Ethical Intuitionism and "Naturalistic Fallacy"

Paper Summary:

Ethical Intuitionists philosophers espouse a meta-ethical theory that holds that some value terms, such as good, are indefinable and unanalyzable. This paper explores the views of philosopher G. E. Moore on ethical intuitionism in his work "Principia Ethica" and for his role in the formation of the "Naturalistic Fallacy" - where natural properties and only natural properties are attributed to what constitutes the value of good.

From the Paper:

"When many of us speak of intuition, we seem to view it as a process by which we attain an instant apprehension of truth. But Moore cautions us differently and points out that cognitions obtained via intuition are as susceptible to error as cognitions obtained empirically or experimentally. If they are, and there is much evidence to agree with him, doesn't this suggest that intuition is "obtained" via some deductive or reasoning or empirical process? What, then, is happening when two people disagree about the nature of good? How can we decide who is right and who is wrong? Must we simply abandon our efforts to find a resolution? That both sides could be right Moore rules out, since he views good as an objective quality. But are so many of us so ill-equipped that only some of us can intuit the true nature of good? Surely not; surely the problem lies with the theory."

More papers on Ethical Intuitionism and "Naturalistic Fallacy":

• Analytical Essay # 125651 : "Ethical Dilemma and Cooper's Model"
• Narrative Essay # 131628 : "Ethical Standards and Students with Special Needs"
• Analytical Essay # 137181 : "Ethical Challenges and the Pat Tillman Investigation"

APA Citation:

MLA Citation: