Language Picturing Reality

Paper Summary:

This paper discusses the theory by Ludwig Wittgenstein that shows that the "private language argument" does not make sense because concepts do not name "internal" sensations. In addition, concepts do not name mental states, and those mental states do not reside in the mind. Consequently, the cognitivism versus behaviorism debate should not even arise. Furthermore, the paper shows how Wittgenstein argues that the "I" does not refer to a thing, so private thoughts and experiences do not inhabit a self. Language does not picture reality, and meaning does not reside in the mind.

From the Paper:

"Throughout the history of philosophy, since Descartes, the mind was considered to be independent from reality and corresponded to this reality by way of mental concepts or language. So concepts and language referred to reality, and that language was in the mind. If the concepts corresponded with reality, then that language was meaningful. If there was a failure of concepts to cohere with reality, then there was a lack of meaning. As a result, since the mind produced concepts, meaning was also something in the mind."

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