Abstract
In this paper the author looks behind the scenes of the Challenger space shuttle disaster. Although the popular reason for the disaster is known as the technical failure of the O-rings, the author explores the intra-personal and inter-personal processes within the Challenger project which, in his opinion, led to the making of the flawed decision to launch the shuttle. He examines all of the processes of communication, leadership, monitoring and group dynamics which played significant roles in the disaster and looks at the roles of named individuals who, in the author's opinion, contributed to incorrect decisions being made by the launch team. In conclusion, the author blames inter-personal and intra-personal processes, which were flawed and problematic, with no one person able to correct the problems evident as the main cause for the disaster.

From the Paper
"Apart from physical communication problems during the project, there were also communication problems relating to areas in the project's planning stages. For instance, launch commit criteria and limits on booster surface temperatures were not communicated between NASA and Thiokol, primarily because they either did not exist, or were not part of the reporting network (Bell, p.47). In not relaying important information such as launch commit criterion, a process was occurring with individuals at various stages prior to the launch, whereby each person was using the communication and reporting process as the locus of responsibility for information disclosure rather than individually accepting responsibility for deciding whether or not to pass on information which he believed to be of significance."

Tags:resonsibility, communication, engineers, failure, planning

From the Paper
"In order for the stakeholders in the shuttle program are to be satisfied that a disaster of the Challenger type will never occur again the decision making process that allowed the disaster must be explored. It is fair to state that certain kinds of decisions that stood on their own merit should no longer have credence.

In the broadest possible sense, despite the tremendous accomplishments of the engineers, scientists, and management involved in the shuttle program, the greatest mistake in respect to Challenger was enthusiasm. The groundwork for any project from ditch-digging to landing a rocket on the moon, must be laid with careful, methodical work that allows for no shortcutting..."

Abstract
The Challenger Space Shuttle exploded 73 seconds after take-off from the Kennedy Space Center on January 28, 1986, killing all 7 crew members on board. The accident threw the U.S. space program into turmoil as NASA grounded its remaining space shuttles over the next two years for redesigning of their safety features and implementing stricter quality control. This paper describes the Challenger disaster, discusses why the accident occurred, whether it could have been prevented, and who was to blame. It also discusses the dangers of space travel even in the 21st century.

From the Paper
"NASA launched the re-usable Space Shuttle program in the late 1960s. The Space Shuttle was initially part of a plan to ferry astronauts and cargo to and from an Earth-orbiting space station. Later on, lack of funding forced NASA to drop the plan for the "space station" and it revised the shuttle's function as a "space truck" that could deploy and retrieve satellites and carry out scientific experiments in space. Each Space Shuttle was designed to perform about 100 missions with only minor maintenance. Their re-usability, in contrast, to the "throwaway" spacecrafts used earlier was purported as a major cost-cutting feature. However, space shuttles proved very expensive to develop and NASA had to make more frequent launches to offset the costs. In one year alone (1986--the year of the Challenger disaster) 24 shuttle missions were planned. (Chaikan, 2003)"

Tags:travel, nasa, accident

Abstract
This paper analyzes Chapters 6 and 7 of the "Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report". Specifically, it discusses the issues that surfaceed about NASA and its organization and answers the question: If you were designing a new organization to change the core processes what would be your priorities for change? It examines how the National Air and Space Agency (NASA) ultimately is a business organization, just like any other, and how it faces the same funding issues, internal power struggles, and management concerns that any other business faces.

From the Paper
"The need for change in the organization is clear, and the priorities need to be established and followed. Clearly, the first priority should be either a general housecleaning in management, or at least a re-evaluation of the current management mission, and how it must contribute to change and safety, rather than deadlines and appearances. The second priority must be communication, because the communication streams are flawed, and it seems some staff are afraid to communicate concerns or problems. It also seems budgetary concerns are also a major issue with NASA. These concerns must be addressed, but they should never come ahead of Shuttle safety, and it seems from the start, they have."

Tags:nasa, communication, mission, challenger

Abstract
This paper explains the technical aspects and managerial issues of the Challenger disaster. The author states that behavioral issues don't apply, but rather NASA proved to be seriously deficient in their organizational theory.

