Abstract
In this article, the writer discusses why the space shuttle Challenger exploded. The writer maintains that the reasons behind the Challenger disaster include poor decision-making, ethical lapses and communication problems. This paper addresses these issues and makes recommendations.

From the Paper
"Why did the space shuttle Challenger explode? Many people assume it was because of poorly-functioning O rings on the booster rocket. However those O rings didn't send that ship up on a cold winter's morn. People did. When the space shuttle Challenger exploded, speculation about the cause of the disaster was frenzied. The last thing anyone wanted to believe was that the tragedy could be the result of willful human negligence. However, extensive evidence supporting ...."

Tags:Challenger, ethics, decision-making, tragedy, communication problems

Abstract
This paper explains that NASA managers were informed, adequately and promptly, about the unsuitability of the approved design of shuttle rocket boosters when used under temperatures below 40 F per the contract signed with Morton-Thiokol; but NASA authorities were subject to severe economic and political pressures and schedule backlogs. The author states that, instead of upholding his superior's decision, his fellow professionals' technical findings and recommendations, and observing his profession's code of ethics, Joe Kilminster subjected himself to the pressure of NASA and recommended the launch, despite the negative input of his engineers. The paper concludes that Kilminster is morally accountable and culpable for the disaster, directly risking the lives of seven persons by ignoring his own knowledge as an expert engineer and the strong recommendations of his subordinate professionals

Table of Contents
Introduction
Review of Literature
M. M. Jennings, "Summary of the Challenger Episode"
Gordon Stubley, "Engineer and Integrity"
Diane Vaughan, "The Challenger Launch Decision"
National Society of Professional Engineers, "Code of Ethics for Engineers"
Texas A & M University, Departments of Philosophy and of Mechanical Engineering, "The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster"
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

From the Paper
"Joe Kilminster, an engineer, and the Vice President or Space Booster Programs at Thiokol, was one of four management signatories who approved the launch and the author of the written recommendation that it was all right for the shuttle to fly. Thiokol's contract with the NASA provided that shuttles with boosters, like the Challenger, would function properly only within the range of 40 to 90 F. Its engineers also formalized their objection to such launch the day before the disaster."

Tags:nasa, boosters, pressures, negative, ignoring

Abstract
The paper relates that the Space Shuttle Challenger disintegrated 73 seconds after its take off after an O-ring seal in one of the rockets failed. The paper reveals that information regarding O-ring performance under thermal pressure had been disregarded in the launch preparation and many believe that recognition of crucial statistical data could have averted this tragedy. The paper further reveals that the Rogers Commission, the most significant source of information regarding the Challenger crash, has been criticized for its lack of objectivity. The paper discloses that instead of admitting the agency's negligence, NASA dodged questions regarding the O-rings, and deferred all answers as currently under investigation.

From the Paper
"On January 28, 1986, at approximately 11:39 am EST, the United States suffered one of its worst tragedies when the Space Shuttle Challenger disintegrated 73 seconds after its take off after an O-ring seal in one of the rockets failed. This seal failure resulted in a flame lean from the rocket booster, which consequently infiltrated the external fuel tank, causing a fire which destroyed the structure of the external tank. In addition, the aerodynamic forces quickly broke the orbiter. (Dalal,945) The shuttle was disintegrated and killed all seven crew members (including a teacher). Eventually, some of the vehicle pieces were recovered from the ocean following thorough search and recovery."

Tags:O-ring, seal, foam, loss, negligence, safety, objectivity

Abstract
In this paper the author looks behind the scenes of the Challenger space shuttle disaster. Although the popular reason for the disaster is known as the technical failure of the O-rings, the author explores the intra-personal and inter-personal processes within the Challenger project which, in his opinion, led to the making of the flawed decision to launch the shuttle. He examines all of the processes of communication, leadership, monitoring and group dynamics which played significant roles in the disaster and looks at the roles of named individuals who, in the author's opinion, contributed to incorrect decisions being made by the launch team. In conclusion, the author blames inter-personal and intra-personal processes, which were flawed and problematic, with no one person able to correct the problems evident as the main cause for the disaster.

From the Paper
"Apart from physical communication problems during the project, there were also communication problems relating to areas in the project's planning stages. For instance, launch commit criteria and limits on booster surface temperatures were not communicated between NASA and Thiokol, primarily because they either did not exist, or were not part of the reporting network (Bell, p.47). In not relaying important information such as launch commit criterion, a process was occurring with individuals at various stages prior to the launch, whereby each person was using the communication and reporting process as the locus of responsibility for information disclosure rather than individually accepting responsibility for deciding whether or not to pass on information which he believed to be of significance."

Tags:resonsibility, communication, engineers, failure, planning

Abstract
This paper explains that organizational behavior focuses on the study of behavior within the organizational construct, concentrating on how an individual, group, and structure affect the behavior within the organization. The author points outs that learning from the Challenger Disaster required the NASA organization to look carefully at (1) forces contributing to the flawed decision, (2) reasons for the decisions and behavior that contributed to them, and (3) organizational shortcomings that affected the outcome. The paper stresses that communication can lead to misunderstanding, but so does lack of action; people within the chain of command at NASA did not act upon information that may have changed the outcome.

