Paper Summary:

This paper discusses the opinions of many after September 11th, that the present form of terrorism has made classical deterrence theory outdated. According to the paper transnational terrorism has totally dented conventional wisdom, which had dictated proceedings during the cold war. Similarly, rogue states all over the world, in general, and the Middle East and South Asia, in particular, have created a great deal of tension in Washington. The paper further discusses how the role of the American rival states, such as, North Korea and China and the functions and limitations of the UN Security Council have completely transformed the security structure of the sole hyper power of the world. This paper tries to elucidate the best possible deterrence strategy the United States should pursue after the cold war.

Outline:
Introduction
Statement of the Problem
Purpose of the Study
Justification of the Study
Research Design and Methodology
Collection of Data
Data Analysis and Search Tactics
Limitations of the Study
Part 2
Transnational Terrorism
The Rogue and the Rival States
The U.N. Security Council
Conclusion of This Section
Part 3
Literature Review
Classical Deterrence Theory
The End of Cold War deterrence
A New Justification
Conclusion of This Section
Part 4
The First Case Study: The Strategic Triangle (US/China/Russia)
The Sino-Russo Partnership
The US-Russian Labyrinth: A Subtle Relationship
The Source for Cooperation and Divergence
Effect of the End of Cold War
Conclusion of This Section
The Second Case Study: Deterring North Korea
US Policy on the Korean Peninsula Since 1945
The Future of the U.S. Foreign Policy on the Korean Peninsula
The Status Quo Option
The Hard-Line Option
Compromise
Early Bush Administration Policy
Conclusion
The third Case Study: Transnational Terrorism
Counter-terrorism in a Global Society
Conclusion
Part 5
Observation and Conclusion
Correcting the Strategic Gaps in the U.S. Approach to Homeland Defense Concentrating Less on Who is Responsible and More on What They Ought to be Responsible of
Planning for Higher-Probability, Lower-Consequence, and Lower-Probability, Higher-Consequence Events

From the Paper:

"At the threat of generalization, one could make a case that US relations with China were greatly powered by two issues: the vicissitudes in the Sino-Russo association and--the more significant of the two--the Taiwan problem. For 30 years following the "People's Republic of China" (PRC) emergence in 1949, the United States carried on to acknowledge the adversary Chinese government (the Republic of China, or ROC) that had moved to Taiwan after trailing behind the civil conflict on the mainland. The path to ultimate US standardization with the PRC in 1979 was cemented by US President Richard Nixon, whose striking plan was to build a coalition with China--which was, at that time, in conflict with the Soviet Union--in an effort to oppose the increasing Soviet threat. However the United States, in spite of everything, maintains informal relations with the Republic of China. Certainly, under the "Taiwan Relations Act," a piece of internal US legislation, Washington is under a duty to defend Taiwan's safety and therefore carry on arms sales to the isle .
Washington's Taiwan association has bedeviled its dealings with the Republic of China from this time onwards, even more so following 1988 when Taiwan's political leadership demonstrated growing inclinations in the direction of a separatist route outside the One China state-of-affairs. All through a brief disagreement amid mainland China and Taiwan in 1996, the United States sent off two naval battle factions to the Taiwan channel to demonstrate moral cooperation for Taiwan (and maybe to gratify President Clinton's congressional associates). An unintentional war with China was hardly prevented only with the sensible removal of the US carrier Independence, at the same time as, the second carrier, the Nimitz, was still on its route as of the Mediterranean Sea. The narrow escape drove home the Republic of China's sincerity in relation to Taiwan to the Clinton management, forcing it to assume a soul-searching evaluation of Sino-US strategy. The concluding decision for Clinton's "thoroughgoing" engagement policy concerning the Chinese, which he practiced all through his second presidential tenure, was to prevent himself from being heaved into an unintentional war with China on behalf of Taiwan ."

Sample of Sources Used:

• Alexandre Y. Mansourov. North Korea Is Poised to Cross the Nuclear Rubicon: Will the Canary Die in the Mine?, in International Journal on World Peace. Vol. 20, 2003.
• Andrew Mack. A Nuclear North Korea: The Choices Are Narrowing. World Policy Journal. Vol. 11, 1994
• Arthur K. Cebrowski and John W. Raymond. Operationally Responsive Space: A New Defense Business Model. Parameters, Vol. 35, 2005
• Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke. Deterrence and Foreign Policy. World Politics, 41 (January 1989), 177.
• Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1974. pp. 38-45, 519-22. See also Doron Almog, The West Bank Fence: A Vital Component in Israel's Strategy of Defense. Special Studies on Palestinian Politics and the Peace Process, Research Memorandum no. 47 (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), pp. 13-15. See a so http//www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubs/working/almog.doc, pp. 9-10.

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