Abstract In this paper the author looks behind the scenes of the Challengerspaceshuttledisaster. Although the popular reason for the disaster is known as the technical failure of the O-rings, the author explores the intra-personal and inter-personal processes within the Challenger project which, in his opinion, led to the making of the flawed decision to launch the shuttle. He examines all of the processes of communication, leadership, monitoring and group dynamics which played significant roles in the disaster and looks at the roles of named individuals who, in the author's opinion, contributed to incorrect decisions being made by the launch team. In conclusion, the author blames inter-personal and intra-personal processes, which were flawed and problematic, with no one person able to correct the problems evident as the main cause for the disaster.
From the Paper "Apart from physical communication problems during the project, there were also communication problems relating to areas in the project's planning stages. For instance, launch commit criteria and limits on booster surface temperatures were not communicated between NASA and Thiokol, primarily because they either did not exist, or were not part of the reporting network (Bell, p.47). In not relaying important information such as launch commit criterion, a process was occurring with individuals at various stages prior to the launch, whereby each person was using the communication and reporting process as the locus of responsibility for information disclosure rather than individually accepting responsibility for deciding whether or not to pass on information which he believed to be of significance."
Abstract The ChallengerSpaceShuttle exploded 73 seconds after take-off from the Kennedy Space Center on January 28, 1986, killing all 7 crew members on board. The accident threw the U.S. space program into turmoil as NASA grounded its remaining spaceshuttles over the next two years for redesigning of their safety features and implementing stricter quality control. This paper describes the Challengerdisaster, discusses why the accident occurred, whether it could have been prevented, and who was to blame. It also discusses the dangers of space travel even in the 21st century.
From the Paper "NASA launched the re-usable Space Shuttle program in the late 1960s. The Space Shuttle was initially part of a plan to ferry astronauts and cargo to and from an Earth-orbiting space station. Later on, lack of funding forced NASA to drop the plan for the "space station" and it revised the shuttle's function as a "space truck" that could deploy and retrieve satellites and carry out scientific experiments in space. Each Space Shuttle was designed to perform about 100 missions with only minor maintenance. Their re-usability, in contrast, to the "throwaway" spacecrafts used earlier was purported as a major cost-cutting feature. However, space shuttles proved very expensive to develop and NASA had to make more frequent launches to offset the costs. In one year alone (1986--the year of the Challenger disaster) 24 shuttle missions were planned. (Chaikan, 2003)"
From the Paper "In order for the stakeholders in the shuttle program are to be satisfied that a disaster of the Challenger type will never occur again the decision making process that allowed the disaster must be explored. It is fair to state that certain kinds of decisions that stood on their own merit should no longer have credence.
In the broadest possible sense, despite the tremendous accomplishments of the engineers, scientists, and management involved in the shuttle program, the greatest mistake in respect to Challenger was enthusiasm. The groundwork for any project from ditch-digging to landing a rocket on the moon, must be laid with careful, methodical work that allows for no shortcutting..."
Abstract This paper analyzes Chapters 6 and 7 of the "Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report". Specifically, it discusses the issues that surfaceed about NASA and its organization and answers the question: If you were designing a new organization to change the core processes what would be your priorities for change? It examines how the National Air and Space Agency (NASA) ultimately is a business organization, just like any other, and how it faces the same funding issues, internal power struggles, and management concerns that any other business faces.
From the Paper "The need for change in the organization is clear, and the priorities need to be established and followed. Clearly, the first priority should be either a general housecleaning in management, or at least a re-evaluation of the current management mission, and how it must contribute to change and safety, rather than deadlines and appearances. The second priority must be communication, because the communication streams are flawed, and it seems some staff are afraid to communicate concerns or problems. It also seems budgetary concerns are also a major issue with NASA. These concerns must be addressed, but they should never come ahead of Shuttle safety, and it seems from the start, they have."
An analysis of the events that led up to the SpaceShuttle Columbia disaster and the changes that NASA has implemented to prevent a similar disaster from occurring.
Abstract This paper introduces and analyzes the topic of the SpaceShuttle Columbia disaster. Specifically, it analyzes the accident that occurred on the morning of February 1, 2003 and discusses the events that led up to its occurrence. The paper then discusses what NASA learned from the Columbia disaster and the changes that it has implemented as a result.
From the Paper "In conclusion, NASA learned much from the Columbia disaster, and they have implemented new flight techniques and safety checks that help ensure this type of accident does not happen again. However, the Columbia disaster indicates that communication and decision-making at NASA is sometime suspect, and that continues, even today, even though NASA has developed these new safety checks to help make sure disasters like Columbia do not happen again. While the communication techniques NASA officials use may come into question, ultimately, it is recognized that space travel, although we often take it for granted, is inherently dangerous. Astronauts know that, and so do their families. Every time we send another space shuttle into orbit, we face the possibility of disaster, it is that simple. Still, space travel has largely been safe, and it seems that NASA will continue to promote safe space travel into the future."
