An analysis of the extent the bureau-shaping model explains the power held by senior civil servants.
2,107 words (approx. 8.4 pages) |
9 sources |
APA | 2007
Paper Summary:
This paper assesses the bureau-shaping model in terms of how it justifies the power held by senior officials. It is divided into two parts and looks at the position of senior civil servants in some west European countries, especially with regard to the power they wield over their department and minister or equivalent. The paper also explores the failings of the bureau-shaping model in explaining the power of senior civil servants, and tries to find alternative sources which may help us in this regard.
From the Paper:
"In order to assess the extent of the power held by senior civil servants we need, firstly, to consider their background, i.e. from what sort of pool are these bureaucrats picked? This is dependent upon the type of civil service in question. For example, the UK civil service is not a technocratic one, and ever since the reforms made in the early twentieth century following the Northcote-Trevelyan report, there has been huge emphasis placed on examinations, especially for the upper echelons of the service (Kingdom, 1990: 14). As a result, many of those at senior level are products of an Oxbridge education. This elitist system has undergone much criticism, but its apologists maintain that "the pluralist nature of the British political system" compensates for any of its defects. "
Sample of Sources Used:
Allinson, Christopher W. 1984. Bureaucratic Personality and Organisation Structure. Aldershot: Gower.
Downs, A. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown
Dunleavy, Patrick. 1991. Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Kingdom, J. E. (ed). 1990. The Civil Service in Liberal Democracies: An Introductory Survey. London: Routledge.
Marsh, David, M.J. Smith and D. Richards. 2000. 'Bureaucrats, Politicians and Reform in Whitehall: Analyzing the Bureau-Shaping Model', British Journal of Political Science, vol. 30, pp. 461-482.