Judicial Powers and Limitations

Paper Summary:

The paper explains that Article III of the Constitution of the United States laid the foundation of the American judicial system. The paper discusses how the creation of a federal judiciary that was not subject directly to the various states was itself a revolutionary concept. The paper relates that many felt that Article III went too far in giving all extra-state matters to the federal courts and so Amendment XI was added that did not require all suits against and involving states, or those brought by foreign nationals or ambassadors, to be heard by the federal court. The paper illustrates how this debate over the degree of permissible judicial authority still continues today.

From the Paper:

"The judiciary would represent one of the essential checks on the abuse of the new national power. A strong federal judicial branch would complement equally powerful legislative and executive branches. Similarly, in Federalist # 10, James Madison also argued for the importance of an all-embracing and powerful national government as an antidote to faction - "The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States." (Hamilton, Federalist # 9; Quinn, 1997, p. 77) A national system of courts would help smooth out the differences between the nation's various component parts."

Sample of Sources Used:

• Collier, Christopher; and Collier, James Lincoln. (1987). Decision in Philadelphia: The Constitutional Convention of 1787. New York: Ballantine Books.
• Eskridge, W. N. (2005). Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics. Yale Law Journal, 114(6), 1279+.
• (1997). The Federalist Papers Reader and Historical Documents of Our American Heritage (F. Quinn, Ed.). Santa Ana, CA: Seven Locks Press.
• Jillson, C. C. (1988). Constitution Making Conflict and Consensus in the Federal Convention of 1787. New York: Agathon Press.
• Keck, T. M. (2002). Activism and Restraint on the Rehnquist Court: Timing, Sequence, and Conjuncture in Constitutional Development. Polity, 35(1), 121+.

More papers on Judicial Powers and Limitations:

• Dissertation or Thesis # 92104 : "Judicial Powers and Limitations"
• Analytical Essay # 123926 : "Separation of Powers"
• Analytical Essay # 149067 : "Irish Courts' Approach to Discretionary Administrative Powers"

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