An analysis of the Battle of Cannae and the military leadership of Hannibal Baraca.
Essay # 63247 |
1,350 words (
approx. 5.4 pages ) |
5 sources |
MLA | 2005
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$ 27.95
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Abstract
This paper describes the Battle of Cannae in great detail using powerful verbs and statements that depict the battle. The paper shows the genius of Hannibal and his ability to master the art of military leadership. The paper explores Hannibal's Carthaginian roots and examines his military leadership prowess that culminated in the Battle of Cannae. The paper highlights Hannibal as the finest Carthaginian general ever known.
From the Paper
"Hannibal Baraca, a descendant from a prominent Carthaginian family, led the Carthaginian army into the heart of the Roman Empire, and he struck fear into the hearts of the Roman peoples for many years. The battle of Cannae would be the culmination of Hannibal's abilities as a General, and in this battle Hannibal's army butchered the biggest Roman army to date that mustered around 80,000 men by some accounts. Chabrais once had these words to say about leadership, " An Army of deer led by a lion is more to be feared than an army of lions led by a deer". There is no doubt that Hannibal was a lion, but the other advantage Hannibal had was that his men were seasoned savages that fought like wild beasts on the battlefield bringing total destruction to their enemies. According to Brian Caven, "with the death of Hasdrubal and the succession of Hannibal ... The Army of Spain passed from the control of a mature statesman, ... into that of an impetuous young man in whom the principal motivating force was a burning desire for military glory"(85). Hannibal Baraca, the finest Carthaginian general ever known, feared by his enemies, would have his finest hour as a General at the battle of Cannae."
Tags:carthaginian, spain, roman
Looks at the reasons for the third war between Rome and Carthage.
Analytical Essay # 148555 |
2,915 words (
approx. 11.7 pages ) |
4 sources |
MLA | 2011
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$ 51.95
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Abstract
This paper explains that, during the time of the Romans as it is today, making war on another country for the reasons of seeking power or for another nation's wealth was unpopular and untenable; instead, other motives needed to be created to justify the Roman's third war against Carthage in 149 B.C.E. Next, the author contends that the official powers in Rome could not have really felt threatened by Carthage but rather Cato saw the opportunity to appropriate a greater share of the Carthaginian wealth for the Roman Empire and its nearby allies. The paper describes the Third Punic War especially the complex interplay between Rome, Carthage and the Numidians under King Massinissa, the three powers interested in the North African region, which led to the fear mongering that supported the war. The sources are in the footnotes.
From the Paper
"Even the explanations given by Pliny and Appian concerning Cato's rather baseless rabble-rousing have been called into question by modern scholars, however. Some even maintain that "it may be doubted whether Cato really went to Africa at all," and that the historians who first recorded such a trip and Cato's attitude towards Carthage in its aftermath were themselves attempting to justify similar military actions. Fear mongering has remained a popular way for garnering public support for otherwise unjustifiable wars, and these historians shows that it was popular even as a retroactive measure two thousand years ago. When war against a particular enemy or region is desired but no reasonable and ethical motive presents itself, most nations in history have not found a great deal of repugnance."
Tags:greed, pre-emptive attack, cato numidians siege