Abstract
The paper is an economic geography discussion of the regional effects of the softwood lumber dispute in Canada. The paper argues that British Colombia is the biggest loser economically of this resource, with the current level of taxes and tariffs. The paper notes how as British Colombia's industry declines, the industries in other provinces improve.

From the Paper
"The economic development of Canada has largely been dependent on the extraction or harvesting of natural resources. Economies based on the extraction or harvesting are generally known as staples economies. In Resources Dean M. Hanink states, "Staple production, consisting of direct exploitation and initial processing of natural resources, or staples, began with the Atlantic Fisheries in the late fifteenth centuries and early sixteenth centuries, and progressed to the interior with the growth of European demand for fur. Expansion into Canada's interior occurred in response to the development of the timber industries of lumber and pulp" (Hanink 235)."

Tags:softwood, lumber, dispute

Abstract
This paper examines how the softwood lumber dispute between Canada and the United States is an important trade dispute and how the disagreement between countries originated in the countervailing duty investigation by the US authorities in 1982/83. It looks at how The US countervailing duties on Canadian softwood lumber were based on the allegedly below-market fees charged by some Canadian provinces for stumpage rights granted to Canadian softwood lumber producers on Crown lands and how this marked the beginning of over two decades of allegations, investigations and imposed penalties by the United States.

From the Paper
"The current lumber dispute between nations began in 1982, when lumber companies in the United States were faced with financial difficulties due to the recession. The US lumber industry petitioned the US government to impose tariffs against Canadian softwood lumber imports under the provisions of US countervailing duty law (Yin, 2004). The Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports (CFLI) filed a countervailing duty petition against softwood lumber from Canada, alleging that Canadian federal and provincial governments were subsidizing softwood lumber production by selling the right to cut timber on public lands at artificially low prices (Schwindt, 2004). The petition was taken to the US Department of Commerce and the US International Trade Commission (ITC) to determine if imported lumber from Canada was directly or indirectly subsidized by the Canadian government (Yin, 2004). In 1983, the International Trade Association (ITA) of the Department of Commerce concluded that the amount of subsidies was less than 0.5% and that Canadian stumpage programs did not amount to countervailable subsidies (Yin, 2004). "

Tags:forest, management, stumpage

Abstract
The paper relates that the proposed softwood lumber agreement is designed to resolve the long standing trade dispute between Canada and the United States. The paper explains why Canada's primary objective with the proposed agreement is to liberalize trade. The paper explores whether Canada's interests are being served by this agreement. The paper looks at an important interest group, the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) that supports Canada in this dispute.

Outline:
The Proposed Agreement
Interest Groups

From the Paper
"The proposed softwood lumber agreement is designed to finally resolve the long standing trade dispute between Canada and the United States. It has provisions that are beneficial for Canada and provisions that are beneficial for the United States."
"The major benefit for the Canadian industry is the fact that the agreement would result in the elimination of the trade barriers currently in place. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's website states,
"The U.S. will revoke the CVD and AD orders on Canadian softwood lumber imports and stop collecting deposits"(Anonymous www. international.gc.ca/eicb/softwood/basic-terms-en.as). This would mean that the trade barriers erected by the United States would be essentially eliminated.""

Tags:economy, trade, barriers, tariffs, duties, NAHB, policy, interest, groups

Abstract
The paper looks at how the proposed agreement between Canada and the United States to resolve the softwood lumber dispute has a number of provisions binding both the United States and Canada. The paper explains that it ensures that for at least seven years, Canadian softwood lumber exporters will have access to up to 34 percent of the United States market in this industry, and it also requires that the United States return 78 percent of the $5 billion it has collected in countervailing and anti-dumping duties on Canadian lumber exports since May 2002. In addition, the paper relates that the agreement requires that Canada impose an export tax on softwood lumber sent to the United States if the price of this lumber drops below $355 per thousand board feet. Finally, the paper discusses how the agreement notes that the Atlantic provinces of Canada are exempt from the agreement.

From the Paper
"The proposed agreement between Canada and the United States to resolve the softwood lumber dispute between the two countries has a number of provisions binding both the United States and Canada. It ensures for at least seven years that Canadian softwood lumber exporters will have access to up to 34 percent of the United States market in this industry. It also requires that the United States return 78 percent of the $5 billion it has collected in countervailing and anti-dumping duties on Canadian lumber exports since May 2002. In addition, the agreement requires that Canada..."

Tags:busines, canada, trade

Abstract
The paper relates that the Softwood Lumber Agreement was introduced in 1996, and established the rules governing export for the following five years. The paper looks at how this agreement marked the latest point in a dispute that has been unremitting for two decades. The paper discusses the core issue that concerned stumpage fees charged to Canadian firms that remove lumber from Crown lands.

From the Paper
"The Softwood Lumber Agreement was introduced in 1996, and established the rules governing export for the following five years. This agreement marked the latest point in a dispute that has been unremitting for two decades. The core issue concerned stumpage fees charged to Canadian firms that remove lumber from Crown lands. The agreement stipulated the limit on the amount of lumber which might be exported to the US annually, and also introduced a system of fees to be used if the exports exceeded the limits. "The main provision was for a free export quota per year of 14.7 billion...""

Tags:interests, trade, disputes

Abstract
This paper discusses the 1996 Canada-US Softwood Lumber agreement. It describes the terms of the agreement and the differing interests of the federal and provincial governments in the agreement. The paper then looks at the differing roles that the federal and provincial governments play in implementing the agreement. Next, the paper discusses Canada's objectives in entering into the two free trade agreements, the FTA and the NAFTA and discusses how the Softwood Lumber Agreement fits into these. Finally, the paper looks at the BC Lumber Trade Council and what it represents.

