Economic Models of Voting

Paper Summary:

This paper examines how it is generally believed that the more the economy grows or slows down, the more all voters reward or punish the incumbent party for improving or worsening their economic situation and how presidential approval ratings often drive the results of the economic models of voting. It looks at how these approval ratings are typically conceptualized as capturing both non-economic factors and other economic factors beyond near-election economic growth. It discuss two major economic models, the competency and low-cost of voting, both of which show how economic outcomes may affect party choice.

From the Paper:

"It is logical to expect public support for the EU, as a relatively new political system, to be more responsive to short-run policy outcomes than is public support for political institutions in mature democracies. In other words, EU institutions might not benefit from broad legitimacy. Thus, the European publics have a tendency to blame EU institutions rather than policy-makers for short-run policy failures. However, even if this is the case, only a weak theoretical connection exists between EU policy and domestic economic performance (Palmer 1995). Until very recently, the EU was responsible for neither fiscal nor monetary policies. And while EU membership represents a constraint on national economic policies, historically, this effect has been indirect."

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