This paper compares and contrasts the United States' invasion into Iraq with the war in Vietnam. The paper looks at the two wars from strategic or operational viewpoints, as well as war aims and military strength. It then looks at the principles and motives of war, as well as the troop numbers and casualties. The paper suggests that more differences than similarities seem to exist between the two experiences.
From the Paper:
"While the differences far outweigh the similarities between these two conflicts, still we cannot deny that Vietnam does have significance for this ongoing war. What we have discussed so far should not allow us to conclude that war in Iraq is much easier than it was in Vietnam. Though North Vietnamese were a formidable force and Iraq is a much weaker enemy, still America has many odds against it which can make even this conflict an embarrassing symbol of failure. For one, America doesn't have public support any longer. People are aggressively forcing the government to pull out from Iraq. This can have a far reaching implication on US already feeble attempts at building a stable democracy in Iraq."
Sample of Sources Used:
Harry G. Summers, Jr., Vietnam War Almanac, New York: Facts on File Publications, 1985, p. 113.
Quoted in Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam, New York: W. W. Norton, 1982, p. 92.
Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002, p. 238.
Spencer C. Tucker, ed., Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 64.
Richard K. Betts, "Interests, Burdens, and Persistence: Asymmetries Between Washington and Hanoi," International Studies Quarterly, December 1980, p. 523.