Nagel's Critique of Belief and Desire

Paper Summary:

This paper discusses "The Possibility of Altruism," by Thomas Nagel, focusing on three major parts of his critique of the traditional theories of prudential behavior, which are based on the belief/desire model of practical reason. The writer argues that these objections involve an arbitrary distinction between "reasons" and "desires" and a simplification of terms which are really interconnected and complex. The writer demonstrates that Nagel's use of the term "desire" changes according to his goals, which often leads to a trivializing of the word. The paper concludes that Nagel's critique relies on assumptions about the term "desire" which do not take into account its subtleties, and thus his objections seem more like issues of language than problems of motivation.

From the Paper:

"Nagel's first attacks the idea that a reason is capable of motivating only if there is a prior desire which causes this reason: "my own future interest can provide me with...a reason capable of motivating only if a desire for that object is present in me at the time" (28). He objects to this picture of practical reason because if I lack the relevant desire, I have no reason to act, and the system is no longer normative. Moreover, he believes that the requirement of a prior desire is trivial and unnecessary. Even if a desire for future happiness accompanies all prudential action, it is not necessarily the cause of this action. Nagel contends that this desire can be caused by the practical reason in the same way that the motivation towards action is (30)."

More papers on Nagel's Critique of Belief and Desire:

• Analytical Essay # 32851 : "An Analysis of the Works of Shakespeare and Plato"
• Analytical Essay # 127211 : "Friendship in "Of Mice and Men"
• Book Review # 139941 : "Fear and Desire "Dracula"

APA Citation:

MLA Citation: