Persian Gulf Security

Paper Summary:

This paper examines how Operation Ernest Will was both a diplomatic and military action to preserve a critical world asset, crude oil, reinforce an alliance in the Persian Gulf and contain a regional war between Iran and Iraq and how the United States, through Operation Ernest Will, achieved their short-term political objective in 1987 by reflagging Kuwait oil tankers. It assesses why the U.S. felt it had to protect its national interests by force and analyzes what those interests were: protection of the U.S. homeland from attack, continued prosperity based in part on preservation of an open world economy, assured access to Persian Gulf oil and prevention of war among the great powers of Europe and the Far East along with preserving the independence of Israel and South Korea.

From the Paper:

"As early as 1984, the Reagan Administration began to address the issue of Iran indiscriminately attacking non-belligerent Kuwaiti shipping. By 1987, the U.S. agreed to reflag eleven of their tankers and arranged to provide them protection in the Persian Gulf. In his report to Congress, Secretary Weinberger states "our reflagging arrangement with Kuwait is a limited response to a very real threat." Ironically, the United States provided limited support, during different periods of the war, to both Iran and Iraq, perplexing several Arab nations as to the true intentions of the U.S. in the region creating an ambiguous foreign policy position."

More papers on Persian Gulf Security:

• Essay # 71478 : "The Persian Gulf"
• Research Paper # 60033 : "The 1991 Persian Gulf War"
• Analytical Essay # 59360 : "Kuwait: Security Threats and Response"

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