Bernard Williams and External Reasons

Paper Summary:

This paper discusses Bernard Williams' view and arguments that external reasons have no impact upon moral decision-making. In doing so, the paper presents and explains both Williams' position and that of the Kantian school he opposes. Ultimately, it argues that Williams' stance is compromised and is incompatible with the basic nature of ethics.

From the Paper:

" To close, the last several pages have looked at Bernard Williams' argument that internal realities and not a priori, objective "externalities" shape (rational) moral decision-making in human beings. While Williams' work certainly has some logical force, it is compromised in the sense that it appears to oppose the entire intent of ethical/moral philosophy - which is to arrive at a set of principles capable of guiding human conduct. In the final analysis, Bernard Williams has created a provocative thesis on the motivations informing human action - but it is one that refutes the necessity for even having moral philosophy around in the first place."

Sample of Sources Used:

• "Bernard Williams." Reference.com: Bernard Williams. 2007. Lexico Publishing Group, LLC. 10 Feb. 2007 <http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Bernard_Williams>
• Cullity, Garrett, and Berys Gaut (eds.). Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 10 Feb. 2007. Questia.com <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=12343762#10>
• Guthrie, Shandon L. "Immanuel Kant and the Categorical Imperative." The Examined Life. 2001. Shandon L. Guthrie. 11 Feb. 2007 <http://sguthrie.net/kant.htm#N_10_>

More papers on Bernard Williams and External Reasons:

• Analytical Essay # 131802 : "Bernard Williams and External Reasons"
• Research Paper # 99234 : "Internal and External Reasons for Behavior"
• Analytical Essay # 129337 : "Determinants on Human Conduct"

APA Citation:

MLA Citation: