Abstract
The paper utilizes Amartya Sen's entitlement approach to famine as an explanation of the famine during China's Great Leap Forward. The paper argues that the primary reasons for this famine were the fundamental problems in central planning policy, together with structural inadequacies of the government system of the People's Republic of China in the 1950s.

Outline:
Introduction
The Great Leap Forward
Famine - The Theoretical Literature
Famine as a Crisis in Central Planning
The Relevance of the Sen Model
Conclusion

From the Paper
"In order to understand the famine in China in the late 1950s it is first necessary to understand the political, social and economic context that gave rise to the famine in the first place. With the establishment of the People's Republic of China under a Communist government in 1949, centuries-old traditions of agricultural production and economics were been revised at all levels of Chinese society."
"After 1949 China embarked on a series of Five-Year Plans that were designed to reestablish China's industrial capabilities and increase agricultural production. The shaping of these plans led to considerable political disagreement within the leadership of the People's Republic. The architects of the first of these plans - particularly Chen Yun and Zhou Enlai - believed that material incentives would lead to gradual increases in grain and industrial production (Spence 1990, 575). However, such "gradualism" ran contrary to paramount leader Mao Zedong's "heroic" vision of revolution as "continuing struggle" (Spence 1990, 596)."

Tags:food, availability, entitlements, collectivization, agriculture, Five, Year, Plans, Sen

Abstract
This paper examines how between the spring of 1959 and the beginning of 1961 what is generally regarded as the worst famine in the history of mankind occurred in China. In particular, it assesses whether the Chinese famine can be considered genocidal. The discussion centres on Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the role of intentionality. It looks at how the Great Leap Forward was the personal vision of Mao Zedong and how the warped processes on which the policy was based, both in theoretical and practical terms led to the worst peacetime famine in human history. The paper also argues that the lack of intention prior to the onset of famine denotes mass manslaughter and that the presence of intention in the period which immediately followed provides the necessary features and characteristics of genocide.

From the Paper
"There is no doubt that the widespread famine which took place following the GLF came about as a direct and unequivocal consequence of the policies of the central communist government, and Mao in particular. However, responsibility is naturally not enough to prescribe deliberate intention. Thus, effectively offering determinations which suggest that the initial famine was a deliberate intention on the part of Mao and the communists is perilously irksome. Smil (1999; p. 1619) suggests that as the famine was "manmade" then there is an implicit possibility of intension. Moreover, Smil (1999; p. 1619) suggests that the three key indicators of intentionality in famine, i.e. omission, commission and provision are all evident in the policies and actions of the central government during the famine period. "

Tags:mass, manslaughter, communists

Abstract
This paper examines the hidden famine of 1958-1962 in China and argues that it was the result of Mao's 'great leap forward' error of trying to collectivize agriculture while attending to industrialization, bogus Soviet advice, the Communist failure to respond to what was obviously severe famine, and disaster's social imprint. The famine showed the timelessness of rural/urban networks, rumour, subversive sentiment, and government cover-up and failure. The famine's gravity was hidden from the outside world till the late 70s, though 40 million Chinese had died.

From the Paper
"In 1958-1961, and the succeeding year, millions of Chinese died in a severe famine created by the Great Leap Forwards and made worse by Beijing's failure to respond. Effort was made to hide the famine from urban Chinese and the world, despite signs that all was not well in the countryside. Between the spring of 1959 and December of 1961, at least 30 million starved to death with the rate of births per annum not returning to previous levels till the mid-1960s."

Tags:maochina, greatleap, famine

Abstract
This paper reviews "Hungry Ghosts" by Jasper Becker, sharing with the reader how urban populations did not know full extent of famine of 1958-1962 even though they were alert to old signs of famine as often known in Chinese history. According to this paper, state censorship propaganda and the passport system kept news from moving openly, but cities continued to receive rural vagrants desperate for food defying the passport system.

From the Paper
"The little-reported famine in the new People's Republic of China (PRC) was not seen, in its full extent, by city dwellers. However, a chapter in Jasper Becker's 'Hungry Ghosts' imparts how there were clear signs that things were not going well in the countryside. (1998) However much Chairman Mao put into propaganda and censorship to hide Communist failures, the public had the wisdom of centuries in terms of recognizing, yet again, bad government."

Tags:china, 1958famine, rural, urban

Abstract
This paper explains that, until the 1970s, sinologists and others studied the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) media for clues as to what might be occurring in Mainland China of which there was much conjecture. The author compares the reports from two 1960 CCP media releases, which were prepared for the national Chinese audience by the People's Republic of China (PRC), with what is now known about the terrible Communist planning error in the agricultural sector during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The paper concludes that all media materials from Beijing were expected to be propaganda; therefore, the Chinese public became adept at discerning what really might be happening. The author stresses that this reflective habit is still practiced in the PRC, despite much liberalization of the mass media.

