Abstract This paper examines how Martin Heidegger, in "Being and Time", examines the existential structures with which Dasein (being) interacts in order to reveal their unification as a structural whole. The paper points out that the phenomenon of 'care' underlies the structural totality of Dasein's being-in-the-world as the fundamental interpretation of itself, through which it is disclosed as being-ahead-of-itself. Furthermore, the state-of-mind of anxiety discloses Dasein's turning away from itself in its 'fallenness' into the world, only to turn back toward itself to realize the possibility of authentic being, as opposed to the inauthentic being provided by the everyday interpretation of Dasein. The primordial interpretation of Dasein's being as care allows the primary differentiation of possibilities, which are enacted through a care structure that both underlies and inhabits existence, facticity and 'fallenness'. The paper concludes that these existential structures are unified through the care structure to delimit an essential definition of the basic state of that entity to which Being is an issue.
From the Paper "The phenomenon of 'care' underlies the structural totality of Dasein's Being-in-the-world as the fundamental interpretation of itself, through which it is disclosed as being-ahead-of-itself. Martin Heidegger, in Being and Time, examines the existential structures that Dasein, as that entity to which its Being is an issue, interacts with to reveal their unification as a structural whole, within which Dasein manifests as a Being-possible. The state-of-mind of anxiety discloses Dasein's turning away from itself in its 'fallenness' into the world, only to turn back toward itself to realize the possibility of authentic Being, as opposed to the inauthentic Being provided by the everyday interpretation of Dasein. The actualization of any possibilities requires that Dasein exist ahead-of-itself in projecting its Being into those possibilities. The primordial interpretation of Dasein's Being as care allows the primary differentiation of possibilities, which are enacted through a care structure that both underlies and inhabits existence, facticity and 'fallenness'. These existential structures are unified through the care structure to delimit an essential definition of the basic state of that entity to which Being is an issue."
Abstract This paper analyzes Martin Heidegger's essay "The Concept of Time", which examines the nature of time and his concept of authentic being-in-the-world, or "Dasein". The paper takes a look at Heidegger's inquiry into prevalent notions of 'what time is' , his attempt to account for the continuity of existence experienced by human beings, and subsequently into the temporality of time. Ultimately, the paper addresses the idea that "Dasein", in its ability to interpret its own being, may run ahead to the indeterminate certainty of its own non-existence to expose the entirety of its own time, rendering it accessible in its authenticity as 'how', not simply 'what' or 'when'.
From the Paper "Heidegger observes that even the everyday is running ahead to the future, albeit in an inauthentic manner that loses its own past. "The future is now that to which care clings--not the authentic, futural being of the past, but the future that the present itself cultivates for itself as its own." The present constantly jumps ahead to the next present 'now' in a succession of events analogous to its facticity of objectively rendered significances. The 'fallenness' of Dasein into everydayness causes it to appropriate an irretrievability of the past through the everyday clinging to the present. Authentic history is lost in the material obsession with the now of the present as present: the past is inaccessible as material events that are no longer present. "Because this history and temporality of the present utterly fail to attain the past, they merely have another present." In the everyday experience of present as simultaneity of 'what'-points in space, the past is rendered as a present forever separate from the immediate present. The 'how' that opens from Dasein's being futural gives access to authentic past in the ability to repeat the experience in its interpretation instead of its transient materiality."
Abstract This paper discusses the theory of Being as presented by Heidegger in his book "Being and Time" (1927). The ontological priority given to the concept of Dasein accrues from the importance that Heidegger attached to it. He felt that it was the Being-there, which should be studied in order to understand the Being itself.
From the Paper ?Martin Heidegger was a great German philosopher of the early twentieth century. He gave us some valuable concepts which are though important to the world of euphemism are still very complex to comprehend completely. I believe that a lot of confusion that we face today while trying to understand his work accrue partially from his work actually being complex and partly from the fact that German language has some terminologies which we are not able to grasp fully unless we are familiar with that language.?
