Monopoly Politics

Paper Summary:

This paper explains that monopoly politics draws upon the question of how rulers, specifically kings, are able to gain enough compliance and cooperation from their subjects to ultimately achieve monopolistic control over politics in their territories. The author describes the powers of the king and argues against the theory that rulers used methods of pure coercion to force their subjects into submission. Instead, the author suggests that the theory of strategic bargaining may be a more apt method of describing how Kings gained monopolistic power.

From the Paper:

"Not only was the king the head of some major core institutions, but also he had the ability to use this institutional power to gain strategic control over the means of large-scale coordination, and institutional innovation. Because of his institutional advantages, the king had a monopoly over the ability to coordinate large numbers of people. He could coordinate collective action (i.e. military), taxation, land distribution and law. Even though there was no formal constitution, the king had the ability to coordinate legal decisions."

Sample of Sources Used:

• Ertman, Thomas. Birth of the Leviathan. Cambridge: University Press, 1997.
• Spruyt, Hendrik. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.

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