Table of Contents
Introduction
The NASA Challenger Disaster
Recommendations
Conclusion

From the Paper
"In exploring the history behind the Challenger disaster, one discovers, as the Presidential Commission did, that information threatened the "can-do" ideology of the space agency was routinely suppressed by managers at the agency's Marshall Space Flight Center. When Thiokol's engineers raised their concerns a full six months before the disaster, the information they provided was distorted as it made its way up the organizational chain of command, primarily to suit the career interests of Center managers eager to please NASA headquarters. Bosses were told what they wanted to hear and not what they needed to know. Ultimately, Thiokol's engineers were told, in effect, to "sit down and shut up" the night before the launch because the final decision would be made by management."

Tags:accountability, ethics, structure, miscommunication, investigation

Abstract
The Challenger Space Shuttle exploded 73 seconds after take-off from the Kennedy Space Center on January 28, 1986, killing all 7 crew members on board. The accident threw the U.S. space program into turmoil as NASA grounded its remaining space shuttles over the next two years for redesigning of their safety features and implementing stricter quality control. This paper describes the Challenger disaster, discusses why the accident occurred, whether it could have been prevented, and who was to blame. It also discusses the dangers of space travel even in the 21st century.

From the Paper
"NASA launched the re-usable Space Shuttle program in the late 1960s. The Space Shuttle was initially part of a plan to ferry astronauts and cargo to and from an Earth-orbiting space station. Later on, lack of funding forced NASA to drop the plan for the "space station" and it revised the shuttle's function as a "space truck" that could deploy and retrieve satellites and carry out scientific experiments in space. Each Space Shuttle was designed to perform about 100 missions with only minor maintenance. Their re-usability, in contrast, to the "throwaway" spacecrafts used earlier was purported as a major cost-cutting feature. However, space shuttles proved very expensive to develop and NASA had to make more frequent launches to offset the costs. In one year alone (1986--the year of the Challenger disaster) 24 shuttle missions were planned. (Chaikan, 2003)"

Tags:travel, nasa, accident

Abstract
On 28 January 1986, the world was shocked by the destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger, and the death of its crew. This paper examines the processes used in deciding to launch the ill-fated mission. It focuses on the flawed culture within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and its associated mismanagement. It analyses how this culture influenced NASA's beliefs, its decision-making process and its performance.
Outline
Background
Engineering
Management Issues
Belief Systems
Conclusion
Bibliography

From the Paper
"President Nixon endorsed the Shuttle during the 1972 election year because it would increase employment. In a crime against the English language, he announced that the vehicle would "revolutionise transportation into near space, by routinising it." He also recognised that it was politically unacceptable not to maintain a manned presence in space. However, the Office of Management and Budget continued to monitor the programme's costs. NASA was forced to make savings in the short term, at the expense of higher operational costs and greater risks. Solid-rocket boosters were chosen because they were less expensive to develop and could be more quickly refurbished than boosters using liquid propellants."

Tags:communication, culture, launch, neurolinguistic, nlp, orbiter, programming, rockwell, rogers, thiokol

Abstract
This paper explains the technical aspects and managerial issues of the Challenger disaster. The author states that behavioral issues don't apply, but rather NASA proved to be seriously deficient in their organizational theory.

Abstract
This paper discusses how, like most tragic or unusual events in history, the 1986 NASA Challenger explosion offers a hindsight perspective of what "went wrong" and what "should have been done" to prevent the loss of lives.

From the Paper
"The United States' government, NASA officials, airspace scientists, engineers, educators, public interest groups, and the media alike, immediately jumped on the band wagon to explain the events that led up to the tragedy. President Reagan initiated an independent commission to investigate all of the parties involved, while NASA, the media, and the scientific community pointed fingers, called names, and "explained away" with great political finesse the behavior and choices that ultimately led to explosion. Very much like the Salem Witch Hunt Trials, people were questioned and re-questioned concerning their thoughts and actions. Reporters, academicians, social scientists, culturalists, authors, and even, folk song writers, seized the moment to "glean and explain" the events and the "lessons learned." The author, Diane Vaughan, is one of many, who attempted to offer, for a nominal fee of $20+ tax per copy, a "cultural-contextual" explanation of people's thoughts and behavior before and after the explosion. Based on the reading of Dr. Vaughan's book as well as a review of other articles and reports, below is an outline of some of the "lessons learned" from the Challenger accident."

Tags:astronauts, explosion, vaughn

Abstract
This paper discusses ethos, pathos and logos, the five canons, the organizational pattern, aspects of delivery, visual aids, audience, and strengths and weaknesses of Ronald Reagan's speech.

From the Paper
" On January 28th, 1986, the spaceship Challenger was set to take off. NASA and the crew on board were ready, and the Challenger was launched. Only 73 seconds after takeoff, the Challenger blew up, killing all seven crew members. Ronald Reagan, the current president of the United States of America, gave a memorial speech for the Challenger crew that perished on January 31st, 1986. He spoke about the loss of the seven families and the loss of the nation as well. He described each member of the crew, saying what their achievements were, and why they were important to the team. He also said that the space program would continue, despite this tragedy. He said that every family member that he had spoken to felt that each crew member would have wanted it that way. Reagan spoke at the memorial because the explosion was such a shock. "

Tags:audience, canon, challenger, delivery, ethos, logos, memorial, pathos, reagan