Abstract
This essay examines and analyzes the Soviet approach to counterinsurgency during the Soviet-Afghan War. Four aspects of the Soviet counterinsurgency are considered. Firstly, the Soviet's initial approach to the insurgents. Secondly, the Soviet approach of seeking out and destroying the insurgents outside secured areas. Next, the Soviet's use of terrorism to reinstate control. Finally, the fledgling level of discipline of Soviet troops and its effect in the counterinsurgency. Through this research, this paper concludes that the Soviets had a ruthless approach to counterinsurgency with doctrine that had been applied to past conflicts and was not tailored to Afghanistan.

From the Paper
"Leading up to the Soviet-Afghan war, the USSR had learnt much from their experiences in internal irregular conflicts to consolidate communist revolutions in Eastern Europe and in Central Asia. They had learnt that fast conventional forces in overwhelming numbers taking key political and military points, or what could be called a type of 'shock and awe' campaign of the contemporary age, had been effective in the quelling of rebellions against Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. The Soviets had also learnt that the creation and strengthening of a mass-based political organisation was a part of the first step in effective counterinsurgency in Central Asia. Subsequently, a form of counterinsurgency doctrine had been developed from these conflicts."

Tags:insurgency, counterinsurgency, Afghanistan, soviet-afghan, war, Taliban

Abstract
The paper looks at America's past experiences with counterinsurgency and discusses how the US would gain by emulating the four broad principles of counterinsurgency that Britain employed to successfully target insurgency. The paper addresses the ethics of counterinsurgency, argues that counterinsurgency policies followed by the US were ruthless, inhumane, and even clumsy, and suggests the strategy of "disaggregation" in the war against terrorism. The paper emphasizes, however, that counterinsurgency doctrines cannot be abandoned altogether. The paper therefore concludes that combining force on an "as and when needed" basis with a focus on minimizing casualties and increasing nation-building activities would definitely bolster the counterinsurgency measures and be a significant step towards long-term peace and stability in the world.

Outline:
Introduction
Discussion
Past Experiences
European Experience and the 4 Principles of COIN
Ethics of Counterinsurgency
Classical Counterinsurgency and New Methods
Lessons Learnt by the US Marines and the US Army
Military Victory versus Long-term Settlement/Peace
Conclusion

From the Paper
"Insurgency is a combination of subversion and guerrilla warfare tactics used by a small fraction of a discontent population to enfeeble and finally conquer a nation from within. Insurgents normally operate from a materially and numerically weak position and operate within a discontented population by gaining the support of some adherents. They target government facilities, use hit-and-run tactics and use violence to focus attention to their cause. Countering such "low-intensity conflicts" which do not have the position of a full scale war, but are devastating nonetheless, is extremely complex and difficult. Such unconventional war robs the conventional forces of the advantages normally associated with firepower, mobility and numbers, engages the force in long drawn out engagements with an indefinite ending and confusing objectives and at the same time exposes them to criticisms from all quarters. (Joes, 1999, p. 26)"

Tags:insurgency, terrorism, force, casualities, military, jihad, ethics

Abstract
The paper argues that our intelligence community has not yet experienced the full scale integration into modern military strategy necessary for the changing nature of conflict. The paper explains how counterinsurgency forces today are proving formidable for their unpredictability, the difficulty of pinning down assault patterns and their capacity to operate absent of certain hierarchical conditions requisite to western military orientation. The paper goes on to discuss how the failure to adapt intelligence to these conditions would lead to disasters such as Vietnam and the ongoing War on Terror in countries like Iraq.

