From the Paper
"On January 17th, 1948 the Dutch and the Indonesian Republican government concluded the Renville agreement. Under this agreement the Republic was to cede to the Dutch the territories lost in 1947, which included most of West Java. The military unit in the area, the elite Siliwangi Division led by Abdul Haris Nasution, withdrew to Central Java but two Muslim irregular units, Hisbullah and Sabilillah, refused to leave, ignored the Renville agreement and vowed to continue the fight against the Dutch. After the Siliwangi Division returned to West Java to resume the fight against the Dutch, who had attacked Yogyakarta and captured the Republican government in late 1948, they faced a new enemy; the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), or Indonesian Islamic State, which is also known as Darul Islam. Led by S.M. Kartosoewirjo, a perang suci, or holy war, against the Dutch had been declared in 1947. With the atmosphere of betrayal, following the Renville agreement, felt by the residents and kiai, or religious leaders, of West Java, Kartosoewirjo was elected Imam and the war became a Jihad, or holy war, in May, 1948 to free NII territory from both the Dutch and the Indonesian Republican forces."

Tags:adil, colonial, dutch, indonesia, javanese, king, magic, millenial, ratu, sukarno, tentara

Abstract
This paper explains that the Phoenix Program, known as Phung Hoang in Vietnam, was designed to combine the resources of existing Vietnamese intelligence operations under a single banner of CIA control to "neutralize" the Vietcong and South Vietnamese VC sympathizers and to assist the United States in winning the war by stemming the flood of communists seeping down from the north. The author points out that, in retrospect, Phoenix was a program, which gained a horrible reputation during and after the war for its alleged crimes against humanity; American officially stated that Phoenix was responsible for the death of 20,857 Vietcong members during the war. The paper states that the fundamental flaw of the program was America's inability to recognize the Vietcong as a revolutionary, anti-colonial force whose origins are nearly a hundred years old and whose purpose might have some legitimacy; rather the CIA argued that the VC were crippled victims of Communist terror practices.

From the Paper
"The creation of the CIO marked a sudden increase in the use of political warfare by the Americans in Vietnam. Their tactics were copied almost directly from their Communist partners. Vietcong propaganda teams would descend on a Southern village and call a general meeting for the dissemination of anti-American ideas and propaganda. The visits were repeated, and if the villagers were reluctant to join the Vietcong, then they practiced what is known as selective terror. They would arrest a member of the village for spying and then put the villager on trial before a dummy court. The villager was always convicted, and then brutally murdered in the center of the village."

Tags:capture, psychological-warfare, legitimacy, propaganda, offices

Abstract
This paper evaluates the post-9/11 efforts of the international community and the Afghan government towards institutionalizing democracy in Afghanistan. The paper critically analyzes not only the efforts of the international community and the Afghan government but it also evaluates the potential factors such as counter-warlordism and counter-insurgency, that have significantly undermined the post-2001 Afghan democratization process. The paper concludes that the failure of democratization has not only been caused by the over-concentration of the international community on the problems of counter-warlordism and counter-insurgency but also by the failure of the internationally-backed Afghan government in dealing effectively with such challenges.

From the Paper
"To begin, the Bonn Conference in its own did not provide the ground for the democratization of Afghanistan. While the Bonn Agreement of 2001 recognized the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely decide about their political future, it did not practically provide the Afghan people with the opportunity to democratically decide about the future of their country. Ironically, the participants in the Bonn Conference were the representatives of Afghan opposing groups that were neither democratically elected by the people of Afghanistan nor had legitimacy among various Afghan ethnic groups especially Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks."

Tags:warlordism counter-insurgency, ethnic groups, power karzai

Abstract
The paper explains why the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)'s role in Vietnam has been difficult to assess completely. The paper first looks at the degree of commitment that the US government had developed in the political outcome of Vietnam. The paper then discusses the conflict over whether the military or the CIA should establish precedence over covert operations in Vietnam and describes what actually led to the eventual dominance of the CIA in Vietnam. The paper focuses on the many failures of the CIA's covert operations and counter-insurgency effort and contends that the war was already lost when intelligence failures of the CIA failed to adequately prepare the US and its forces to function appropriately in the region.

From the Paper
"The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States (US) and its role in Vietnam during that country's involvement in Southeast Asia is a role that has been difficult to assess completely. Part of the difficulty is that the CIA's role is, of course, almost completely related to covert operations in the conflict which are, by nature, secretive and most often censored. Additionally, the role of the CIA in Vietnam was also often one that was competitive in nature with the role of the military's own covert operations with both bodies vying for dominance in the conflict. Yet, there is a long precedence of CIA involvement in Vietnam and it is one that generally established the US government itself in the region while the French colonial forces were still struggling for dominance."

Tags:espionage, counter-insurgency, operations, Kennedy, Johnson

Abstract
The paper focuses on the Darfur crisis as it exists today, asserting that the crisis is the result of a convergence of domestic political and cultural causes, within the context of regional political and environmental circumstances, all of which are being looked upon with good-intentioned neglect by the international community. The paper also explores the Darfur crisis with a focus on discerning the "root" causes of the crisis from its more immediate "direct" causes. The thesis will be argued, while its direct causes seems to lie in a botched counter-insurgency program launched by the Sudanese government which coincided with drought and regional environmental issues, its root causes lie in the structuring of the Sudanese state in the wake of colonialism.