From the Paper
" The Council advocated to the provincial and federal governments on the basis of the lumber industry and the best interests of the forestry industry as well as of Canada. The Council advocated finding "a durable, long-term solution to the Canada-U.S. softwood lumber dispute and respect for the rules of trade under NAFTA" (BC Lumber Trade Council 1). The Council also upholds certain aspects of the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement along with the interests of the firms in the industry that the Council represents. Advocacy on the part of the Council includes using threats to the federal government. Such threats involve the potential for embarrassment on the international scale along with local disgrace in the event that the agreement is implemented without feedback and influence from the BC Lumber Trade Council. The strategies employed in the advocacy of related to the proposed softwood lumber agreement represent the intensity of feeling surrounding the issues in the dispute. The Council's advocacy measures also are influenced by the extreme significance of the softwood lumber agreement for the lumber industry in British Columbia. The BC Lumber Trade Council also has threatened to sabotage the agreement in the event that their demands are not realized."

Tags:FTA, NAFTA, advocacy, globalization

Abstract
This paper consists of three fixed questions addressing the Canada-US softwood lumber dispute and the new 2006 Agreement. The paper addresses the different interests and functions of the provincial and federal governments, Canadian goals in joining NAFTA and what the softwood dispute seems to imply about how well it serves Cdn interests, and the BC Lumber Trade Council as an example of a public interest group both representing the lumbering industry and advising the BC and federal governments on how to proceed. This question also explores the impact of slowed lumbering and tariffs and the resolution to accept the 2006 agreement.

From the Paper
"The 2006 new Softwood Lumber Agreement between Canada and the United States will reflect the different interests of the provincial and federal governments as well as their different roles in implementing the Agreement. (Beg Et Al: 2003) The larger Canadian political environment that shapes the thinking of both the provincial and federal levels of government has to do with a still insecure feeling in Canada as its economy just managed to survive the 1990s Recession. Brean noted how this has influenced Canadian official reactions to new phenomena such as the..."

Tags:softwood lumber, dispute, public interest group

Abstract
This paper explains that, in the Canadian-U.S.A. softwood lumber dispute, Washington objected to the low Canadian lumber prices; whereas, the provinces of Canada saw their role as regulating lumbering so that the mainly Crown lands on which it takes place are maintained ecologically well. The author points out that the 2006 agreement removed the tariff on Canadian softwood, but also established export taxes that will kick into place should the price of lumber drop too low, thus preventing Canadian exporters from "dumping" or selling lumber in the United States at prices less than what goods cost to produce. The paper stresses that Canada like many Third World countries, is a raw material exporter, subjected to prices and rulings made elsewhere and with whole local or even national economies revolving around particular commodities and their related industries.

Table of Contents:
Introduction
Canada's Objectives
The British Columbia Lumber Trade Council
Concluding Notes

From the Paper
"Critics said that there should be no duty paid by Canadian forestry companies, in the first place, that Americans either wanted to buy lumber that they could not produce in the United States to keep up with demand, or they did not. A Duke University expert on international economic law wrote that the 2005 negotiations that have gone before the present Softwood Lumber Agreement of 2006 involved Washington being made aware of having reacted too quickly to the earlier situation. Some Americans realized that they were on 'thin ice' in terms of the position taken against Canadian producers of lumber, by suddenly charging tariffs, in view of the NAFTA."

Tags:nafta, tariffs, globalization, materials, dumping

Abstract
This paper discusses the Softwood Lumber Agreement between Canada and the United States, which aims to resolve a longstanding trade dispute between Canada and the United States. It describes the advantages and disadvantages of the agreement, as well as the interests of the provincial and federal governments. The paper also discusses the history of the dispute and the role of the Quebec Forest Industry Council.

From the Paper
"This approach to lobbying the federal and provincial governments becomes understandable when we view other documents on the QFIC website, such as its statement of condemnation of the previous Liberal government in Ottawa in November 2005 for not doing enough to supply aid to the Quebec lumber industry. In this the QFIC reiterated to the federal government that the member companies of the organization were suffering under the current ongoing dispute, and that approximately US$1.2 billion in export duties charged by the United States government lay in the United States; money that the QFIC asserted was not only rightfully the money of the exporters, but that it also was desperately needed by many struggling companies in the industry in Quebec (QFIC). As an institutional interest group with a range of members, a collective memory and extensive resources (Stanbury and Moore 229), the QFIC represents a potent force in this particular area as may be seen in the Bloc Quebecois decision to support the minority federal government and insure passage of the agreement."

Tags:QFIC, Quebec, exporters

Abstract
This paper discusses the 2006 Softwood Lumber agreement between the United States and Canada. It describes the reasons for the agreement and its implications. The paper also discusses the different interests of the Canadian federal and provincial governments in terms of this agreement and their role in implementing the agreement. It then analyzes Canada's objectives in entering into the two free trade agreements with the United States (the FTA and NAFTA) and how it relates to the Softwood Lumber agreement. Finally the paper looks at the BC Lumbar Trade Council and its role in supporting Canadian interests in the Canada-US softwood lumber dispute.

Table of Contents:
Overview of the Softwood Lumber Agreement
Free Trade Agreements
The BC Lumbar Trade Council

From the Paper
"In this analysis, the advocacy strategy of the BCLTC is not only audacious but is also reflective of the nature of the proposed softwood lumber agreement and the importance of this agreement's structure to the lumber industry in British Columbia. The fact that the organization is willing to go to the extreme step of implying that its members would scuttle the agreement if they do not get what they want in subsequent drafts is political brinkmanship of the highest order. While this power and strategy is unusual for most Canadian interest groups, it is reflective of the complex and long-running nature of this dispute in British Columbia, as well as of the provincial industry's desire for long term stability in its trade with the United States."

Tags:policy, NAFTA, FTA, BCLTC