Abstract In an effort to better understand the battle at Khe San that involved Americans during the Vietnam War, the paper first examines the historical battle at Dien Bien Phu, which preceded the Khe Sanh battle by ten years. The paper points out that in order to understand the battle at Khe Sanh, it is necessary to first fully understand the Dien Bien Phu battle. The paper then goes on to discuss the battle at Khe Sanh and explain why the dien Bien Phu battle and the Khe Sanh battle were both similar and yet different.
From the Paper "During Khe Sanh, which began thirteen years later, the allied forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States defeated the numerically superior North Vietnamese Army. The battle took place on the Khe Sanh plateau in the Quang Tri Province of northern South Vietnam. There, the three phases of the fighting lasted from April 1967 through April 1968. The Khe Sanh plateau was critical terrain because the North Vietnamese Army used area routes to infiltrate into South Vietnam from Laos and the Demilitarized Zone. To curtail that activity, the allied forces had maintained some form of a combat base since 1962, but in1967, the North Vietnamese Army started building up significant conventional forces in the area around the plateau, and in an effort to deny the North Vietnamese Army control of this important terrain, the U.S. started increasing its own strength in the region."
Abstract This paper aims to show that, despite popular opinion, the selection by French High Command of Dien Bien Phu as a massed defense against the Communist forces of the Viet Minh was ultimately based on the best evidence available. It briefly sketches the events leading up to the battle of Dien Bien Phu, including a general look at the first Indochinese war of 1946-1954, and an analysis of the decisions made by the French high command leading up to the actual establishment of the base at Dien Bien Phu. It also provides an understanding of the French political climate in the metropolis after the Second World War.
From the Paper "When high command succeeded in evacuating Na Son without any problems, the last in a series of events gelled together to make the example of Na Son one worth repeating, at least to General Navarre. After the furious assault subsides, Na San is evacuated without incident. In order to confuse the several battalions of Viet Minh still established around the base, elaborate preparations were carried out. False radio communiques, parachute drops, use of civilian airplanes, and intense fighter and bomber cover were all employed to achieve a full evacuation. All this could not have occurred, however, if a small problem hadn't manifested itself when it did. "
Abstract The author of this paper discusses the significance of the battle at Dien Bien Phu as the place where the first Vietnamese revolutionaries found their power and became a force to be reckoned with and argues that had the United States learned from this battle and adopted the successful tactics in this terrain and situation, it might have had a better chance of winning its own conflict in Vietnam.
From the Paper "The end of World War II brought vast political changes throughout Asia. In previously colonial areas, nationalists used the opportunity present in the Japanese surrender and the temporary weakness of European powers to demand self-determination. The August Revolution brought the Vietminh to power in Vietnam, and the clash between French and Vietminh was inevitable, as neither side was willing to concede sovereignty to the other. A few months after the close of World War II, France sought to re-establish its discredited and unpopular colonial rule in Indochina. Encouraged by words of support from President Truman, the French committed almost a million military men to their effort."
Tags: battle, war, chinese, american, fight, conquer, territory
From the Paper "This research will examine the French failure at Dien Bien Phu. The research will set forth the historical context and background for exploring France's role in the modern history of Vietnam, which is, in the modern historical imagination, associated with Dien Bien Phu, and then discuss the causes of the encounter between French and nationalist Vietnamese military forces at the site, as well as issues surrounding the question of whether either the encounter in general or the French failure in particular could have been prevented.
The story of Western failure of culture, ideology, and military strategy in Vietnam in the 20th century is most immediately associated with the American debacle in that country in the circumstances of U.S. withdrawal and the aftermath in the mid-1970s. But a Western prelude to the American failure occur..."
Abstract An examination of the changing nature of warfare between 1860 and 1960 and a look at the reasons for these changes. The paper also attempts to define the change in the structure of wars over this period of time by considering whether wars are always decided by one major battle, or if there are more complicated factors to explain the outcomes of each war.
Table of Contents
Analysis of the American Civil War
European conflicts-Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars.
The Boer War-colonialism and the development of guerilla warfare.
The surprise victory of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese conflict.
The reasons for the Allied victories in the First and Second World Wars-how technology was implicated.
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954-the importance of environmental knowledge in warfare.