From the Paper
"The Darfur crisis as it exists today is the result of a convergence of domestic political and cultural causes, within the context of regional political and environmental circumstances, all of which are being looked upon with good-intentioned neglect by the international community. This essay will explore the Darfur crisis with a focus on discerning the "root" causes of the crisis from its more immediate "direct" causes. The thesis will be argued, while its direct causes seems to lie in a botched ..."

Tags:international, tragedy, Sudan, suffering, Africa

Abstract
In this article the writer discusses that the Darfur crisis as it exists today is the result of a convergence of domestic political and cultural causes, within the context of regional political and environmental circumstances, all of which are being looked upon with good-intentioned neglect by the international community. This essay explores the Darfur crisis with a focus on discerning the root causes of the crisis from its more immediate direct causes. The thesis is argued, while its direct causes seem to lie in a botched counter-insurgency program launched by the Sudanese government which coincided with drought and regional environmental issues, its root causes lie in the structuring of the Sudanese state in the wake of colonialism. As is seen, the inability of the Sudanese government to address the complex needs of diverse groups within its state lies ultimately at the root of the Darfur crisis, with implications both for the Sudan and other post-colonial states.

From the Paper
"Prunier's observation is valuable in two respects: first, he cites the fact that the Sudan has been internationally recognized for another long-running civil conflict in its recent history, and secondly that the causes of the Darfur crisis are not immediately clear or easy to understand. The reference to the Sudan's history of internal civil conflict is particularly significant, as it suggests that there are systemic problems in the Sudanese state that extend beyond the confines of the Darfur crisis. It may be argued that these problems are the "root" causes of the Darfur crisis.
"The Sudan as it exists today is largely a legacy of the colonial era, when the British empire governed vast swathes of Africa. However, a defining characteristic of the Sudan from its colonial period has been the combination of enormous territory and diverse ethnic populations, with an overcentralized state."

Tags:Sudan, colonialism, civil, conflict

Abstract
An 8-page paper on the U.S. involvement in the Philippines during William McKinley's term of office. A brief history of the Philippine-American War will be introduced, followed by a detailed sketch of the U.S. decision to annex the islands, racial attitudes towards the islands and attempts to set up a government on the islands. Other items of discussion will include why the U.S. was interested in the islands, what happened during the counter insurgency on the islands and the outcome, and what the U.S. finally did to give the Philippines their independence. The overall effect the Philippines had on the United States as a nation, will be explored.

Abstract
This paper reviews and discusses the School of the Americas, the secret school that trains assassins. According to the paper, the School of the Americas has been instructing Latin American military officers in the art of counter-insurgency warfare since 1946.

From the Paper
"It is a wonder then that the modern expression of outrage over the abuses that are taking place as we speak and as a direct outgrowth of the contradictions of policy that allow the SOA to remain a viable institution, are so wide spread. The official record of the US has largely remained unchallenged, not surprising given that the nation and its official organizations have actively distanced themselves from open violations in the past. Yet, now, as many who protest the SOA feared such official denials have come to the public attention in the form of abuse in modern war death camps. "

Tags:national, security, latin, america, SOA, classified, training, manuals, Counterinsurgency, techniques

Abstract
This paper examines Krepinevich's book, which is a discussion of the essentials concerning why the United States lost the Vietnam War and how the conflict illustrates the fundamental shortcomings of the U.S. military. It explains how the United States was ill-suited to fighting the unconventional, counter-insurgent type of war that Vietnam necessitated, and additionally, ill-suited to the strategic flexibility such a conflict would demand. It looks at how Krepinevich supports this thesis with a plethora of facts investigating how specific leaders attacked the problems Vietnam presented and how, ultimately, all of them failed.

From the Paper
"After providing these necessary definitions, Krepinevich goes on to explain the broad patterns that counterinsurgent Armies must adopt to be victorious. Namely, governmental forces must turn their traditional strategies upside down, and seek to achieve what conventional patterns of warfare usually consider to be secondary objectives first and primary objectives second; acquisition and sustention of geographic objectives is less imperative than establishing a base of social and political support from the local population."

Tags:warfare, leaders, fighting, insurgent, counter

Abstract
This paper states that America's foreign policy, requiring military intervention by the United States every time something goes wrong in any corner of the world, has not resolved the conflict and has given rise to immense resentment against United States interests. The author believes that the Middle East conflict is the most perfect example of American intervention going haywire; the case of Lebanon is used as an example. The paper contends that even the United States cannot afford to intervene in every conflict, since its military and economic resources are limited, and America's intervention in internal insurgencies is likely to backfire.

Table of Contents
Introduction
Case against USA Intervention
Counter-argument
Conclusion

From the Paper
"We must bear in mind that current rise in organized terrorism has its roots in all such US interventionist attacks in Middle Eastern region. Deep-rooted resentment against America's double standards and its selfish interventionism has given birth to a chain of terrorist organizations that have now become a major threat to peace and security of Americans everywhere in the world."

Tags:military, policy, conflict, lebanon, resouces