Abstract This paper examines the significance of the Asianfinancialcrisis of the late 1990s and its repercussions. It explains how the financialcrisis provided an important lesson to the Asian economies affected in terms of allowing any degree of dependence on foreign investment. The writer discusses how the crisis induced a 'New Asian Miracle' in different Asian economies.
Outline:
Introduction
The Attractiveness of Asia
Reactions to the Crisis American Dimensions
Asian Perceptions
Concluding Remarks
From the Paper "Various domestic conditions have been connected to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 but this paper centers on global forces that created unexpected change to induce the crisis at international as opposed to regional or national levels. Kawai Et Al stress that private capital flows to developing countries grew high in the 1990s so that a sudden drop in investment caused a 1994 crisis in Mexico and South America, then the East Asian crisis. (2005: 185) This World Bank-oriented article is typical of many that rather minimize the role of American patterns of investment that contributed directly to what Asian countries sustained in the 1990s. Throughout East and Southeast Asia governments noted fast falling markets and varied domestic responses as capital ceased to arrive as it had before from developed countries."
Tags: investment, political, economy, markets, World, Bank, drop
Abstract This paper reviews how in the contemporary context in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, the AsianFinancialCrisis of 1997-1998 seems a distant memory that has been obscured by the meteoric economic boom of China and the global changes that have occurred post-September 11, 2001. However this perspective risks ignoring the significance of this crisis given that the underlying structures of the global economy during this crisis, in particular the phenomenon of globalization and its primary institutions the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO) continue to shape our economy today.
Abstract This paper details the roots and causes of the AsianFinancialCrisis in the late 90's. The author discusses some of the economic conditions responsible for the crisis and the various countries involved.
From the Paper "Some economic analysts have described the Asian financial crisis as one of the worst financial disasters to occur in history. These same economists argue that the Asian financial crisis was far worse than the Latin American debt crisis and could be likened to the great depression of the 1930?s. While not any one specific cause can attempt to explain the reason for the crisis, a number of factors during this time frame existed that helped to facilitate the collapse of the Asian economy. Each country affected by the crisis had different impending circumstances for being vulnerable to this predicament during that time period. The crisis began in a few concentrated countries in southeastern Asia and by the end had propagated throughout many of the countries located in Asia bringing devastating affects."
Abstract This paper seeks to examine and analyze the causes of the Asianfinancialcrisis and their effects. It evaluates the impact of such factors as currency overvaluation and debt liquidity on the extent of the bubble collapse. It also looks at the exasperation of the crisis by sovereign and IMF intervention and seeks to explain the ramifications of the crisis at a sovereign and domestic firm-based level.
From the Paper "Currency overvaluation severely affected the Asian nations when combined with the precarious use of debt. The prolific use of foreign currency denominated debt within Asian was only tenable in conjunction with a stable exchange rate. Here, however, despite little rise in real exchange rate, the long run growth rate of Asian countries such as Thailand did not match that of the $US - indicating currency overvaluation. Following the depreciation of the Baht other Asian currencies depreciated due to export competitiveness- an example of contagion . The currency devaluation made it more difficult to make payments in other currencies, thus non-performing loans increased. The foreign currency risk adopted by Asian countries was compounded by liquidity risk."
An analysis of the AsianFinancialCrisis of 1997 which struck Thailand in July 1997, soon engulfed most of the countries in the region ,and at one time threatened to spread the world over.
Abstract This paper is about the AsianFinancialCrisis of 1997, one of the severest financial meltdowns to hit a group of countries in modern day history. It describes how the crisis developed, gives a hypotheses about its causes followed by evidence from research, explaining the causes in detail. Effects of the crisis and a conclusion containing a summary of the research and lessons learnt are also included.
From the Paper "The unprecedented economic growth of the Southeast Asian countries? in the 1980s and 90s was a result of "opening-up" of their economies to take advantage of the globalization trend. This coincided with rapid appreciation of the Japanese yen in the mid-1980s that drove the cost of production sky high in Japan, forcing several Japanese companies to move their production facilities offshore?initially, to South Korea and Taiwan. The Japanese also started an aggressive policy of monetary expansion resulting in ?asset price bubble,? and triggering massive capital inflows into South Korea and Taiwan. By the late 1980s, the Korean and Taiwanese economies experienced a similar appreciation in their currencies, followed by similar policies and large capital outflows?to the neighboring Southeast Asian countries."
Tags: imf, currencies, stock, singapore, taiwan, malaysia, indonesia, international, banks
Abstract This paper reviews the AsianFinancialCrisis of 1997, thought to have marked a dramatic end to a period of unprecedented economic growth among newly industrializing nations of East Asia. Analysis of the crisis indicates that the revelation of its origins in the hidden and often corrupt relationships between government banks and enterprises of many of these economies has fostered a lack of confidence in the health and transparency of these economies. According to this paper, the lack of confidence has been with the fading of the immediate economic shocks of the Crisis the most lasting impact of this event.