Tags: being, ontology, knowledge, existence, logic, live
Abstract This paper summarizes Martin Heidegger's existential analysis of death, as set forth in his work "Being and Time," and then focuses on his claim that death is non-relational and realizes Dasein's utmost potential for being. The writer analyzes these aspects of death as possible sources of individuality for Dasein, and questions why Heidegger believes death is a completely individual experience. The writer extends Heidegger's arguments in order to answer some of the questions that his work evokes, and concludes that since these qualities of death can only be realized in life, they belong to the possibility rather than the actuality of death.
From the Paper "Heidegger begins his analysis by setting forth the problem of death as constitutive of Dasein's Being-a-whole. If death is the totality of Dasein's existence, the one point at which Dasein has extinguished its possibilities and we can "get a whole Dasein into our grasp" (281), then shouldn't this moment be realizable? Instead, the point of actual death is when Dasein ceases to be, and thus wholeness or completion cannot be realized, for Dasein no longer exists as Dasein. As Heidegger states it, "As long as Dasein is as an entity, it has never reached its 'wholeness'. But if it gains such 'wholeness', this gain becomes the utter loss of Being-in-the-world" (280)."
Abstract This paper examines Heidegger's description of factical life experience as attitudinal, in that it indifferently asserts relational meanings as significance. In comparison, it takes a look at his examination of how the Christian life experience stands indifferently towards such indifference. The paper points out that, in factical life, the surrounding world tends to dictate in its immediacy an attitude of the significance of objects that presupposes experience, whereas the Christian life experience of 'having become' inhabits a futurity that exists in both time and history in a manner that factical life cannot. The paper maintains that the primordial Christian lives both time and history in a manner which reduces the significances of factical life to incidental temporality. The paper concludes that this attitude engenders a sense of anguish in its oppositions, which reinforces itself as the 'how', or manner in which Dasein embraces being at the phenomenological point of experience.
From the Paper "Factical life experience is attitudinal in that its Dasein, or being-in-the-world, is determined by a relationship with experience that is presupposed by a web of significances, which refer solely to the surrounding material world. "'Attitude' is a relation to objects in which the conduct is absorbed in the material complex". There exists only an interest in the content, the matter that exists as the material component of experience, which draws the focus away from the experiential self. Attitude is as much a cognitive position toward the world as objects, as it is a dictation of the relationship to the material complex, not as self, but as an object dictated by the significances of the surrounding world. The 'how' of factical life is 'fallen' into because it 'worlds'; the attitude of significance it is not generated from Dasein, rather, it is a living in history. The attitude of significance subsumes the 'how' and hides the historicity of the material complex. History, as enacted by science, forms an objective material complex that factical life experience takes up as 'what actually happened'; a structure of attitudinal foreconceptions of objects which hold significance only with regard to the axiomatic foundations of science as enacted through history. Relational meaning and their enactment are directed by the surrounding world, instead of either being self-generated through Dasein or by the experience itself. Factical Dasein is inserted into factical life to secure itself either against, with, or for history, reducing both Dasein and history to the status of objects in service to factical life's attitudinal relationship to experience. "The concerned Dasein is only an object-segment from a great whole object (from the entire objective historical happening)". Living-in-the-world is constructed objectively in a historical context that is re-interpreted by the tendency of life to 'fall away' attitudinally into preconceptions of objects as significance."
Abstract This paper examines Martin Heidegger's view, in his essay "Plato's Sophist", of the Aristotelian concepts of "conscience" and "know-how". The paper points out that Heidegger delimits these concepts as modes of disclosure, to reveal the manner in which their deliberation of beings relates to their agent and his experience of "being in the world". "Know-how" concerns itself primarily with the production of objects as form, which are then removed from its sphere of influence to realize their being through proper use. "Conscience" takes as its object life itself, and its dileberations of "excellence" are integrated into the agent. The paper maintains that, according to Heidegger, this creates a transparency of action and "being in the world" (Dasein) that must constantly reassert itself to resist life's natural tendency toward concealment. The paper concludes that the fundamental difference between these two modes of disclosure can be seen in their relationship to "excellence" and the manner in which their products are manifested.
