Conceptual Possibility according to Descartes

Paper Summary:

This paper examines Descartes dualist thesis that mind and body are different things and his "Conceivability Argument" in his Meditations on First Philosophy. The conceivability argument uses one's ability to conceive of a mind without a body as a proof that mind and body are necessarily different things. The writer provides an objection to this argument from the point of view of an Identity Theorist, who believes that mind and body are in fact the exact same thing. The objection takes the meaning-reference distinction approach that states that mind and body essentially refer to the same thing but mean different things.

From the Paper:

"One of the central pieces of Descartes' dualist thesis is his conceivability argument, which attempts to establish that mind and body are necessarily different types of things. As it provides grounds for substantiating that mind and body are distinct, this argument also serves as the backbone of a prominent objection to the claims proposed by the simple identity theory. The identity theory makes the claim that all types of mental states and experiences are equivalent to types of brain states or other physical states. This clearly conflicts directly with the dualist's view of an independently existing mind that is responsible for the realization of mental states and experiences regardless of the existence of any corresponding physical entity to go with them. As such, the dualist must have significant objections to the identity theory. One such challenge to the identity theory is well summed by a single claim: "I can imagine myself turned to stone, and yet having images, aches, pains and so on." In this paper I will first demonstrate how an objection to the identity theory centered on this claim can be constructed. I will demonstrate how this objection is quite similar in nature to Descartes' conceivability argument, which will necessitate a brief explanation of Descartes' argument. I will then offer a response from the identity theorist to this objection, which will rely on the relationship between "concept" and "meaning" and the distinction between meaning and reference. In presenting this reply, I will show that this response to the dualist's objection also works against Descartes' conceivability argument."

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