Abstract In this paper, the writer examines President John F. Kennedy's decision-making during the Cubanmissilecrisis of 1962. The writer provides a background of the crisis. In the article, the writer discusses dealings between Kennedy and Soviet leader, Khrushchev. The writer also covers the outcome of the crisis.
From the Paper "The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in October when the Soviet Union under the leadership of Premier Nikita Khrushchev began placing offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba, just miles off the U. S. coast. Traditionally, historians have contended that Khrushchev began placing the missiles in Cuba from a position of strength, intended to defy a weak foe, President John F. Kennedy. They emphasized the apparent resolve Kennedy showed in dealing with Khrushchev, essentially portraying Kennedy as a man who finally became presidential during ... "
Abstract The paper argues that the leadership of John F. Kennedy was tested during the CubanMissileCrisis of 1962. The paper explains that the creation of the ExComm, together with JFK's own willingness to heed advice, take responsibility for decisions and explore all options, may well have spared the world from nuclear disaster.
From the Paper "President John F. Kennedy is today celebrated as much for his steady leadership during tumultuous times as he is lauded for his eloquence and ability to inspire. At no time during his presidency and perhaps during his life would JFK be asked to handle an event more challenging-and more potentially combustible-than the Cuban Missile Crisis."
Abstract This paper explores the thirteen days between the discovery of the missile sites and the final conclusion of the crisis known as the CubanMissileCrisis. Specifically, the paper looks at what the Americans and Russians knew in the lead-up to event and shows how the CIA and KGB definitely had information prior to the actual start of the conflict. The paper explores the historical significance of Russia's involvement in Cuba and the rise of Fidel Castro to power there. The paper also explains the economic and political consequences of the event.
From the Paper "In 1945 American had demonstrated the unparalleled destructive powers of their nuclear weapons, and subsequently taken unconditional control of the Japanese nation and its culture. This was done during war-time, of course. It followed an unprovoked attack against America itself, was necessary to stop countless casualties, and may have been entirely justified. The justification of that act is somewhat irrelevant to its psychological impact on both sides of the cold war, however. America learned the lesson that atomic bombs gave them unlimited bargaining power. The Soviet Union learned that America was willing to use that power to wipe out entire nations. In 1958 the USA had threatened China with nuclear weapons in regards to a dispute over Taiwan. From 1959 to 1961 it threatened nuclear strikes whenever the Soviets agitated for control of the divided Berlin. America had proven at least rhetorically willing to use nuclear strikes for political rather than merely defensive purposes."
Tags: nuclear, castro, 1950, communism, kennedy, cia
Abstract This paper explores the Cubanmissilecrisis and how then President John F. Kennedy dealt with the issue. The writer believes that the 1962 Cubanmissilecrisis established JFK as a heroic and able president who was the first and only president to challenge the Soviets directly. The paper offers a brief background on the lead-up to the event and America's involvement in the near nuclear disaster. The paper includes a section on the memory of this event in American psyche today, evident through the many plays, movies and stories which can be seen throughout the U.S.
From the Paper "The Cuban Missile Crisis teaches much about the nature of international relations during the Cold War and about such relations at any time between adversaries. It affirms the characteristics of the American political system that have helped the country succeed for two centuries in the face of considerable international opposition and numerous crises. Kennedy represented a change in the presidency, a youthful man rather than an older political leader, and his vibrancy affected the nation and made people ready to do more than they might otherwise have wanted to do."
Tags: bay, of, pigs, castro, cuba, communism, jfk, cia, leadership, presidency, cold, war, revolution
Abstract The paper discusses the importance of the challenges that arose between Kruschev and Kennedy during the CubanMissileCrisis and the result of their actions and decisions.The paper endeavours to portray Kruschev as the person responsible for easing tensions in the area and not being responsible for causing the Cubanmissilecrisis and further shows that, in fact, as a result of Kennedy's actions in the area, Kruschev had no option but to assist Cuba as he did. The paper appends relevant source material.
From the Paper "Those who want to rescue Khrushchev's reputation from the dustbin of history frequently note that the Soviet Premier was every bit as responsible in his thinking as was Kennedy during the height of the crisis and, in many respects, even before it began. For instance, whatever his failings, it was not Khrushchev who stepped up surreptitious assaults against Castro, launched the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion - those were all things initiated by the Kennedy Administration. Further, the aggressive American build-up under Kennedy was understandably worrisome for the Soviet Leader, who had to watch this unfold fully cognizant of the fact that NATO had missiles pointed at the heart of the Soviet Union from nearby Turkey (Meyer, 113). Seen in that light, Khrushchev's secretive military support of Castro during the summer and fall of 1962 was entirely understandable - even if he erred in deploying missiles by stealth to the tiny island. More significantly, Kennedy's clandestine and not-so-clandestine efforts to unseat Castro surely raised tensions between the Soviet Union and America inasmuch as the US President had to have known on some level that the Soviets would feel compelled to protect the embattled Cuban leader from US efforts to kill him. All in all, the blame for the escalation of the crisis prior to mid-October of 1962 cannot solely, maybe not even mostly, laid at the feet of Nikita Khrushchev."
Abstract This paper describes the key players and events that led up to the CubanMissileCrisis. The paper details the posturing that went on between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the imminent danger posed to the world because of the crisis, how it was resolved and the resulting aftermath of the crisis.
From the Paper "October of 1962 brought about one of the most important conflicts of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis. Perhaps the most studied international confrontation of the Twentieth century, the crisis was the closest that the world has ever come to a nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a major confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in which tensions ran high on either side as both countries struggled with intense negotiations. The missile crisis represents the one time that world leaders and the international community stared down what Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorenson called "the gun barrel of nuclear war," the death of history as we know it."
Abstract This paper asserts that many people today simply do not realize just how close the world came to nuclear war when John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev squared off for 13 tense days during the CubanMissileCrisis of October 1962. The paper claims that given the highly secretive nature of the Soviet regimen during this period in history, it is unlikely that many average citizens were aware of what was taking place during this fateful 13-day period in history. Despite these constraints, much has been learned since 1962 about what took place behind closed doors in Moscow and Washington and this paper investigates this information to determine what part Nikita S. Khrushchev played in negotiating the compromise and the response of the Soviet leadership of the day. A summary of the research is provided in the conclusion.
Outline
Introduction
Review and Discussion
Background and Overview
The Role of Nikita S. Khrushchev
Conclusion
From the Paper "Today, the Cuban Missile Crisis is generally remembered as lasting for just thirteen days (from October 16-28), beginning with the point at which Washington discovered that active construction was taking place in Cuba to install launch facilities for Soviet medium-range missiles, to the day the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Khrushchev, publicly and formally agreed to withdraw missiles from Cuba. As part of the eventual compromise that was reached, President Kennedy guaranteed that the United States would not invade Cuba. More comprehensive accounts of the missile crisis extend beyond these immediate 13 days to include the period from October 28 to November 20 as well, when intensive negotiations were conducted that more fully set forth and codified the agreements had been reached, the period when the U.S. naval blockade was lifted, and the special alert status of the military forces of both countries had ended."
A review of the CubanMissileCrisis and new information that has recently come to light that somewhat alters our perception of what actually transpired.
2,250 words (approx. 9 pages), 6 sources, 2005, $ 89.95
Abstract This paper reviews the history of the CubanMissileCrisis and the way in which it was handled by the Kennedy administration. According to this paper, the belief that the incident was simple, is incorrect. This was a complex situation.
From the Paper "The Cuban Missile Crisis was for a long time portrayed in Western history books as a sudden, unexpected crisis that was handled masterfully by the Kennedy administration, resulting in the avoidance of nuclear conflict. Thus, it was considered a textbook example of how to handle such crises. However, recent decades have seen the gradual exposure to public and academic scrutiny of numerous previously classified US documents. This has enabled historians to gain a better insight into the reality of the situation. As a result, it is becoming increasingly clear that a simplistic portrayal of the incident as sudden aggression from the Soviets and the Cubans is erroneous."