From the Paper "The characteristic of excellence ( ) finds its expression differently in (know-how) and (conscience), revealing a primary distinction between these two modes of disclosure. While both direct themselves toward the becoming of beings which 'may be otherwise', stands beside ( ) its productions, whereas integrates its productions. Excellence ( ) is to manifest the perfection inherently possible to beings, which requires a degree of certitude. T finds this possible, within its limits of disclosure, while can never have such. Though the authentic being of an object is inaccessible to because it does not participate in its use, perfection of form ( ) may be reached through its fundamental methodology. As a set of principles drawn from a multiplicity of experiences, the process of trial and error creates a certainty that the form ( ) has achieved its maximum potential. As with the scientific method, the more experiments that reinforce a theory, the more accurate a representation of reality it is assumed to be. Any error results in a reworking of the theory to include such information, therefore increasing its accuracy ( ). "But in the case of , on the contrary, where it is a matter of a deliberation whose theme is the proper Being of Dasein, every mistake is a personal shortcoming". Errors do not open up the possibility of a higher degree of knowledge; rather, they are a complete corruption of proper being. Every deliberation of is in the form of an either/or proposition: it cannot have an end ( ) of excellence ( ) because it is excellence ( ) in its constant becoming. "The [origin] with which has to do is the action itself. And the which is taken into consideration in is the action itself". Thus, within , that which is uncovered remains uncovered through the constant struggle which orients it always toward its continuous expression in the actions ( ) of authentic Dasein. Conscience may be distorted by the desires and their usurpation of Dasein, but it can never be forgotten."
Abstract This paper discusses and compares Martin Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of human existence and St. Anselm's ontological argument on the existence of God. The writer describes the concept of "dasein," or "being," and the special meanings that Heidegger assigned to it. The writer explains how Heidegger saw being as preceding knowing and how his argument progresses to the conclusion that the being of "dasein" is time. St. Anselm, on the other hand, begins with a negative proposition and uses logic to deduce the existence of God. The writer concludes that while St. Anselm derives everything else from the generalization of God's existence from logic, Heidegger finds it nearly impossible to even completely understand the concept of being.
Outline:
Heidegger
St. Anselm
Comparison
From the Paper "St. Anselm advanced that since God is that, than which nothing greater can be thought, He must necessarily exist in reality (Kent 2006). His ontological argument was in the form of a deduction ad absurdum. It presents a hypothesis, which presents unacceptable or non-valid consequences, which make the hypothesis false. He argues that God is that "than which no greater can be conceived" and sets it in conflict with the hypothesis that God does not exist. If the hypothesis is accepted or valid, then nothing imaginable can be greater than God. It also argues that a God that exists is greater than a God that does not exist."
Abstract An examination of the work "The Meaning of Being" by Heidegger and his philosophies on the question of being and the meaning of being. The author examines the works of Dasein and analyzes Heidegger's meaning of fundamental ontology and existential analytic and his distinction between existential analysis and ontological inquiry.
From the Paper ?Heidegger begins his magisterial work, Being and Time, with the claim that the question of Being, and specifically the questioning of and into the "meaning of Being" that his philosophical work seeks to inaugurate in the form of an existential hermeneutics, must begin from Dasein. "Fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein"
Abstract This paper examines Sartre's "Being and Nothingness" and how he portrays the nature of consciousness and material reality. The paper looks at this nature by way of Sartre's early works that have a bearing on these issues, including "Being and Nothingness", "The Psychology of Imagination", and "Nausea". The paper points out that Sartre relied very heavily on the categories of Heidegger's "Being and Time" and thus considers how Heidegger would assess the Sartrean 'en-soi'.
From the Paper "There is the common-place acknowledgement that Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness is an interpretation of Martin Heidegger's discussions of anxiety, guilt, death, and temporality in Being and Time. Indeed, Sartre's debt to Heidegger is substantial. For example, Heidegger's Dasein, inauthenticity, and facticity (or thrownness) become Sartre's pour-soi, bad faith, and contingency, respectively."
Tags:dasein, etre, pour, soi, for, itself, conscious, subject, misinterpretations, existence
Abstract This paper discusses the similarities and differences between Carl Roger's phenomenal field Concept, the existentialist vision of Desein as applied by Martin Heidegger, and George Kelly's personal construct theory.
Tags: Phenomenal, Field, Dasein, (existentialist), Personal, Construct, Theory
