Abstract This paper examines the Vietnam Phoenix program and discusses whether the Phoenix program was successful and the problems that were associated with it. It specifically discusses the lessons that can be learned for counterinsurgency from the years 1967 to 1972 and then goes on to examine how these lessons can be applied to the War in Iraq.
Table of Contents:
Abstract
Introduction
Research Question
Scope and Significance
Summation
Thesis Overview
Literature Review
The Phoenix Program in Vietnam
Methodology
Data and Findings
Lessons Learned from Phoenix
Conclusions/Recommendations
Applications for Iraq
From the Paper "The lesson learned from Phoenix and from the Vietnam War in general was that the open airing of the ugly side of war is to be avoided at all costs, and yet the Abu Ghraib offenders seem to have never learned this particular lesson. Moving forward from this discussion the U.S. must come up with a comprehensive plan to regain the trust of the Muslim world. The U.S. must disunite a previously fractured system of groups, who united on the idealism of the high level of morality that is stressed in the Islamic faith, all without further dividing the many factions that will eventually have to live together in a unified nation, if that is still in the cards. It is for this reason that the humanitarian lessons of the Phoenix Program must be reiterated even further, as well as the need to win back the hearts and minds of those Iraqis not interested in further strife and insurgent attacks. Another lesson that was learned during the Phoenix Program was an essential need to rely on the civic system to relate information and understanding regarding the history and intentions of each group. Armed militias, not unlike those in North Vietnam, assert power and influence through coercion and violence and demand infrastructural support from the region in which they work, similar to the VC. The lesson here is being that state-building and realistic infrastructural support systems must be built in these regions, for lasting change to become effected."
Tags:counterinsurgency power military, human rights
Abstract This paper explains that, according to linguist Noam Chomsky, the government of the United States is a terrorist state because it participates in activities that (1) involve violent acts or endanger human life, which is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State and (2) appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. The author uses examples such as World War I, Vietnam, Indonesia, the U.S. involvement in Central America and Turkey receiving 80 percent of its arms from the U.S. to launch its counterinsurgency campaign. The paper relates that Chomsky uses his linguistic skills to indict the United States government for its use of constructed ideals to create the appearance of correctness for the crimes committed against humanity.
From the Paper "Chomsky voices his surprise that the September 11 events had a rather abrasive effect on the American people. Indeed, there is a tendency towards more critical consideration of issues that were previously accepted without question. These include the U.S. role in the Middle East and local issues relating to human rights and freedoms. The press of course is attempting to suppress this upsurge of protest by denying it. Chomsky however cites a variety of examples of demands for talks, the engagement of audiences and the sale of books promoting the idea that the government is engaging in terrorist activities that should be addressed if indeed the American way of life is to be preserved."
Abstract The paper contends that American policy failed to prevent a communist takeover in South Vietnam. The paper explains that American military strategy was flawed due to its overemphasis on search and destroy missions and its neglect of counterinsurgency or pacification in South Vietnam.
From the Paper "This research paper examines the policies and strategies pursued by the United States during the Vietnam War, the reasons why they failed and possible alternatives. Directly or indirectly, the United States was militarily involved in Vietnam for roughly a quarter century. American policy was to contain worldwide communist expansion and in particular to prevent a communist takeover of South Vietnam by communist North Vietnam and Vietcong in the South."
Tags: search, destroy, policy, American, response, insurgency, pacification, Military
Abstract This paper refers to the contrasting accounts of the Mau Mau Revolt of 1952-1960 that hastened the independence of Kenya at the terrible price of a civil war and brutal British counterinsurgency campaign. It then discusses economic origins and Marxist historians' views, and examines the dimensions of Kenya's numbers who accepted or supported British rule, demanded a gradual devolution of power and maintained respect for institutions.
From the Paper "The Mau Mau Uprising of 1952-1960, sharpened conflict between Kenya's European settlers and the Home Office in Britain that would bring Kenya's independence in 1963. The rebellion is a reminder of how colonial movements of the kind were often always well developed, ideologically, even as their heroes stay in popular memory as people involved in a noble campaign for freedom. The Mau Mau featured various contrasts in a unique movement that grew from an unique Kenyan environment. "
Abstract This paper reviews and discusses the School of the Americas, the secret school that trains assassins. According to the paper, the School of the Americas has been instructing Latin American military officers in the art of counter-insurgency warfare since 1946.
From the Paper "It is a wonder then that the modern expression of outrage over the abuses that are taking place as we speak and as a direct outgrowth of the contradictions of policy that allow the SOA to remain a viable institution, are so wide spread. The official record of the US has largely remained unchallenged, not surprising given that the nation and its official organizations have actively distanced themselves from open violations in the past. Yet, now, as many who protest the SOA feared such official denials have come to the public attention in the form of abuse in modern war death camps. "