Abstract
The paper discusses the very public tragedy of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia that was the third major fatal disaster for the space program and the second for the shuttle, after the explosion of the Challenger on takeoff in 1986. The paper explains that Columbia had actually been out into service before the Challenger, and it lasted more than fifteen years after the Challenger disaster. However, the paper relates on reentry from its final mission, the Columbia disintegrated over the American Southwest and was spread across the landscape for miles.

From the Paper
"The very public tragedy of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia was the third major fatal disaster for the space program and the second for the shuttle, after the explosion of the Challenger on takeoff in 1986. The Columbia had actually been out into service before the Challenger, and it lasted more than fifteen years after the Challenger disaster. However, on reentry from its final mission, the Columbia disintegrated over the American Southwest and was spread across the landscape for miles. As with the Challenger, this disaster was followed by a lengthy investigation and hearings to determine what happened, how it could be avoided in the future, what organizational changes were needed in NASA to assure that..."

Tags:columbia, shuttle, breakdown

Abstract
This paper explains that NASA managers were informed, adequately and promptly, about the unsuitability of the approved design of shuttle rocket boosters when used under temperatures below 40 F per the contract signed with Morton-Thiokol; but NASA authorities were subject to severe economic and political pressures and schedule backlogs. The author states that, instead of upholding his superior's decision, his fellow professionals' technical findings and recommendations, and observing his profession's code of ethics, Joe Kilminster subjected himself to the pressure of NASA and recommended the launch, despite the negative input of his engineers. The paper concludes that Kilminster is morally accountable and culpable for the disaster, directly risking the lives of seven persons by ignoring his own knowledge as an expert engineer and the strong recommendations of his subordinate professionals

Table of Contents
Introduction
Review of Literature
M. M. Jennings, "Summary of the Challenger Episode"
Gordon Stubley, "Engineer and Integrity"
Diane Vaughan, "The Challenger Launch Decision"
National Society of Professional Engineers, "Code of Ethics for Engineers"
Texas A & M University, Departments of Philosophy and of Mechanical Engineering, "The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster"
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

From the Paper
"Joe Kilminster, an engineer, and the Vice President or Space Booster Programs at Thiokol, was one of four management signatories who approved the launch and the author of the written recommendation that it was all right for the shuttle to fly. Thiokol's contract with the NASA provided that shuttles with boosters, like the Challenger, would function properly only within the range of 40 to 90 F. Its engineers also formalized their objection to such launch the day before the disaster."

Tags:nasa, boosters, pressures, negative, ignoring

Abstract
In this article, the writer discusses why the space shuttle Challenger exploded. The writer maintains that the reasons behind the Challenger disaster include poor decision-making, ethical lapses and communication problems. This paper addresses these issues and makes recommendations.

From the Paper
"Why did the space shuttle Challenger explode? Many people assume it was because of poorly-functioning O rings on the booster rocket. However those O rings didn't send that ship up on a cold winter's morn. People did. When the space shuttle Challenger exploded, speculation about the cause of the disaster was frenzied. The last thing anyone wanted to believe was that the tragedy could be the result of willful human negligence. However, extensive evidence supporting ...."

Tags:Challenger, ethics, decision-making, tragedy, communication problems

Abstract
The space shuttle program from inception has been challenged by trade-offs. Management at NASA is forced to make difficult decisions regarding schedule and budgets, and some of those decisions aren't proper from an engineering perspective. Due to budgetary constraints and a disconnect between management and sound engineering, the nation has experienced two shuttle tragedies: Challenger and Columbia. This paper attempts to explore the tradeoff and conflict between budget and safety.
Outline
Abstract
Bad Beginnings
Challenger
From Challenger to Columbia
Conclusions

From the Paper
"On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded 18 miles from its initial launch point at Kennedy Space Center, a mere 73 seconds into its tenth flight. Seen only by launch cameras, intermittent puffs of black smoke escaped the right solid rocket booster (SRB) from .678 until 2.733 seconds into the flight, stopping only to reemerge as a flame another 56 seconds later, and ultimately leading to the destruction of the orbiter. (NASA, 1986) All eight crew members of the Challenger were lost in the explosion and the eight-mile plummet into the Atlantic Ocean."

Tags:challenger, columbia, commision, feynmann, nasa, rogers