Abstract This paper presents a review of the Asianfinancialcrisis, triggered by the devaluation of Thailand's national currency, the baht, in 1997, and the role that the IMF played in making the crisis worse than it had to be.
From the Paper "In July, the Thai government ended a long-time policy of linking the value of their national currency, the baht, to the U S dollar and it triggered a financial crisis in Asia. A rapid devaluation of the baht suddenly reduced export revenues, made imports much more expensive and made capital investments in Thailand less attractive. This was an economic meltdown that soon spread to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan. Asian stock prices plunged as a result and there were worldwide repercussions. Some analysts suggest that speculators and the..."
Abstract This paper looks at a more neglected dimension of the Asianfinancialcrisis: the role of political factors and the role of political-economic interaction in initiating the crisis, determining the depth of the crisis and shaping the recovery from the crisis. The paper explains that the Asiancrisis was a global problem of large proportions; countries as far away as the United States felt the burden of the Asian problems with economic issues and political problems. The paper examines how politics played a vital role in the financialcrisis due to money, politics and nepotism. The paper concludes that it will take a great deal of time before there is any real trust put into the governments and political systems of many of these countries.
Outline:
Introduction
Economic Determinants of AsianFinancial Crises
The Role of Politics in AsianFinancial Crises
Post Crises Recovery and Crises Management
Conclusion
From the Paper "Known as the G-7 several industrialized countries, specific countries have been supplying and controlling the flow of capital funds to third-world countries. These countries are the United States, Canada, France, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and Australia. Because the G-7 group has such enormous and far-reaching economic strength, it can dictate and control the interest rate that the countries in its group charge to the nations that wish to borrow money. This is very significant for the third-world countries when they borrow money because they have little control over the rate of interest that they pay and they are not able to 'shop around' and find a better rate for their borrowing."
Abstract This paper explains that, because investors lost confidence, the Asianfinancialcrisis was not just a domestic problem but rather spread to other parts of the, world especially Third World countries. The author posits that the recovery from the crisis was dependent on the macro economy prior to the crisis within each country. The paper relates that South Korea and Malaysia have different internal structures, were at different levels of development before the crisis and have different survival rates with very different 'after crisis' scenarios. The author points out that the crisis in Malaysia was more of a currency crisis, which had spillover effects within other sectors of the macro economy; however, South Korea faced more of a banking crisis. The paper discuses the role of the International Monetary Fund, the government's role in each region and the Asian Monetary Fund to present a policy outline for preventing future crises.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
A Historical Debate
AsianFinancialCrisis: A Closer Look at South Korea and Malaysia
Role of the IMF
Figure 1: Malaysia's and South Korean Unemployment Worsened by IMF Policies
Asian Monetary Fund: Policies and Procedures for Future Crises.
Figure 2: Economic Growth, the Main Aim of the AMF: Implications for Asia
From the Paper "There were a lot of issues that caused the financial crisis. Mainly, investors lost confidence in the Asian market and started to remove capital from South Korea and Malaysia. The onset of the loss of confidence by investors began when the economies, such as Mexico had crises that preceded the Asian crisis. Similarly, the United States was increasing interest rates during the period to lower inflation as part of its monetary policy. Investors prefer to invest in the United States versus Asia, since the former is considered less risky."
Abstract The East Asianfinancialcrisis was an important developmental economic event in that region. This paper attempts to put that financialcrisis in perspective. The paper examines the speculation on whether the region still might suffer from or be prone to the effects of such a financialcrisis. The paper also explains that the East Asianfinancialcrisis can best be characterized as a currency crisis.
Outline:
I. Introduction
Motivation
Problem Definition
Goals and Objectives
Significance of Study
Summary of Results
II. Literature Review
Relative to Prior Research
Relevant Literature
Theory and Methodology
III. Methodology
Relation to Previous and Present Literature
Hypothesis Formulation
Advantages and Limitations
Plan of Analysis
IV. Data Collection and Analysis
Results and Explanations
Achievement of Goals and Objectives
V. Implications and Policy Recommendations
Implications
Policy Recommendations
From the Paper "The 1997 East Asian financial crisis, also known as the IMF crisis, caused the contraction of many formerly robust East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. The crisis began in Thailand and quickly spread throughout the region with sudden devaluation of currencies, stock markets and various other economic structures (Li). One unique characteristic of the East Asian financial crisis was not that it occurred but that it spread like a pandemic from one economy to the other in the region. The problem examined here is whether these conditions or characteristics that led to the financial crisis in the region persist in any real sense."