From the Paper "In 1909, F.T. Marinetti stated that, 'We will glorify war-the world's only hygiene-militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of freedom-bringers, beautiful ideas worth dying for, and scorn for woman.' This belief in the glory of war held by many at the turn of the century, was completely changed with the horrific events of two world wars in 1914 and 1939. Indeed, the basic principle of the concept known as 'total war' practised throughout many twentieth century conflicts was largely unheard of in the previous century. In contrast to the majority of conflicts in the nineteenth century, the distinction between civilians and soldiers of the twentieth century became increasingly blurred. In examining past wars we can observe that changes have taken place both regarding the principles and technology of war. "
Abstract This paper traces the evolution of the United States' policy toward Vietnam during the administration of President Dwight Eisenhower (January 1953-January 1961) and discusses the factors which shaped that policy and contributed to its ultimate failure. The focus of this paper is on the mind-set and operating assumptions of President Eisenhower and other key members of his national security team and their manifestation in Vietnam policy. The paper includes an annotated bibliography.
From the Paper "After Japan occupied military bases and ports in southern Indochina in June 1941, the oil resources of the Dutch East Indies lay exposed. The United States then restricted the export of high octane gasoline to Japan which Fall said "hardened the Japanese Navy's insistence upon an attack on Southeast Asia before its petrol supplies were completely exhausted." According to the historians of the Pentagon Papers, "ambivalence characterized U.S. policy [toward Indochina] during World War II." President Franklin Roosevelt opposed the return of French colonial control over Indochina. On January 24, 1944, FDR said: "France has had that country . . . for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning." However, Winston Churchill and Charles De Gaulle vigorously opposed FDR's plans to place Indochina under international trusteeship so Indochina's postwar status was left unresolved. In late August 1945, President Harry Truman assured De Gaulle that the United States recognized French sovereignty over Indochina. Truman never replied to letters sent to him by Ho Chi Minh, leader of the communist Vietminh and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which Ho announced on September 2, 1945."
Tags: Indochina, Cold, War, Dien, Bien, Phu, Kennedy, Cambodia
Abstract This paper explains that the conquest and colonialization by France of Vietnam began by using the Catholic Church and their missionaries as an advance party to eliminate the threat to France's other vast southeast Asia holdings and ended with France's embarrassing military defeat in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu. The author points out that the nationalist movement arose in Vietnam in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and gained momentum during the Japanese occupation of World War II; after the end of World War II, the Vietminh party (the League for the Independence of Vietnam, a coalition of nationalists and Communist groups), headed by Ho Chi Minh, established a republic with its capital at Hanoi. The paper relates that President Truman, not President Kennedy, were the first leader to entangle the U.S. in the Vietnamese malaise because Truman actually sent military forces to set up missions in Indochina to protect the United Nations troops in Korea from being attacked by Communists from both China and North Vietnam.
Table of Contents
Introduction and Thesis
The True Beginning and the Reasons Therefore
The Geography and History of Early Vietnam
Religion and French Imperialism in Vietnam
World War II and Post War Vietnam up to 1954
The French Indochina War
The Geneva Accords and U. S. Involvement
From the Paper "The first European missionary executed in the Vietnamese Central capital of Hue was Frenchman Francois Isidore Gagelin. This of course was a public and highly publicized event wherein the Good Father Gagelin was publicly strangled. Not hanged mind you but strangled with two beefy hands of a huge Vietnamese executioner. This incident happened in the late 1830s and stuck in the minds of both the Catholic Church and the French government."
Abstract This paper explains that the roots of the Vietnam War (1961-1975) really began with the fall of the French Colonial Empire at Dien Bien Phu, when the Americans became involved in the greatest war debacle in U.S. history. The author points out that this secret war was being conducted mainly by the Central Intelligence Agency and its founding Director Allen Dulles, the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Dwight David Eisenhower. The paper explains that this war started when Ho Chi Min, the Communist strong man in Hanoi and founder of Viet-Cong, and Ngo Dinh Diem, president of South Vietnam, who had the full backing of the United States' assets, got involved in a gorilla war, which escalated into the Vietnam War from which Ho brought the United States to their knees in disgrace.
From the Paper "With the abrupt fall of the Japanese Empire in August of 1945, Ho Chi Minh seizes his opportunity. Using the established Viet Minh, formally known as Vietnam Doc Lap Dong Minh or The League for the Independence of Vietnam, Ho established at the 8th Plenum at Pac Bo, in May of 1941, as his tool. In September 1945, Ho Chi Minh declares Vietnam's independence in Hanoi. Surprisingly there is little to no opposition to his declaration and he feels confident his organizational structures and skills are sound. So confident, in fact, Ho goes to Paris in 1946 to negotiate the separation from France personally with his staff of advisors."
Abstract This paper discusses American involvement in Vietnam during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies, explaining that involvement at that time was minimal, and was primarily limited to diplomacy, combined with covert military support for the French, who were battling the Viet Minh insurgency. The paper then looks at how American involvement escalated when the French base at Dien Bien Phu fell in 1954, compelling French withdrawal from Indochina and causing American policymakers to conclude that the United States would have to take a more direct role in Indochina in order to prevent communist takeovers of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.
