Passive Support of International Terrorism

Paper Summary:

This paper discusses the phenomenon of passive support of international terrorism from a legal standpoint. It questions whether there is any normative ground to assess the relationship between terrorist organizations and their harbor states. The paper contends that there is a close relationship between the principle of territorial sovereignty and an international obligation to deny passive support, including both an obligation of due diligence and a proactive duty to prevent international terrorist acts.

Table of Contents:
Abstract
Passive Support Motivations
Domestic Politics
Types of Passive Support
Acquiescence, Connivance, and Collusion
Encouraging and Tolerating
Toleration and Inaction
Some Concluding Observations
Territorial Sovereignty and Obligation to Deny Passive Support
Sovereign Integrity and the Due Diligence Obligation
The Attribution of Knowledge
Duty to Act and Prevent
Conclusions

From the Paper:

"The relationship between the principle of territorial sovereignty and an international obligation to deny passive support may be appraised in the light of at least two different legal obligations: the obligation of due diligence and the proactive duty to prevent international terrorist acts. In both cases, the attribution of knowledge may be critical in establishing the link between international terrorist organizations and their host states. The main criterion to attribute knowledge, as was established in the Corfu Channel case, is clear evidence that the same state knew or ought to have known. The evidence could also be indirect, proved, for example, by official notes. Applying this criterion to hold passive sponsors responsible for the failure to act in due diligence and prevent terrorist acts, however, may not answer the question of whether the argument of self-defense is lawful. As was discussed above, the legality of the argument of self-defense will instead depend on the normative framework of the use of force. Nevertheless, establishing a clear link between terrorist organizations and their host states may influence the way the international community will respond to the argument of self-defense against states that harbor international terrorist organizations."

Sample of Sources Used:

• Annan, Kofi. In Larger Freedom: Decision Time at the UN . Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005; Evans, Gareth, Sahnoun, Mohamed. The Responsibility to Protect. Foreign Affairs. November/December, 2002; Feinstein, Lee; Slaughter, Anne-Marie. A Duty to Prevent . Foreign Affairs, January/February 2004; Slaughter, Anne-Marie. Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: the Grand Themes of UN Reform . The American Journal of International Law. Washington: Jul 2005. Vol. 99, Iss. 3, p. 619-631;
• Byman, Daniel. Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge University Press. 2005, p. 222
• Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 26 February 2007, (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), para. 429, p. 153
• Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICJ Reports, 2007, para. 429
• Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran ICJ Reports, 1980, para. 8

More papers on Passive Support of International Terrorism:

• Research Paper # 98003 : "International Terrorism"
• Term Paper # 109345 : "Defining International Terrorism"
• Essay # 38508 : "International Terrorism and the United Nations"

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