This paper explains that Operation Barbarossa was largely the brainchild of Hitler himself; his general staff advised against fighting a war on two fronts, but Hitler, considering himself a political and military genius, did not fear fighting Britain, possibly America, and now Russia, all at the same time. The author points out that, to make it more palatable to both the German population and the rest of the world, Nazi leaders painted Operation Barbarossa as a defensive attack by stating that the Red Army was preparing to attack Germany, thus Germany needed to strike first before the Russians were fully prepared. The paper concludes that the operation failed miserably because of Germany's logistical problems, an underestimation of the Soviet Army's abilities, and the onset of the harsh Russian winter.
From the Paper:
"Before initiating Operation Barbarossa, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were diplomatically on friendly terms, having signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact a short time before the German and Soviet invasion of Poland. While appearing on the surface to be a simple treaty of non-aggression, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact also contained secret protocols for the dividing up of the border-states between the two nations. The pact surprised the world because of Germany and the USSR's opposing ideologies and mutual hostility. But Hitler had long wanted to conquer western Russia to fulfill his goal of eastern expansion. So the pact was simply one of short-term convenience, which the Nazis thought little of breaking."