Abstract This paper explains that Operation Barbarossa was largely the brainchild of Hitler himself; his general staff advised against fighting a war on two fronts, but Hitler, considering himself a political and military genius, did not fear fighting Britain, possibly America, and now Russia, all at the same time. The author points out that, to make it more palatable to both the German population and the rest of the world, Nazi leaders painted Operation Barbarossa as a defensive attack by stating that the Red Army was preparing to attack Germany, thus Germany needed to strike first before the Russians were fully prepared. The paper concludes that the operation failed miserably because of Germany's logistical problems, an underestimation of the Soviet Army's abilities, and the onset of the harsh Russian winter.
From the Paper "Before initiating Operation Barbarossa, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were diplomatically on friendly terms, having signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact a short time before the German and Soviet invasion of Poland. While appearing on the surface to be a simple treaty of non-aggression, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact also contained secret protocols for the dividing up of the border-states between the two nations. The pact surprised the world because of Germany and the USSR's opposing ideologies and mutual hostility. But Hitler had long wanted to conquer western Russia to fulfill his goal of eastern expansion. So the pact was simply one of short-term convenience, which the Nazis thought little of breaking."
This paper discuses intelligence during World War II, as presented in Barton Whaley's "Codeword Barbarossa" and Roberta Wohlstetter's "Pearl Harbor - Warning and Decision".
Abstract This paper explains that Barton Whaley's "Codeword Barbarossa" has long been considered the definitive study of Hitler's ability to hoodwink Stalin, the Soviet Union's intelligence service and other Allied intelligence networks. The author relates that Roberta Wohlstetter's "Pearl Harbor" conveys that, although rarely has a government been so well informed as to what to expect, this government had "expected wrong". The paper suggests that these books indicate that histories of intelligence or espionage are only tentative as new evidence or new capability in assessing primary sources emerge. The paper concludes that these volumes underscore that, during wartime, uncertainty freezes planning: Stalin responded to the possibility of a German invasion of the Soviet Union; whereas, Pearl Harbor generals waited, puzzled by information from Washington.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
Operation Barbarossa Pearl Harbor
Reflection
Conclusion - 'Surprise' and History
From the Paper "On June 21, 1991, a German soldier on the Russian border defected to the Soviet forces and stated that Germany was about to invade the Soviet Union. The warning arrived too late. The June 22 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union proceeded as one of history's worst instances of military surprise, the Soviet forces soon surrounded by the Germans as the Luftwaffe destroyed the Soviet air force, on the ground. At the end of World War II, Whaley had a fair amount of the forerunning intelligence story assessed, to which he added what was gained from various forms of evidence concerning European intelligence networks' activities ..."
Abstract In his attempt to achieve global domination, Adolf Hitler made many crucial decisions which ultimately affected both the outcome of World War II and the fate of his own regime. This paper examines three major decisions made by Hitler that eventually changed the direction of the war. It looks at how the first of these was his failure to give his full support to a Mediterranean campaign and how many of his advisors felt that the capture of Egypt and the Suez Canal would have weakened Britain considerably and might even have lead to eventual capitulation. It then examines his postponement and eventual cancellation, of Operation Sea Lion. Finally, it discusses his decision to invade Greece and Yugoslavia and the effect it had upon Operation Barbarossa.
From the Paper "On October 3, in an address to the German people, Hitler announced the collapse of the Soviet Union. He declared that Russia was finished, and that Britain's dreams of a two front war were dead. His optimism seemed justified, especially after the fall of Kiev on September 19, followed by the victory in the Battle of Kiev on September 26, which resulted in the capture of some 665,000 Soviet prisoners, according to German reports. (7 1124) Hitler viewed this battle as "the greatest victory in the history of the world," though some of his generals did not share his views on its strategic importance. Heinz Guderian, among others, felt compelled to speak to Hitler about the capture of Moscow."
Hitler's invasion of Soviet Union (1941-1945). Examines origins of Nazi strategy, miscalculations, Operation Barbarossa, seige of Stalingrad, German defeat.
3,600 words (approx. 14.4 pages), 15 sources, 2001, $ 127.95
From the Paper " This research paper discusses the war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (1941-1945), its origins, nature and course and assesses the reasons for Germany's defeat in the East.
Adolf Hitler decided to invade the Soviet Union in mid-1941 for a combination of ideological, strategic and economic reasons. This turned out to be a fateful miscalculation and may not have been the most promising option then open to Nazi Germany. The Wehrmacht enjoyed spectacular successes in the summer and early fall of 1941; however, the Germans lost their best chance to achieve decisive victory late that year due to a combination of factors. In 1941-1942 the Germans grossly underestimated the courage, tenacity, numbers and recuperative power of their Soviet foe and unwisely split and overextended.."
