Paper Summary:

This paper examines Searle's original argument against the possibility of strong Artificial Intelligence, or what he calls intrinsically intelligent AI. This argument was presented in "Minds, Brains, and Programs" which contains his original formulation of the Chinese Room example and many others. This paper explains Searle's original view (which has been slightly modified in recent years) against the possibility of strong AI. It then examines the serious shortcomings in his argument, namely his flagrant assumption that intelligence is a bio-chemical property, something that he barely mentions in his text. Holfstadter later called this view "bio-chauvinist." The writer examines what it is Searle is trying to say, where his bio-chauvinism comes into play, and what the end result is.

From the Paper:

"In his paper "Minds, Brains, and Programs," John R. Searle attempts to establish the impossibility of strong artificial intelligence (AI), that an "appropriately programmed computer" can have genuine mental states. The validity of strong AI implies a direct correspondence between mental states and formal processes, and as such, insists that a properly defined program is sufficient for producing understanding and intentionality in the thing instantiating that program. Searle refutes this claim, arguing that a program could not be sufficient for producing intentionality because for any program it is possible to instantiate it in something without producing mental states in the thing. In elucidating this central point, Searle derives a distinction between "intrinsic" intentionality and "derived" intentionality. He defines intrinsic intentionality as the sort present in things that clearly have mental states, such as people. Searle distinguishes this from derived intentionality, which he claims is ascribed by those with intrinsic intentionality to things that "perform the sort of functions that we perform on the basis of our intentionality," but that do not actually possess mental states or a genuine intentionality. With this distinction, Searle's claim that programs are not sufficient, or even necessary, for producing intentionality becomes a claim that mere things - namely computers for our purposes - can only have derived intentionality and never can possess intrinsic intentionality. Searle's argument, pushed by his example of the Chinese room, at first seems to raise an alarming challenge to AI proponents, but on closer examination it becomes clear that the thrust of Searle's claim relies on some highly debatable intuitions and assumptions he makes a priori. In this paper I will argue that Searle's conclusion is entirely dependent these contestable assumptions and intuitions. I will then attempt to construct what Searle's response to this objection would likely be, and I will conclude by discussing the significance of this debate with regards to AI and all of cognitive science."

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