Outline:
Introduction
Background
Research Question
Research
The Analysis
Conclusion

From the Paper
"The demand for a fusion of intelligence and operational conditions where counterinsurgency is concerned is underscored by a recent history of failure in both the areas of American intelligence and American military occupation. Particularly tracing back to the failed engagement of Vietnam during the Cold War, we can observe a clear demonstration of failure to connect these two elements to successfully obstruct a Vietnamese insurgency as well as a template for victory by the occupied population.
"Vietnam's history was as an unhappily occupied territory constantly bubbling with resistance to foreign colonization such as that imposed by the French. Thus, for the U.S, the groundwork to its failures in Vietnam would be laid in the years following World War II. Under the leadership of communist revolutionary and ardent Vietnamese nationalist Ho Chi Minh, the northern-based political party achieved recognition by the French government as a legitimate governing authority. Yet, even as Ho Chi Minh negotiated the terms of his nation's independence from the century of colonial rule, "French authorities on the scene were attempting to set up Cochinchina as an independent state separate from the rest of Viet Nam and under French protection" (Joes, 20) This site would become the seat of operations first for the French during the First Indochina War from 1946 to 1954, and then, as Saigon, for the Americans during the Second Indochina War from 1965 to 1975."

Tags:Vietnam, War, on, Terror, Iraq, Afghanistan

Abstract
This paper compares the challenges faced by the U.S. in its counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, with those faced in the Vietnam War and those faced by the USSR in the Soviet-Afghan War. In comparing, this paper focuses on the challenges of insurgent foreign support, public support at home for the counterinsurgent forces, and the effectiveness of counterinsurgency doctrine. Through this research, this paper concludes that the counterinsurgency challenges faced by the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan are nothing new.

From the Paper
"Today, the United States (U.S.) finds itself in counterinsurgent conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. On September 11th 2001, global Islamist Jihadists belonging to Al Qaeda and led by Osama Bin Ladin, performed a succession of devastating attacks on the U.S. Subsequently, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 in order to punish what it believed to be those Islamic Jihadists that had attacked them, and to oust the Taliban government in place that it believed to have harboured such jihadists. A secondary result of the September 11th attacks was the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was conducted as the U.S. said it believed Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and was linked to the jihadists that had attacked them. Since these invasions, the U.S. has become bogged down in counterinsurgency efforts largely against those Islamist jihadists it had aimed to attack in the first instance. Indeed the global Islamist jihadist movement coordinated primarily by Al Qaeda is fighting an unrestricted war against the West."

Tags:military, doctrine, oil, guerilla, warfare, Vietnam, War, Soviet-Afghan, War

Abstract
This is a basic outline that sets forth to answer the six questions the professor asked for discussion within the requirements section for this paper. The focus is on Islamic fundamentalism, its underlying teachings and the United States' response and actions in order to deal with juhadism and terrorism in both Iraq and Afghanistan. It provides three specific sources and three additional books and studies that can be used in the final research paper.

From the Paper
Counterinsurgency Tactics to Combat Islamic Fundamentalism 1. General Research Question (state the full question first): A significant issue for counterinsurgency operations within the Middle East sphere, and specifically, Iraq and Afghanistan concerns the management of jihadist fundamentalism. This research paper attempts to offer an explanatory study into the behaviors and mentalities that are associated with jihadism. Moreover, it will assess current and past tactics to deal with this issue on a counterinsurgency basis and seek to answer the ways in which the United States can combat the number of fundamentalist Muslims throughout the world.

Tags:islamic, fundamentalism, counterinsurgency

Abstract
This paper examines the Vietnam Phoenix program and discusses whether the Phoenix program was successful and the problems that were associated with it. It specifically discusses the lessons that can be learned for counterinsurgency from the years 1967 to 1972 and then goes on to examine how these lessons can be applied to the War in Iraq.

Table of Contents:
Abstract
Introduction
Research Question
Scope and Significance
Summation
Thesis Overview
Literature Review
The Phoenix Program in Vietnam
Methodology
Data and Findings
Lessons Learned from Phoenix
Conclusions/Recommendations
Applications for Iraq