Abstract This paper discusses the East Asianfinancialcrisis of 1997-1998 and how it represented not only a shock to the regional economies of East Asia but, in a larger context, a blow to the confidence of global financial markets in the fundamental structural soundness of East Asian economies. The paper points out that the East Asian economies that were at the center of the crisis - in particular, Thailand and South Korea - were also among those being most highly praised for their market liberalization and fiscal prudence during the regional economic boom of the 1990s. This, in particular, represented troubling concerns for the global economic community in terms of the validity and trustworthiness of assessments of East Asian economies. With this in mind, this paper considers whether it is safe to assume that the crisis is truly over.
Abstract This paper is about what came to be known as the AsianFinancialCrisis of 1997-98, which hit Thailand in July 1997, soon engulfed most of the countries in the region and at one time threatened to spread the world over. It traces the history and background of the crisis, the reasons why it happened, the effects it has had socially, politically and economically. The paper also covers the approaches adopted by the countries involved, and the international financial institutions to overcome the crisis and the lessons that need to be learnt from it. The focus of the paper is on the business and economic aspects of the crisis and only briefly covers its cultural, social, and political ramifications.
From the Paper "The next country to be affected by the Thai contagion was Philippines. Its central bank tried to support its currency by increasing the interest rates overnight. The Thai finance minister who was against devaluing the country's currency resigned on June 19. The Thai prime minister continued to declare that his country would "never devalue the baht" as late as June 30. But things had already gone out of hand as the Thailand's central bank had limited reserves of dollars and soon ran out of them in trying to defend the bath. The Bank of Thailand was forced to announce a managed float of the currency on July 2 with an SOS to IMF for help. This resulted in a sudden devaluation of baht to record lows against the dollar and the start of the currency crisis in East Asia was well and truly underway."
Abstract The paper discusses the 1997 East Asianfinancialcrisis, also termed the IMF crisis locally within the region, that saw the downturn of many East Asian and Southeast Asian economies. The paper explains that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) received much of the blame due to its handling of the crisis. The paper focuses on the IMF efforts in South Korea and reveals that the IMF today is moving toward a less restrictive and more realistic system.
Outline:
Introduction
The East Asian Economic Crisis South Korea
Conclusion
From the Paper "The South Korean Central Bank was forced to expand its open market operations (OMO) in order to attempt to stabilize its currency. By elevating the amount of OMO in terms of their own securities, Central Banks attempt to control extreme devaluation in times of stress or manage exchange rates in a more stable fashion (Guille 57). For South Korea, contracting the amount of currency through sales of securities was extremely important in controlling the free-fall of the Won during the extent of the crisis."
Tags: currencies, devaluation, stock, market, assets, economy, World, Bank
Abstract This paper discusses the cause of the AsianFinancialCrisis in 1997, and the South Korean government's reaction to monetary and financial pressures. According to this paper, the Asianfinancialcrisis has many causes and consequences, but loans by U.S. banks to businesses in South Korea and elsewhere are an important part of the story. These loans helped create the crisis by supporting unsound investments and creating repayment obligations that Korean enterprises were unable to meet, thus undermining financial market confidence in the South Korean economy.
From the Paper "For thirty years prior to the Asian' financial crisis South Korea enjoyed fast growth that translated into impressive economic performance, strong fiscal positioning, and macroeconomic stability (Radelet et al). Economic indicators including decreased inflation, increased saving rates, open economies, and thriving export segments made it impossible for economists to predict what was to follow. In the summer of 1996, the Asian financial crisis erupted in Thailand after the country had just experienced an influx in economic growth."
Abstract The paper reviews the impact of the financialcrisis upon Thailand, which then spread through Southeast Asia, and also reviews its present impact upon that nation and whether or not this impact can be considered positive or negative. The paper takes the view that the 1997crisis was devastating initially for the people of Thailand. However, if there are any lingering effects, they are largely positive ones as the country has remodeled itself and revamped a financial sector that was plagued by a lack of transparency, proper over-sight and inefficiency.
From the Paper "The 1997 financial crisis in Southeast Asia was a water-shed moment in many ways. Not least of all, the crisis in Thailand brought an unceremonious end to the heady optimism that had spread through the region during the course of the booming 1980s and 1990s. While economic growth in Asia during this period rewarded various groups unevenly - as is generally to be expected in predominantly free markets - there was a general economic healthfulness that offered the promise of still more gains in the future. Suffice it to say, these roseate projections for the future were turned up-side-down by the sudden collapse of the Thai baht and the subsequent currency devaluation experienced in other parts of Asia. This paper will briefly review the impact of the crisis upon Thailand (the nation wherein the problem began)."