Tags: astronauts flight communication STS-107, Cape Canaveral
Abstract On 28 January 1986, the world was shocked by the destruction of the SpaceShuttleChallenger, and the death of its crew. This paper examines the processes used in deciding to launch the ill-fated mission. It focuses on the flawed culture within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and its associated mismanagement. It analyses how this culture influenced NASA's beliefs, its decision-making process and its performance.
Outline
Background
Engineering
Management Issues
Belief Systems
Conclusion
Bibliography
From the Paper "President Nixon endorsed the Shuttle during the 1972 election year because it would increase employment. In a crime against the English language, he announced that the vehicle would "revolutionise transportation into near space, by routinising it." He also recognised that it was politically unacceptable not to maintain a manned presence in space. However, the Office of Management and Budget continued to monitor the programme's costs. NASA was forced to make savings in the short term, at the expense of higher operational costs and greater risks. Solid-rocket boosters were chosen because they were less expensive to develop and could be more quickly refurbished than boosters using liquid propellants."
Abstract The spaceshuttle program from inception has been challenged by trade-offs. Management at NASA is forced to make difficult decisions regarding schedule and budgets, and some of those decisions aren't proper from an engineering perspective. Due to budgetary constraints and a disconnect between management and sound engineering, the nation has experienced two shuttle tragedies: Challenger and Columbia. This paper attempts to explore the tradeoff and conflict between budget and safety.
Outline
Abstract
Bad Beginnings
Challenger From Challenger to Columbia
Conclusions
From the Paper "On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded 18 miles from its initial launch point at Kennedy Space Center, a mere 73 seconds into its tenth flight. Seen only by launch cameras, intermittent puffs of black smoke escaped the right solid rocket booster (SRB) from .678 until 2.733 seconds into the flight, stopping only to reemerge as a flame another 56 seconds later, and ultimately leading to the destruction of the orbiter. (NASA, 1986) All eight crew members of the Challenger were lost in the explosion and the eight-mile plummet into the Atlantic Ocean."
Abstract As the spaceshuttle Columbia began its re-entry into Earth's atmosphere on February 1, 2003, it began to break up. While the exact cause of the shuttle break up is still being investigated, there are many theories being considered, many of which have to do with heating tiles under the shuttle. The paper examines the process of an air-shuttle's re-entry into the atmosphere and shows where things could have gone wrong with Columbia.
From the Paper "In the final stage, the shuttle approaches the upper atmosphere and enters the ionization blackout. In the ionization blackout, hot ionized gases of the atmosphere surround the shuttle. This prevents radio communication with mission control for the about twelve minutes. At this point the shuttle is traveling at 17,000 mph. As the shuttle collides with air molecules, friction is generated which leads to surface temperatures of around 3000 F. The steep angle of re-entry ensures that most of the aerodynamic heating is directed towards the underside of the shuttle where the heat resistant tiles offer the greatest amount of protection. As the atmosphere thickens, the shuttle's thrusters are eventually switched off, at which point the shuttle's aerodynamic flight features kick in, and it can be flown like an airplane."
Abstract This paper talks about the ways in which the shuttle is designed to overcome basic heat transfer problems during launch, orbit and re-entry. The main points in this paper are the active and passive systems in the TPS and the history of the shuttle design.
From the Paper "10...9...8...Patiently the Space Shuttle waits on the launch pad...7...6... everything is in place...5...4... all functions are working properly...3... the conditions are comfortable on the coast of Florida, and the temperature is nice and warm...2...1... IGNITION! (Figure #1) The sudden burn of the rockets jolts the humongous craft to life. As streams of flame shoot out its lower portion, the craft begins to inch skyward. In no time its speed has increased, and it begins hurtling through the air towards its mission. While still inside Earth's atmosphere, the airflow over the Shuttle begins to warm the craft's surface, until it becomes "white hot." Then, the craft breaks free of the atmosphere's restraints, plunging into the freezing void of outer space. The Space Shuttle must be able to withstand these temperature extremes and still accomplish its mission objectives. After the mission, as the craft returns to Earth, it again encounters tremendously high temperatures as it re-enters Earth's atmosphere. The Shuttle encounters a lot of atmospheric resistance and slows itself down through this phase, then finally glides to a comfortable rest at Edwards Air Force Base in sunny Southern California, where the astronauts and craft must prepare to begin the process all over again. These intense hot and cold extremes drive scientists and design engineers as they work to control the internal temperature of the space shuttle throughout the various phases of its journey. They do this by using many creative systems such as specially designed tiles and radiator systems, to both reflect and radiate heat that would otherwise be dangerous to the craft and crew."