From the Paper
"The lesson learned from Phoenix and from the Vietnam War in general was that the open airing of the ugly side of war is to be avoided at all costs, and yet the Abu Ghraib offenders seem to have never learned this particular lesson. Moving forward from this discussion the U.S. must come up with a comprehensive plan to regain the trust of the Muslim world. The U.S. must disunite a previously fractured system of groups, who united on the idealism of the high level of morality that is stressed in the Islamic faith, all without further dividing the many factions that will eventually have to live together in a unified nation, if that is still in the cards. It is for this reason that the humanitarian lessons of the Phoenix Program must be reiterated even further, as well as the need to win back the hearts and minds of those Iraqis not interested in further strife and insurgent attacks. Another lesson that was learned during the Phoenix Program was an essential need to rely on the civic system to relate information and understanding regarding the history and intentions of each group. Armed militias, not unlike those in North Vietnam, assert power and influence through coercion and violence and demand infrastructural support from the region in which they work, similar to the VC. The lesson here is being that state-building and realistic infrastructural support systems must be built in these regions, for lasting change to become effected."

Tags:counterinsurgency power military, human rights

Abstract
This paper refers to the contrasting accounts of the Mau Mau Revolt of 1952-1960 that hastened the independence of Kenya at the terrible price of a civil war and brutal British counterinsurgency campaign. It then discusses economic origins and Marxist historians' views, and examines the dimensions of Kenya's numbers who accepted or supported British rule, demanded a gradual devolution of power and maintained respect for institutions.

From the Paper
"The Mau Mau Uprising of 1952-1960, sharpened conflict between Kenya's European settlers and the Home Office in Britain that would bring Kenya's independence in 1963. The rebellion is a reminder of how colonial movements of the kind were often always well developed, ideologically, even as their heroes stay in popular memory as people involved in a noble campaign for freedom. The Mau Mau featured various contrasts in a unique movement that grew from an unique Kenyan environment. "

Tags:kenya, maumau, historiography

Abstract
The paper contends that American policy failed to prevent a communist takeover in South Vietnam. The paper explains that American military strategy was flawed due to its overemphasis on search and destroy missions and its neglect of counterinsurgency or pacification in South Vietnam.

From the Paper
"This research paper examines the policies and strategies pursued by the United States during the Vietnam War, the reasons why they failed and possible alternatives. Directly or indirectly, the United States was militarily involved in Vietnam for roughly a quarter century. American policy was to contain worldwide communist expansion and in particular to prevent a communist takeover of South Vietnam by communist North Vietnam and Vietcong in the South."

Tags:search, destroy, policy, American, response, insurgency, pacification, Military

Abstract
This paper explains that, according to linguist Noam Chomsky, the government of the United States is a terrorist state because it participates in activities that (1) involve violent acts or endanger human life, which is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State and (2) appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. The author uses examples such as World War I, Vietnam, Indonesia, the U.S. involvement in Central America and Turkey receiving 80 percent of its arms from the U.S. to launch its counterinsurgency campaign. The paper relates that Chomsky uses his linguistic skills to indict the United States government for its use of constructed ideals to create the appearance of correctness for the crimes committed against humanity.

From the Paper
"Chomsky voices his surprise that the September 11 events had a rather abrasive effect on the American people. Indeed, there is a tendency towards more critical consideration of issues that were previously accepted without question. These include the U.S. role in the Middle East and local issues relating to human rights and freedoms. The press of course is attempting to suppress this upsurge of protest by denying it. Chomsky however cites a variety of examples of demands for talks, the engagement of audiences and the sale of books promoting the idea that the government is engaging in terrorist activities that should be addressed if indeed the American way of life is to be preserved."

Tags:correctness, coerce, vietnam, bush, guise

Abstract
This paper reviews and discusses the School of the Americas, the secret school that trains assassins. According to the paper, the School of the Americas has been instructing Latin American military officers in the art of counter-insurgency warfare since 1946.

From the Paper
"It is a wonder then that the modern expression of outrage over the abuses that are taking place as we speak and as a direct outgrowth of the contradictions of policy that allow the SOA to remain a viable institution, are so wide spread. The official record of the US has largely remained unchallenged, not surprising given that the nation and its official organizations have actively distanced themselves from open violations in the past. Yet, now, as many who protest the SOA feared such official denials have come to the public attention in the form of abuse in modern war death camps. "

Tags:national, security, latin, america, SOA, classified, training, manuals, Counterinsurgency, techniques