The NASA Challenger Disaster

Paper Summary:

This paper explains that organizational behavior focuses on the study of behavior within the organizational construct, concentrating on how an individual, group, and structure affect the behavior within the organization. The author points outs that learning from the Challenger Disaster required the NASA organization to look carefully at (1) forces contributing to the flawed decision, (2) reasons for the decisions and behavior that contributed to them, and (3) organizational shortcomings that affected the outcome. The paper stresses that communication can lead to misunderstanding, but so does lack of action; people within the chain of command at NASA did not act upon information that may have changed the outcome.

Table of Contents
Introduction
The NASA Challenger Disaster
Recommendations
Conclusion

From the Paper:

"In exploring the history behind the Challenger disaster, one discovers, as the Presidential Commission did, that information threatened the "can-do" ideology of the space agency was routinely suppressed by managers at the agency's Marshall Space Flight Center. When Thiokol's engineers raised their concerns a full six months before the disaster, the information they provided was distorted as it made its way up the organizational chain of command, primarily to suit the career interests of Center managers eager to please NASA headquarters. Bosses were told what they wanted to hear and not what they needed to know. Ultimately, Thiokol's engineers were told, in effect, to "sit down and shut up" the night before the launch because the final decision would be made by management."

More papers on The NASA Challenger Disaster:

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• Essay # 33664 : "The Future Of Civilian Space Flight"

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