Table of Contents
Introduction
'Go to the First Line of Agriculture!'
'Advance Payment of Wages Every Month Stimulates Enthusiasm of the CCP'
Mao's Famine
Concluding Discussion

From the Paper
"The article seems to fit with a great deal that appeared through the month of September 1960 to do with agricultural gains, work still to be done, the potential for China to become a kind of agrarian paradise, and general applause for the rural laborer. In the article discussed, rural toil is said to be very good for cadres who may still be bureaucrats or people otherwise not yet exposed to the soil. Readers in the cities, or for that matter in Hong Kong or Taiwan or wherever else refugees from the Communist state had fled, had reason to wonder what was meant by the "transfer of large numbers of cadres ..."

Tags:reflective, mao, collective, censorship, planners

Abstract
This paper provides a discussion of Ge Fei's story addressing persons displaced by events in China through two stories set in 1928 that involve the killing of a Nationalist officer not known to be reliable as he revisits by chance his home district and the sensation of shared and personal hallucination. The paper examines Yu Hua's "Chronicle of a Blood Merchant" that describes late 1950s villager life, the low expectations of the masses for whom reality changes little aside from unaffordable basic costs, and then the 1958-63 Great Famine.

From the Paper
"It is likely that more needs to be discussed of the generation affected by the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976, as children, a time when Chinese literature stagnated, the introduction of Reform in 1978 encouraging varied, if cautious expression. In the 1980s and 1990s, the results of Western modernist and postmodernist criticism available in Chinese starting to be seen. This paper discusses the contributions of Ge Fei and Yu Hua as have been analyzed in different ways. More important is probably..."

Tags:post reform, ge fei, yu hua

Abstract
This paper reviews Jasper Becker's "Hungry Ghosts", a book detailing the Chinese famine that occurred during the Great Leap Forward. The paper considers four main points made by Becker concerning Mao's responsibility for the famine: a reliance on pseudoscience, a faulty industrial policy, fear and intimidation that inhibited truth telling and failure to act once the truth was known. Each of these is considered in turn and Becker's argument regarding each is critiqued.

From the Paper
"In his ground-breaking study, "Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine", British journalist Jasper Becker depicts what is clearly one of the most tragic events in all of human history: the heretofore little known and misunderstood Chinese famine that resulted from Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward from 1958-1962. He outlines the events which led to the massive starvation of an estimated 30 million people as Mao's government pursued an agricultural-industrial revolution based on pseudo-scientific fantasies about manufacturing and production, and backed by state-sponsored violence and intimidation designed to fabricate for official records what was not and could not be realized in actual practice."

Tags:famine, agriculture, maoism

Abstract
This paper begins with a synopsis of the first millennium of Chinese history and the rise of Mao Tse Tung to power. It traces the childhood and early history of this communist leader and explains his take on Marxist and Communist ideology. The paper then turns to discuss the first phase of Chinese political and economic development (1952 to 1957) and Mao's economic policy. The era of the "Great Leap Forward" is explored and the 1959-60 famine is brought up as Mao's first failure. The paper looks at the involvement of Deng in China's leadership before and after the death of Mao Tse Tung and at Mao's status as a visible icon throughout China. His aims and involvement in the Cultural Revolution of 1966 are studied and the differences between Mao's and his successor, Deng's leadership are raised. The paper concludes by evaluating and comparing the relative successes of these two leaders.

From the Paper
"Though both were dedicated to the communist ideology, as each had their time at the helm as Emperors in their own right. Mao Tse Tung was the high priest of Chinese communism, charismatic, energetic, calculating, and a true personal power. Mao led ideologically with great slogans and focused on what should be rather than what was, he actively shunned the West, and maintained an archaic absolutism based upon a cult of personality that resulted in the failures of the Great Leap Forward, the Famine of 1959-1960, and eventually to the Cultural Revolution. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the impact of Mao Tse Tung's ideology upon the form and function of China."

Tags:childhood, ideology, economic, policy, Great, Leap, Forward, famine, Deng, icon, Cultural, Revolution, leadership, comparison

Abstract
The paper discusses the peasant uprisings, the famine, the closure of academies and the role of the Muslims in the collapse of the Ming dynasty. The paper concludes that while there is an enormous volume of historical information about the dynasty's demise, it is still unclear who the personalities were that played major roles in the downfall.

Outline:
Introduction and Overview
Peasant Rebellions
Academics and Politics

From the Paper
"What were the conditions and dynamics that led the Ming Dynasty to a fall from grace and power? In his book, The Glory and Fall of the Ming Dynasty, author Albert Chan writes that "...the very fact that it lasted for nearly three centuries" indicates that the Ming Dynasty certainly had its strong points. Years of association with scholars and a "sound knowledge of history" helped the Hung-wu emperor avoid the mistakes that previous emperors had made. Indeed, Chan insists that it is historically fair to describe the Hung-wu emperor as a "...ruler of genius" (p. 376). It was the Hung-wu emperor who realized that an "...overpowerful military class" - giving too much power to the generals - might mean soldiers would obey their commanders and not the government. He also realized that family could encroach on his authority, and he tried to keep a handle on all aspects of governing."

Tags:famine, academies, Muslims, rebellion, peasants

Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of the spatial distribution of the Chinese population that includes an assessment of food security. The paper concludes that with certain strategies undertaken by the government, China should be able to maintain high levels of food security.

Tags:replacement rate, famine, infrastructure, fertility rate, arable land, agriculture, spatial distribution, density, population, family planning, food supply, One-Child Policy