Abstract This paper discusses how the Canadian-led raid on Dieppe, France, in August 1942 is described as the 'largest raid in history'; and is also acknowledged how tactically, it was almost a complete failure. Significantly, the contentious history of this raid resides in its losses of human life, in that it was, without question, a slaughtering of Canadian soldiers who had been launched into an unbeatable raid attempt. So, how do Canadians make sense of this, a great raid, a disastrous raid, a slaughtering of some sacrificial lambs in the name of politics, or a genuine attempt that failed, and from which many valuable lessons were learned about future raiding efforts against the Germans.
Abstract The paper shows how the Marine Corps was formed as a compliment to the naval forces. While the navy fought at sea it still required some link to the land, which became essential for the naval operation success. Thus in 1798 the US Marine Corp was officially launched. The author of the paper analyzes the Marine Corps, provides a critique and concludes that finally the Navy saw a need to develop its own troops to extend to the ground level.
From the Paper "Through an analysis of the historical military operations and the strategy employed through the focus on sea warfare there was an obvious centralization of control. The military operations were conducted either in the seas or on land. There was remote chance of the two coordinating in their maneuvers. With time this changed and the mission became more critical. The philosophy of war changed, as did its implementation. The heart of the naval capabilities in the operating environment saw a difficulty that could only be solved through innovation. The Marines were that very innovation arising through the ideology of being able to precisely engage the enemy."