From the Paper "The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 has often been described as "the greatest blunder of the Second World War" and historians have long debated the relative contributions of ideology and strategy to Hitler's decision to implement Operation Barbarossa, as the invasion was known, at this particular time (Rich 204). Although the notion of lebensraum, the acquisition of 'living room' for the expansion of the Aryan peoples, had long been a major factor in Hitler's plans for the Eastern front. his planning had also included a commitment to avoid involving Germany in a two-front war. Despite the inevitability of fighting on two fronts because of the unexpected continuing strength of Britain and the United States' entry into the war, however, Hitler believed that Barbarossa was necessary in practical terms. While he certainly held that it was necessary..."
Abstract This paper explains that William Shirer's detailed, first-hand account of the reign of Hitler's Third Reich allows his readers to delve deeply into the dynamics that led to Hitler's success and to his downfall marking the end of the Second World War. The author points out that Shirer expresses antagonism over Hitler's personality and actions as a leader. The paper stresses the Third Reich's inhumane practices against the Jewry and the Nazi government's blatant practice of plunder and corruption.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Birth of the Third Reich
Chapter 2: Birth of the Nazi Party
Chapter 3: Versailles, Weimar and the Beer Hall Putsch
Chapter 4: The Mind of Hitler and the Roots of the Third Reich
Chapter 5: The Road to Power: 1925-31
Chapter 7: The Nazification of Germany: 1933-34
Chapter 8: Life in the Third Reich: 1933-37
Chapter 9: The First Steps: 1934-37
Chapter 10: Strange, Fateful Interlude: The Fall of Bloomberg, Fritsch, Neurath and Schacht
Chapter 11: Anschluss: The Rape of Austria
Chapter 12: The Road to Munich
Chapter 13: Czechoslovakia Ceases to Exist
Chapter 14: The Turn of Poland
Chapter 15: The Nazi-Soviet Pact
Chapter 16: The Last Days of Peace
Chapter 17: The Launching of World War II
Chapter 18: The Fall of Poland
Chapter 19: Sitzkrieg in the West
Chapter 20: The Conquest of Denmark and Norway
Chapter 21: Victory in the West
Chapter 22: Operation Sea Lion: the Thwarted Invasion of Britain
Chapter 23: Barbarossa: The Turn of Russia
Chapter 24: A Turn of the Tide
Chapter 25: The Turn of the United States
Chapter 26: The Great Turning Point: 1942-Stalingrad and El Alamein
Chapter 27: The New Order
Chapter 28: The Fall of Mussolini
Chapter 29: The Allied Invasion of Western Europe and the Attempt to Kill Hitler
Chapter 30: The Conquest of Germany
Chapter 31: The Last Days
Analysis of Shirer's "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich"
From the Paper "With an already developed hatred for the Jews and belief that the Germans were the superior race, Hitler, in the midst of the World War I, had strengthened his political ideology. Disillusioned by the loss of the Germans in the war, Hitler began boldly expressing his views against anti-Semitism. As a young soldier, he was given the opportunity to share with his fellow soldiers his political thinking and beliefs as he was appointed as an educational officer for the German Army. Shirer also disclosed how Hitler's investigation of the German Workers' Party led to his becoming a member of the said party, then eventually conjoined this part with that of the National Socialism."
Tags: holocaust, unbiased, race, personality, political
Abstract This paper details the historical events of the World War II Battle of Stalingrad, fought between the Russians and Germans. The Battle of Stalingrad was an influential battle which allowed the allied nations of the world to regroup. Without this defeat, the German army would have been able to continue aggressively pushing both east and west for quite some time. The paper shows that thanks to the valiant efforts of the Russians defending their homeland, the German army was held at bay long enough for the United States and other Allied nations to send enough support to truly defend the Western front.
From the Paper "After attacking the Russians in the summer of 1941, the Germans found themselves up against a tougher enemy then expected. They were forced to pursue the Soviet people deeper into the interior of the Russia. The winter of 1941-1942 proved to be a very long, cold, and difficult one for the Germans, offering very little hope for a successful campaign so far from home. As the spring of 1942 began, the Germans developed a new battle plan to ensure they would not meet anymore setbacks. This new aggressive offensive, known as Operation Blau was ordered on April 15th 1942, by Hitler himself in Fuehrer directive no. 41, which outlined a detailed 4 phase plan for brining the country of Russia to its knees (Seaton, 256)."