This paper evaluates, by reviewing individual journal articles, the correctness of Joe Kilminster's decision to launch the ?Challenger? space ship on its mission, which ended in disaster.
Abstract This paper explains that NASA managers were informed, adequately and promptly, about the unsuitability of the approved design of shuttle rocket boosters when used under temperatures below 40 F per the contract signed with Morton-Thiokol; but NASA authorities were subject to severe economic and political pressures and schedule backlogs. The author states that, instead of upholding his superior's decision, his fellow professionals? technical findings and recommendations, and observing his profession's code of ethics, Joe Kilminster subjected himself to the pressure of NASA and recommended the launch, despite the negative input of his engineers. The paper concludes that Kilminster is morally accountable and culpable for the disaster, directly risking the lives of seven persons by ignoring his own knowledge as an expert engineer and the strong recommendations of his subordinate professionals
Table of Contents
Introduction
Review of Literature
M. M. Jennings, "Summary of the Challenger Episode"
Gordon Stubley, "Engineer and Integrity"
Diane Vaughan, "The Challenger Launch Decision"
National Society of Professional Engineers, "Code of Ethics for Engineers"
Texas A & M University, Departments of Philosophy and of Mechanical Engineering, ?The SpaceShuttleChallengerDisaster?
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
From the Paper "Joe Kilminster, an engineer, and the Vice President or Space Booster Programs at Thiokol, was one of four management signatories who approved the launch and the author of the written recommendation that it was all right for the shuttle to fly. Thiokol's contract with the NASA provided that shuttles with boosters, like the Challenger, would function properly only within the range of 40 to 90 F. Its engineers also formalized their objection to such launch the day before the disaster."
Abstract This paper explains the technical aspects and managerial issues of the Challengerdisaster. The author states that behavioral issues don't apply, but rather NASA proved to be seriously deficient in their organizational theory.
Abstract In this article, the writer discusses why the spaceshuttleChallenger exploded. The writer maintains that the reasons behind the Challengerdisaster include poor decision-making, ethical lapses and communication problems. This paper addresses these issues and makes recommendations.
From the Paper "Why did the space shuttle Challenger explode? Many people assume it was because of poorly-functioning O rings on the booster rocket. However those O rings didn't send that ship up on a cold winter's morn. People did. When the space shuttle Challenger exploded, speculation about the cause of the disaster was frenzied. The last thing anyone wanted to believe was that the tragedy could be the result of willful human negligence. However, extensive evidence supporting ...."
Tags:Challenger, ethics, decision-making, tragedy, communication problems
Abstract This paper presents a detailed examination of the arrest and charge of Constable Robert Hagan regarding the stolen pieces of the SpaceShuttle Columbia. The writer explores several aspects of the case, including what Hagan is charged with doing and what his possible punishments might be.
From the Paper "For society to function properly it must be able to place the utmost trust in those it chooses to protect and to serve its members. The ability to trust police officers and others who are charged with leading the moral path is essential to the continued growth and development of the nation. When a trusted official breaks the law it sends shock waves through society. Constable Robert Hagan II has been charged with stealing from the United States government. His case has made national news because he is a trusted elected official and as such expected to hold himself to a higher standard than the average resident. His case is being watched closely by media and laymen alike as he goes through the process he was supposed to help implement and uphold."
Abstract This paper examines the future of civilian space flight in the wake of the Challengerdisaster on January 28, 1986 and NASA's opposition to civilian flight.
Abstract This paper discusses how, like most tragic or unusual events in history, the 1986 NASA Challenger explosion offers a hindsight perspective of what "went wrong" and what "should have been done" to prevent the loss of lives.
From the Paper "The United States? government, NASA officials, airspace scientists, engineers, educators, public interest groups, and the media alike, immediately jumped on the band wagon to explain the events that led up to the tragedy. President Reagan initiated an independent commission to investigate all of the parties involved, while NASA, the media, and the scientific community pointed fingers, called names, and "explained away" with great political finesse the behavior and choices that ultimately led to explosion. Very much like the Salem Witch Hunt Trials, people were questioned and re-questioned concerning their thoughts and actions. Reporters, academicians, social scientists, culturalists, authors, and even, folk song writers, seized the moment to "glean and explain" the events and the ?lessons learned.? The author, Diane Vaughan, is one of many, who attempted to offer, for a nominal fee of $20+ tax per copy, a "cultural-contextual" explanation of people's thoughts and behavior before and after the explosion. Based on the reading of Dr. Vaughan's book as well as a review of other articles and reports, below is an outline of some of the "lessons learned" from the Challenger accident."
