MacArthur and the Inchon Decision

Paper Summary:

The paper introduces the topic of General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War and then discusses MacArthur's career in the form of questions and answers. In this way, the paper examines the decisions that resulted in his victory at Inchon and the subsequent setbacks that marred this final victory in the general's life. The paper also discusses MacArthur's role as a communicator and his likely rationale for approaching the planning and prosecution of his battle strategy at Inchon. In addition, the paper explores why MacArthur did not keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff well informed and examines what factors played a role in his dismissal. Finally, the paper provides an assessment of the positive and negative lessons that can be learned from MacArthur's lengthy military career.

Outline:
What Were the Mission, Goal(s), and Objectives of the U.S. vis-a-vis the Korean Situation in August, 1950?
MacArthur was an Expert Communicator. How Did he Use Communication to Accomplish Inchon? How Did he Vary Communication Tactics Depending on the Audience and Objective?
Why Was Inchon the "Right" Decision?
MacArthur Did Not Keep the JCS Well Informed. What Are the Arguments For and Against This? Was He Right in Not Keeping Them Informed? Does This Create an Ethical Dilemma?
Less Than Three months After the Sweeping Victory at Inchon, the U.S. Military Suffered its Longest Retreat. How Did This Rapid Reversal Take Place? What Characteristics Within the Man MacArthur Contributed to Produce These Two Radically Opposed Outcomes?
MacArthur was Fired by President Truman. What Factors Played a Role in his Removal? What Happened to the Great Communication Skills that Enabled Inchon? Did They Fail Him? If So, How?
What Lessons, Positive and Negative, Can We Learn from MacArthur?

From the Paper:

"The fundamental mission of the U.S. in August 1950 was to stop and reverse the relentless drive of tens of thousands of elite North Korean forces invading their South Korean ally. Without U.S. intervention, it was feared that the entire southern peninsula would soon be overrun by the invading North Koreans, and there was sufficient justification for such concern. For example, in his recent book, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War, Halberstam (2007) reports that, "On June 25, 1950, nearly seven divisions of elite North Korean troops, many of whom had fought for the Communist side in the Chinese civil war, crossed the border into South Korea, with the intention of conquering the entire South in three weeks" (p. 1). Just as there were two very different sides to the man himself, his legacy is likewise perceived in vastly different ways by different schools of thought concerning MacArthur's actions at Inchon in 1950."

Sample of Sources Used:

• Brune, L. H. & Higham, R. (1996). The Korean war: Handbook of the literature and research. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
• Chapter 6: Decision making. Case 6.4 - The politics of getting an idea adopted: The Inchon decision.
• Demick, B. (2007, November). The Korean war's Rumsfeld: Examining Douglas McArthur's debacle, David Halberstam found a familiar pattern. Washington Monthly, 39(11), 47.
• Dorschner, J. (2003). Douglas MacArthur's last triumph.
• Grandstaff, M. R. (2007). No substitute for victory: Lessons in strategy and leadership from General Douglas MacArthur. Parameters, 37(3), 128.

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