Abstract The paper discusses the CIA's failings in investigating the build-up of Soviet missiles in Cuba and President John F. Kennedy's skepticism towards anything coming from the CIA. The paper explains how the intelligence community's failure at the Bay of Pigs made Kennedy less than receptive to any information he received from them. The paper concludes that had Kennedy been more receptive, the CubanMissileCrisis could have been headed off months earlier.
From the Paper "In an article that was published less than three years after the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962, Roberta Wohlstetter comments at length upon the role that intelligence played in the international incident. Specifically, she floats the idea that the U.S. intelligence establishment knew about the missiles long before they chose to act on them. For example, she mentions U.S. Senator Kenneth Barnard Keating and how he asserted in August of 1962 that he had reliable evidence of "cylindrical objects" being transported by flatbed in Cuba, as well as evidence of Soviet motor convoys. Still, despite Senator Keating's public proclamations, the dramatic (and conspicuous) arms build-up in the fall of 1962 seemed to catch U.S. leaders - both military and civilian - by surprise when it became evident that some sort of decisive action was needed."
Tags: Bay, of, Pigs, Kennedy, Castro, arms, evidence, skepticism
Abstract This paper takes a look at the Soviet Union's role in the CubanMissileCrisis between America and Cuba in 1962. The writer explores the crisis from the Soviet Union's perspective using documents from the Soviet Union archives and puts together a historical account from their view. The paper shows that the Cold War was triggered by the crisis and the eventual dismantling of the former Soviet Union was a result of the Cold War, therefore the Cubanmissilecrisis, while it scared the world for 14 days, set the stage for today's friendly relations between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union.
From the Paper "The Soviet Union placed the missiles in Cuba as a strategic military and political statement to the world about the actions of America. According to recently released documents pertaining to the crisis the idea came to then Soviet Union leader, Nikita Khrushchev, to use as a counter message to the US. He felt the United States had been flexing its muscles and some of the more recent decisions and actions by the states had countered what the Soviet Union had been led to believe(COLD WAR: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIShttp://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/colc.html). The crux of the disagreement was nestled in he direct actions of the United States. The problem as realized in retrospect was that the Soviet Union used deceit and lies to accomplish its point instead of holding discussions with the US powers about its concerns."
An examination of the predicted outcome of the Cubanmissilecrisis using the policy forecaster model and whether these correlate to the actual outcome of events.
Abstract This paper discusses the Cubanmissilecrisis and explains that the discovery by surveillance planes of Soviet missile silos being built in Cuba was one of the major confrontations of the Cold War. The paper analyzes the Cubanmissilecrisis with the use of the policy forecaster model. It then looks at the predicted outcome using the policy forecaster model and whether it corresponds with the actual outcome of events.
From the Paper "The next variable that I will discuss is that of salience. The United States had a high salience regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis. Almost immediately following the discovery of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, it became the most pressing issue to the country. The Cuban Missile Crisis was of great importance to every actor involved, and even those not involved, as a wrong move could have triggered a chain reaction of nuclear attacks. I believe that the issue was of added importance to the US because of the closeness of Cuba to the mainland. The issue was also of high importance to the Soviet Union, as the United States already had missile bases located close to their border. At the time, the US held the advantage over the Soviets in most areas. The salience variables I will use for the Policy Forecaster are ninety for the United States, and eighty-three for the Soviet Union."
Abstract The paper explains that, considering the information now available, it seems unlikely the Soviets would have attacked the United States over the Cubanmissilecrisis. The author states that it actually appears the United States was the aggressor: The missiles were placed in Cuba by the Soviet Union as deterrents in response to a real threat from the United States because the United States had been planning on attacking Cuba for years, going back to the Eisenhower administration. The paper concludes that the weapons did ensure a peace because (1) the United States government agreed not to invade Cuba if the Soviet Union agreed to remove the missiles from Cuban soil, which they did, and (2) the United States agreed to remove missiles from Turkey. Several long quotes.
From the Paper "The Cuban Missile Crisis is one of the defining moments in twentieth century United States history. The Cold War was at its apex. The Cubans asked the Soviet Union to protect them against an American attack. In 1961, the United States sent troops into Cuba in an attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro. The attack failed and later became known as the Bay of Pigs fiasco. In 1962, Kruschev sent missiles into Cuba in order to deter an American attack. We were at the brink of World War III, both sides used verbal threats, and War was only averted when the Soviet Union removed the missiles in return for an American promise to not invade the island."
Abstract This paper examines the possibility that President Kennedy had advanced knowledge of Soviet intentions to place missiles in Cuba, but did not or could not prevent it, and instead used the peaceful settlement of the crisis as a means of moving toward detente.
From the Paper:
"The CubanMissileCrisis was precipitated by Soviet desires to overcome the strategic superiority that the United States had developed in order to continue an aggressive global foreign policy. President Kennedy then allowed the crisis to develop so that it could be used as a stepping stone toward detente and the new world order."
Tags: jfk, soviet, union, khrushchev, military, cold, war, castro, fulbright
Abstract This paper analyzes the CubanMissileCrisis and President Kennedy's handling of this confrontation with the Soviet Union. First, the paper briefly examines the global events and Cold War conditions that precipitated the missilecrisis. The paper then discusses the tensions between Moscow and Washington and why they had increased throughout the decade of the 1950s after the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb, then its first hydrogen bomb and brutally invaded Hungary in 1956.
From the Paper "In conclusion, President John F. Kennedy's ability to balance issues of national interest against the imminent threat of global nuclear war was the most important aspect of his leadership during the Cuban Missile Crisis in late October of 1962. Ironically, it was disagreement among Kennedy's advisors that ultimately produced a tough but measured response that compelled Khrushchev to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba and thus avoid an American invasion and likely escalation into nuclear war.
"By the narrowest of margins, World War III had been avoided. Despite the ill-considered decision of Premier Khrushchev to antagonize the United States by deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba certain to be discovered, and President Kennedy's ill-considered decision to authorize the Bay of Pigs invasion the preceding year, which antagonized Khrushchev into deploying those nuclear missiles to Cuba, both leaders managed to restrain their hawkish advisors and generals, and found a way to resolve the crisis through back-channel diplomacy and covert compromise."
Abstract The paper discusses the Cold War, viewed as a battle of power between the two major actors, the United States of America and the USSR, had several turning points in its evolution. The paper continues and states that one of the most important moments of the Cold War, when mankind was closest to a nuclear disaster, happened in 1962 in Cuba. The paper then relates that, in order to further understanding of the crisis, it discusses it in a historical context, describes it and discusses its results within the Cold War evolution. The paper concludes that an effect of the crisis was the creation of a direct link between the US and the USSR (the Hot Line) which represented a first step towards a better communication and cooperation between the two political systems.
From the Paper "The beginning of the crisis can be placed when the American President, John F. Kennedy was notified that the Soviets deployed missile equipment and missiles in Cuba, on October 16, 1962. Viewed as a serious threat not only for the American security but also a threat for the European Allies, the US's response had a large number of possibilities to be taken into account. These were "a Blockade Plan--employs 24 to 36 destroyers, a carrier task force, etc., which can marshal significant strength to blockade Cuba, both air and maritime; air Strike Plan--currently being revised, but employs between 450 and 500 aircraft. (...); fast Reaction Assault Plan--employs both air-borne and amphibious assault with about 32,000 troops in initial phase, with balance of assault forces arriving in increments as they become available. Ultimately builds up to about 80,000 troops in Cuba around D+18 days. Full-Scale Deliberate Assault Plan--employs simultaneous airborne and amphibious assault with around 49,000 troops engaged on D-Day, building to about 60,000 by D+5 days, and again to 80,000 by D+16 days." (The Avalon Project, 1998). Form the scenarios that President Kennedy and his team made, the first option was chosen. This was a very important moment not only for the crisis itself, but for the evolution of the Cold War. A military naval blockade was chosen for several reasons: Kennedy wanted to diffuse the crisis on the basis of a non-military action that would have probably given reason for an increase in tensions between the US and the USSR. Also, because the US was unable to 100% prove that USSR had rockets in that area it needed to gain support from its European allies. "
