paper discusses the influence of the Cold War tensions between the communist world and the free world on Eisenhower's military-industrial complex concerns.

From the Paper
" In conclusion, President Dwight Eisenhower's warning in 1961 of the power and influence being accumulated by the military-industrial complex was based on his concerns that the Cold War tensions between the communist world and the free world was creating a permanent industrial-military-political power base in the United States.
President Eisenhower believed that the massive spending on conventional and nuclear weaponry generated by the Cold War was necessary to a certain extent, but he also considered the military-industrial complex that has been created by this spending to be a potential threat to America's democratic institutions and to world peace. That threat is no longer just potential, it is very real, and is inflicting grave damage on America's economy and democratic institutions every day."

Tags:power, communist, nuclear, democracy

Abstract
The paper identifies three reasons why Hitler managed to gain such power; there was rampant anti-Semitism, the rest of the world underestimated him and Hitler also managed to gain the trust of the German people because he carried out his promises. The paper therefore shows how Hitler gained power through a brilliant combination of politics, economic policy and psychological and military might. The paper points out that it is easy from a new millennium perspective to dismiss Adolf Hitler as an obsessive madman who fooled an entire nation, but, on the contrary, Hitler was a brilliant politician who sold himself very well and eliminated those who did not buy his philosophy.

From the Paper
"On March 7, 1936, German troops, under the leadership of dictator Adolf Hitler, took over the Rhineland. Hitler not only blatantly violated the Treaty of Versailles; this act, essentially the beginning of World War Two, proved to the world that Hitler was not only a force to be reckoned with; it also gave later scholars years of theorizing as to how a supposedly "civilized" country like Germany could fall definitively under the spell off such a man. One can essentially pinpoint three definitive reasons why Hitler could have gained such power."

Tags:anti-Semitism, Jews, scapegoats, military

Abstract
The paper examines the various forms of government, including, pluralism, social democracy, participatory democracy and the concept of elitism. The paper focuses on the system of military elitism where all citizens would be granted an equal opportunity to participate in the government, but, this participation would be founded upon the individuals' participation in the military of the country. The paper then considers the potential negative outcomes of military elitism but concludes with a positive perspective of this form of government.

Outline:
Who Should Rule
The Potential Political Venues
The Proposed System and Value of Military Elitism
The Elitism in Current Military Spending
The Arguments Against Military Elitist Government
Conclusion

From the Paper
"The form of government which is perceived as the most fair in regards to both the connection and investment of the citizen with the government, alongside the citizen's capacity to obtain power through the government, is military elitism. In this form of government, participation would be limited to those who have served in the military. By establishing this requirement, it ensures that all those living within the country who wish to achieve political power must first help the country through serving it in the military. This would create a ruling class of individuals who have and will continue to serve the country, with hopefully its best intentions in mind."

Tags:social, participatory, democracy, pluralism, elite, policy, power

Abstract
Comparing and contrasting a current event like the war in Iraq with an historical event like President Eisenhower's warning about the military-industrial complex enables us to realize that those who forget the past are likely to suffer the consequences. Most Americans have forgotten about President Eisenhower's warning in 1961 of the growing power and influence of the military-industrial complex, and America is suffering the consequences today, for we are mired in a war in Iraq that benefits no one except the massive defense industry.

From the Paper
The Military-Industrial Complex and the War in Iraq: A Warning Unheeded Comparing and contrasting a current event like the war in Iraq with an historical event like President Eisenhower's warning about the military-industrial complex enables us to realize that those who forget the past are likely to suffer the consequences. Most Americans have forgotten about President Eisenhower's warning in 1961 of the growing power and influence of the military-industrial complex, and America is suffering the consequences today, for we are mired in a war in Iraq that

Tags:military, industrial, complex

Abstract
The paper describes "Carnage and Culture" as a conservative view of Western military history that asserts that Western military might is superior to and cannot be defeated by non-Westerners. The paper examines Hanson's reasons why certain fundamentals of Western society and culture make this the case. The paper discusses how Hanson believes that the war in Iraq is not only winnable, but that victory is a certainty. The paper contends that, on the contrary, current events are teaching us that in many ways the war on Iraq has already been lost.

From the Paper
"Hanson, author of The Western Way of War (1989) and The Other Greeks (1995), has chosen nine battles fought by the West against various non-Western enemies that prove, as Hanson claims, why Western cultures have been able to field armies and navies capable of routing numerically superior enemies all across history. Seven of these battles were victories for the West. Of the other two, one is the ruinous Roman defeat at Cannae in 216 B.C, and the other an offensive in the late stages of the Vietnam War in 1968 - a strategic victory overseas that became a political defeat at home in the United States. Each of these battles is lovingly recreated - and some critics claim re-imagined in favor of the author's speculations - as Hanson spells out his thesis; that the Western war machine is superior, and that it is the personal politics of the individual that make it so."

Tags:military, might, victory, weaponry, warfare, Iraq

Abstract
This paper examines the Vietnam Phoenix program and discusses whether the Phoenix program was successful and the problems that were associated with it. It specifically discusses the lessons that can be learned for counterinsurgency from the years 1967 to 1972 and then goes on to examine how these lessons can be applied to the War in Iraq.

Table of Contents:
Abstract
Introduction
Research Question
Scope and Significance
Summation
Thesis Overview
Literature Review
The Phoenix Program in Vietnam
Methodology
Data and Findings
Lessons Learned from Phoenix
Conclusions/Recommendations
Applications for Iraq

From the Paper
"The lesson learned from Phoenix and from the Vietnam War in general was that the open airing of the ugly side of war is to be avoided at all costs, and yet the Abu Ghraib offenders seem to have never learned this particular lesson. Moving forward from this discussion the U.S. must come up with a comprehensive plan to regain the trust of the Muslim world. The U.S. must disunite a previously fractured system of groups, who united on the idealism of the high level of morality that is stressed in the Islamic faith, all without further dividing the many factions that will eventually have to live together in a unified nation, if that is still in the cards. It is for this reason that the humanitarian lessons of the Phoenix Program must be reiterated even further, as well as the need to win back the hearts and minds of those Iraqis not interested in further strife and insurgent attacks. Another lesson that was learned during the Phoenix Program was an essential need to rely on the civic system to relate information and understanding regarding the history and intentions of each group. Armed militias, not unlike those in North Vietnam, assert power and influence through coercion and violence and demand infrastructural support from the region in which they work, similar to the VC. The lesson here is being that state-building and realistic infrastructural support systems must be built in these regions, for lasting change to become effected."

Tags:counterinsurgency power military, human rights